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This thesis is a theoretical analysis. It attempts 
to address the pr6blem of how to coriceive the process 
by which, in certain cultures, a particular social. 
phenomenon, the stigmatisation of homosexuality, has 
powerful negative effects at the level of individual 
emotions. Individuals' abhorrence of their own 
homosexual desires, as well as individuals' abhorrence 
of the homosexuality of others, are considered. The 
answer provided is held to apply to both men and women. 
The problem is also addressed, within the same parameters, 
of how change from abhorrence to acceptance of homo-
sexuality is to be conceived with respect to the relation 
between social and individual phenomena. 
In order to develop an answer to these questions, rele-
vant aspects of appropriate theoretical frameworks are 
described and an integration of them developed. These 
frameworks are: Lacanian psychoanalysis, ·which provides 
an account of the individual subject's relation to the 
social; and a post-structuralist view of ideology, which 
analyzes the specific contributions made py the social 
phenomenon of ideology to the way the individual makes 
sense of the world. A particular aspect of ideology as 
unders~ood in this view is emphasised and developed. 
This is the importance ideology is unders.tood to give 
to the concepts "natu~al" and "unnatural". The 
ideological role of these concepts is then argued to 
provide a link, for the present purposes, between the 
psychoanalytic theory of the subject and the relevant 
iv 
theory of ideology. In this way a synthesis of the 
two theoretical areas, suitable for the present aims, 
is developed. 
This synthesis is then applied to the problem outlined 
above of making sense of homophobia (the abhorrence of 
homosexuality), and to the problem outlined above of 
making sense of the resolution of homophobia (the 
change to acceptance of homosexuality). The homophobic 
individual is argued to be best conceived of as trapped 
in a complex set of contradictions resulting from the 
collusion of unconscious strivings with the ideologically 
emphasised idea of what is natural. The resolution of 
homophobia is argued to be best conceived of as a 
resolution of the above-mentioned set of contradictions 
through modifications of the role given by ideology to 
the concepts of what is natural and unnatural. 
This conceptualisation of the synthesis of aspects of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and aspects of a theory of 
ideology is then suggested to have a variety of further 
applications of the type developed here. 
', 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis attempts to of fer at least part of an 
explanation of why it is that there exists a widespread 
abhorrence of homosexuality in Western cultures, such 
that people who come into contact with homosexuals 
experience a powerful feeling of aversion or dread, and 
such that almost all homosexuals themselves experience 
a powerful feeling of self-abhorrence upon discoverin~ 
homosexual desires within themselves. 
For the purposes of the thesis, homosexuality or 
homosexual desire will be defined as feelings of 
emotional and sexual attraction towards individuals of 
the same biological sex as the persoh experiencing the 
attraction. Such factors as exclusivity of homosexual 
or heterosexual desire, or the degree of preponderance 
of either in any given case, will not be considered 
here. The present concern is to describe the 
mechanisms by which the abhorrence occurs where i't 
occurs, so that the details of its incidence are 
largely irrelevant in this context. The fact that 
such abhorrence occurs at all is sufficient to justify 
the posing of the present question. "Homosexual" and 
"gay" will be used synonymously throughout. 
1.1 The Abhorrence of Homosexualitv 
There is a burgeoning literature which deals with the 
psychological and idealogical effects of the homo-
-2-
sexual label on homosexuals and on those who have 
contact with them directly or indirectly. It is 
clear from this literature that there is a general 
reaction of aversion to or abhorrence of homosexuality 
at some point in both cases (Bobys ~ Laner, 1979; 
Bullough, 1979; Cass, 1979; Coleman, 1982; Dank, 
1971; Goodyear, Abadie & Barquest, 1981; Hart & 




Lee, 1977; Malyon, 1982; 
Morin & Garfinkle, 1978; Morin & 
Weinberg, 1973). This abhorrence has 
been given the name "homophobia". Originally defined 
by Weinberg (1973) as "the dread of being in close 
quarters with homosexuals", it is now used to indicate 
any "negati~e attitude, belief, or action directed 
against homosexual persons" (Hudson & Rickets, 1980, 
p.357). These include "the responses of fear, disgust, 
anger, discomfort, and aversion" (ibid., p.358). 
This term will be used throughout the thesis, and 
purely as a descriptive term. It will refer both to 
the feelings of abhorrence experienced by gays in 
relation to their own homosexuality, and to the 
feelings of abhorrence experienced by those in direct 
and indirect contact with them. No reference to the 
psychoanalytic use of the term "phobia" is intended; 
this thesis is itself an attempt to provide a fresh 
explanation of the mechanism of this aversion to 
homosexuality. Clearly, a number of reactions are 
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covered by the present usage of homophobia (Mosher 
& O'Grady, 1979; San Miguel & Millham, 1977). The 
ensuing analysis, which does not pretend to be a 
complete account of homophobia, will explain aspects 
of some of these reactions. It will also help to 
clarify their mutual relations. This will be further 
discussed in Chapter Seven. 
The literature on homophobia is largely concerned 
with the variables which intensify or alleviate the 
psychological and ideological effects of the stigma, 
and tends to take as a starting point the fact that 
there is such a feeling of aversion associated with 
the label. Insofar as the aversive feeling has itself 
been explained, this has been done mainly by way of 
ad hoc hypotheses in the style of micro-sociological 
studies (Fein & Nuehring, 1981; Jacobs & Tedford, 1980; 
MacDonald & Garnes, 1974; Millharn & Weinbergeri 1977; 
Ross, 1978; San Miguel & Millharn, 1977; Storms, 1978; 
Weinberger & Millham, 1979). 
There are a few studies which attempt to explain the 
feeling of abhorrence towards homosexuality in terms 
of a systematic theory. Some of these are interaction-
ist in approach, of which the prime example is Plummer 
(1975) I and some are psychoanalytic (Hocquenghern, 1978; 
Mieli, 1980). 
1.2 The Interactionist Approach 
The interactionist approach is wanting in a number of 
respects. Firstly, it is at this stage more a 
. -4-
programme for research than a systematic explanation 
in its own right (PlummeJ:", 1981, p.75). Secondly, 
it is incapable of providing an explanation of homophobia 
beyond fairly crude levels of analysis. For symbolic 
interactionism is a theoretical framework based upon the 
assumptions
1
that human individuals or subjects act 
according to their perceptions of the meanings of the 
events and objects in their worlds; that these meanings 
are developed in interaction with other people; and that 
the perceived meanings may be renegotiated. These are 
the premises with which an interactionist account begins 
(Plummer, 1975, p.11). There is no means, therefore, 
within an interactionist framework, by which the 
ultimate nature of the interacting subjects can be 
analysed. For an unanalysed subject is always pre-
supposed in the application of the framework. A subject 
who can already perceive meanings is a precondition for 
the premises of the framework to be workable. This 
I 
thesis aims to demonstrate that a framework which can 
analyse the nature or constitution of the human subject 
in detail infuses an explanation of the mechanisms of 
homophobia with a wealth of useful detail. Such detail 
cannot be obtained by study undertaken within an inter-
actionist approach. The deficiency of the interactionist 
framework in this respect is therefore an important one. 
The psychoanalyt~c framework adopted in this thesis is 
certainly capable of providing a detailed analysis of 
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the subject. Furthermore, particularly following 
Lacan's contribution, psychoanalysis 9rovides a 
highly rigorous account of the relation of the 
individual to others, to society at large, and 
especially to language (Lacan, 1977a, passim.; 
Lemaire, 1977, passim.; Wilden, 1968, passim.). 
This clearly suggests its suitability in developing 
an account of the emotional effects of labelling. 
1.3 The Classical Psychoanalytic Approach 
The psychoanalytic literature on homosexuality, 
however, is almost entirely concerned with aetiology 
and "cure" (Bergler, 1958; Bieber et al., 1962; 
Freud, 1905, 1920, 1922; Hocquenghem, 1972; Kwawer, 
1980; Lachman, 1975; Masserman, 1969; S6carides, 1978, 
1979, 1981). The focus of such research is on treatment 
and change of the homosexual orientation, rather than on 
the nature and·effect of the value judgment made on it. 
Kwawer, writing in 1980, could state that 
"With the sole exception of Clara Thompson's 
contribution which held open the possibility 
of adaptive homosexual solutions to human 
problems of intimacy, self-esteem, and 
loneliness, psychoanalytic writers implicitly 
or expliriitly conclude that the goal of 
treatment with homosexuals is to change or 
cure the patient of homosexuality, which is 
seen as a psychiatric illness (pp.76-77). 
And although the American Psychiatric Association with-
• 
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drew the definition of homosexuality as a pathology 
in 1973 (Socarides, 1978), the controversy still 
rages amongst psychoanalysts and the majority of 
American psychiatrists still believe homosexuality 
to be pathological (Socarides, ibid., pp.424-425). 
It should be noted that in the United States psycho-
a~alysis and psychiatry are virtually indistinguishable 
(Fine, 1979, p.114ff.). 
The idea of pathology has been-used by such peb?le to 
account for homophobia in homosexuals themselves, as 
well as for the feeling of oppression or rejection they 
often experience after reiolving their self-abhorrence. 
;The homosexual, no matter what her/his 
~evel of adaptation and function in other 
areas of life, is severely handicapped in 
, I 
/'che most vital area - namely, that of her 
;interpersonal relations ••• She also harbours 
considerable aggression against both men and 
women while simultaneously is in deep need of 
affection and support so totally denied her 
in earliest childhood. 
Pathology, organically and psychologically, 
may be defined as a failure to function, with 
concomitant pain and/or suffering. Beneath 
this obvious failure of function and the 
secondary external conflicts it may provoke 
lie the agony, sorrow, tragedy, fear and 
-?-
guilt of both conscious and unconscious nature 
which pervades the homosexual's life 
(Socarides, 1981, p.510). 
The classical psychoanalytic view of homophobia will 
be criticised here on several grounds. Firstly, there 
is disagreement in the psychoanalytic community 
itself on this issue, so that there is room for another 
opinion.. Secondly, a great deal of research suggests 
that the above-described classical psychoanalytic view 
is.invalid. Thirdly, the· assertion of pathology does 
not sufficiently explain homophobia, for both empirical 
and theoretical reasons. 
The view that pathology is intrinsic to homosexuality 
and so,explains homophobia is not unanimously held in . . . 
the psychdanalytic community. "Wiedeinan's.review of 
psychoanalytic literature through the mid-1960s 
concludes that 'there is no agreement that·a specific 
I 
libidinal fixation accounts for' (p.394) homosexuality, 
and there is no ~sirlgle genetic or structural oattern 
that would apply to all or even a major. part of cases •.. '· 
(p.405)" (Kwawer, 1980, p. 75). The review cited here by 
Kwawer refers to Wiedeman (1964), Other psychoanalysts 
who support this acknowledgement are Lachman (1975), 
Mitchell (1978) and Spitzer (1981). 
The existence of such disagreement in the psychoanalytic 
community in itself justifies the development of an 
explanation of homophobia other than that of its beina 
an automatic consequence of pathology. 
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There is, moreover, a great deal of research that 
shows no detectable pathology specific to homosexuals 
or differentiating them from heterosexu~ls, least of 
all fear and guilt in interpersonal relations (Barr 
& Catts, 1974; Coleman, 1978; Freedman, 1975; 
Freud; 1905, 1920, 1925, 1930, 1951; Gonsiorek, 
1982; · Oberstone & Sukoneck, i97~; Siegelman, 1978, 
1979; Silverstein, 1976). This research also supports 
the finding cited above that homosexuality cannot even 
be regarded as a clinical entity about which such 
clinical generalisations as Socarides' may be made 
(FitzGerald, 1977; Hooker, 1969; Plummer, 1975, p.56ff; 
Wiedeman, 1964) • 
..... : 
Only •. a part of this research demonstrating the relative 
health of.gays is psychoanalytic; "We believe •.•• 
psychoanalytic treatment need not .require or even desire 
that homosexual persons become heterosexual •.• The 
aopropriate·and mature development of the individual's 
particular sexual orientatioh is our aim" (Herron, 
Kinter, Bollinger & Trubowitz, 1980, p.403). The rest 
of the research is not undertaken in the analytic 
session, and therefore comes out of a different methodology 
to the psychoanalytic research being criticised here. It 
therefore probably contributes nothing to an understanding 
of unconscious dynamics and so may not be used to refute 
the psychoanalytic findings directly. But this does not 
make it insignificant. For it is possible, and, indeed, 
necessary, to distinguish "the pursuit of understanding 
of psychodyrtamics from the medico-moral diagnostic enter-
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prise" (Kwawer, op. cit., p.73). 
To put this differently, the "assumption that an 
individual's sexual orientation is caused, i.e., that 
it has roots and a developmental course, does not imply 
in itself that such development is pathological" (Herron 
et al., op. cit., p.396). The same assertion is argued 
by Lachman (1975), Mitchell (1978) and Spitz.er (1981), 
who point out that evaluation of behaviour and feelings 
as pathological can only be made on the basis of 
present functioning, not on the basis of aetiology. 
This confusion, between establishing a psychodynamics 
for homosexuality - such as has also been established 
for heterosexuality - on the one hand, and establishing 
homosexuality as pathological, on the other, is to be 
found in Socarides and almost the entire body of psycho-
analytic literature of which he is representative in his 
confusion. Referring to the removal of the pathological 
classification from homosexuality, Socarides mentions 
"The change~ ••. rendering chaotic fundamental truths about 
unconscious psychodynamics as well as the interrelation-
ship between anatomy and psychosexual identity" (1978, 
p.414). He has clearly conflated the fact of aetiology 
with the value judgment of pathology. 
This is where the extensive non-psychoanalytic research, 
showing homosexuality to be as non-pathological a 
condition as heterosexuality, becomes significant. For, 
as Kwawer puts is, "the interpretation is a choice from 
a complicated range of human reactions to a patient, a 
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choice of what strikes one personally as the most 
significant feature to comment on. Thus .•. how an 
analyst thinks about homosexuality is necessarily also 
a statement of countertransference" (op. cit., pp.73-74). 
And the oositive outcomes of research into homosexual 
health vis-A-vis heterosexual health suggest that 
analysts are motivated to judge homosexuality as 
pathological by homophobia rather than the findings of 
their own research or the implications of their 
theoretical framework. 
Furthermore, even assuming that that part of the 
psychoanalytic literature which asserts that homosex-
uality is pathological is correct, this would still 
not be sufficient to explain homophobia in the homo-
sexual, let alone in others who are merely in contact 
with homosexuals. Let us assume for the moment that 
Bieber and his associates are correct in saying that "All 
psychoanalytic theories assume that adult homosexuality 
is psychopathologic" (1962, p.18) and that homosexuality 
is "a pathologic, biosocial, psychosexual adaptation 
consequent to pervasive fears surrounding the expression 
of heterosexual impulses. In our view, every homosexual 
is, in reality, a "latent" heterosexual; hence we 
expected to find evidences of heterosexual stri~ings 
among the homosexual patients of our study" (ibid., p.220, 
insertion added). The psychopathological nature of 
homosexuality only has meaning if it expresses itself in 
the lives of homosexuals. It is clear that the fact of 
homosexuality itself is expressed in homosexual life-
-n:-
styles. "The obligatory homosexual is unable to 
function in .•• the male-female sexual union and the 
affective state of love~ tenderness, and joy with 
a partner of the opposite sex" (Socarides, 1981, p.511). 
But it does not follow from this that homosexuals are 
incapable of living a life in every way as satisfactory 
to them as heterosexual life is satisfying to hetero-
sexuals. When Socarides calls the above description of 
heterosexual love "the most meaningful relationship in 
life" (ibid.), and implies that a partner "of the 
opposite sex" is essential for the experience of "the 
affective state of love, tenderness, and joy", he is 
clearly making a value judgment for which psychoanalytic 
theory provides no basis, and which the above-cited 
research on the relative health of gays invalidates. 
Indeed, even if research affirming the relative health 
of homosexuals did not exist, psychoanalytic research 
and theory would expose the above value judgment for 
the arbitrary importation of a moral standpoint that it 
is. For psychoanalysis above all demonstrates that human 
life is generally characterised by deeply rooted 
unconscious fears, as in the fear of incest and the 
fear of castration (Lacan, 1977a, p.323). But few 
people suggest that we ought to regard the inability to 
commit incest as morally and functionally reprehensible, 
simply because it is born of "pervasive fears surrounding 
the expression of .... impulses" (Bieber et al, ibid.). 
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Furthermore, many heterosexuals are incapable of 
functioning in the male-male or the female-female 
sexual union and experiencing the affective state 
of love, tenderness, and joy with a partner of the 
same sex. And this incapacity is sometimes the 
result of an unconscious fear, such as the fear of 
castration. Freud himself points out how difficult 
it is in analysis "to convince a man that a passive 
attitude to men does not always signify castration" 
(1937a, pp.251-252). But few people suggest that this 
incapacity to function because of deep-rooted fears is 
morally and functionally reprehensible simply by virtue 
of its aetiology. 
One of the exceptions to this restraint in denigrating 
heterosexuality is Mieli (1980) . "The objective of 
educastration is the transformation of the infant, in 
tendency polymorphous and 'perverse', into a hetero-
sexual adult, erotically mutilated but conforming to 
the Norm" (p.24). And, 
Male bonding is the grotesque expression of 
a paralysed and unspoken homosexuality, 
which can be grasped, in the negative, in 
the denial of women, whom they speak of 
phallocratically, without any genuine 
consideration, reducing them to a hole, i.e. 
to something that does not exist (p.127). 
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Freud himself repeatedly maintained that a homosexual 
lifestyle is eminently viable. 
Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage, 
but it is nothing to be ashamed of, no vice, 
no degradation, it cannot be classified as 
an illness; we consider it to be a 
variation of the sexual function produced 
by a certain arrest of sexual development ••• 
If he is unhappy, neurotic, torn by conflicts, 
inhibited in his social life, analysis may 
bring him harmony, peace of mind, full 
efficiency, whether he remains homosexual 
or gets changed (1951, p.786). 
Similar remarks may be found in, inter alia, Freud 
1905 (p.138), 1920 (p.150), 1925 (p.38), and 1930 
(p.104). As Kwawer puts it, "Freud's self-awareness 
stands in marked contrast to the absence of self-
scrutiny in some subsequent psychoanalytic writings 
about homosexuality .•• which are insensitive to the 
countertransferential ~mplications of what is proposed" 
(op. cit., p. 74). 
Some psychoanalysts themselves assert that it is not 
the actual effects on the homosexual's life that make 
her/his sexual preference notably pathological, but its 
psychodynamic peculiarity. Present functioning of the 
individual is seen to be irrelevant in evaluating 
pathology; aetiology is what counts. 
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The theoretical orientation ••. that 
preferential homosexuality results from 
disordered psycho-sexual.development, is 
essential to distinguishing that which 
is clinically significant in adolescent 
homosexual behaviour. If homosexuality 
were no more than an alternative way of life, 
one would be concerned clinically only with 
the factors affecting the individual's 
capacity to live comfortably and healthily 
with his homoerotic object choice 
(Gadpaille, 1969, p.63). 
But once homosexuality is considered clinically 
important only because of "disordered psycho-sexual 
development", then it is clear from the above 
discussion that it is considered clinically important 
by an externally.imposed value judgment and not by 
virtue of meaningful effects on the homosexual's life. 
Thus the assertion. that homosexuality is pathological 
gives insufficient grounds to account for homo~hobia in 
self and others, since contentment and homosexuality 
are quite compatible. That heterosexuality is 
essential for happy or self-accepting being is a~ 
assumption, as Storr (1964, p.83), for one, admits. 
And it is an assumption which all the evidence indicates 
is invalid. "In our listening experience so far, we 
have not found the 'happy homosexual'. Nor, for that 
matter.have we had much luck in finding the 'happy 
heterosexual' either" (Herron et al., op. cit., p.396). 
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1.4 Lacan and the Present Approach in Contrast to Classical 
Psychoanalysis 
Lacan himself is strongly opposed to the oremises which 
make the condemnation of "deviant development" possible. 
He has "major differences with contemporary ego psycho-
logists .•. in that he does not recognize the ego as the 
centre of the perception/consciousness system, or as an 
autonomous agency, or as the psychic representative of 
the reality principle. The ego, for Lacan, is a construct ••. 
the rigid mold into which man pours his alienated identity" 
(Evans, 1979). Thus adaptation to society via the reality 
testing of the strengthened ego .is no~ supported by Lacan's 
psychoanalysis. In Lacan's words, speaking of the ego and 
analytic therapy, 
For if its health is defined by its adaptation 
to a reality that is regarded quite simply as 
being suited to it, and if you need the co-
operation of the "healthy part of the ego" in 
order to reduce, in the other part no doubt, 
incompatibil~ties with reality ••. is it not 
clear that there is- no other way of distin-
~uishing the healthy part of the subject's ego 
than by its agreement with your point of view, 
which, in order to be regarded as healthy, 
becomes the measure of things, just as there 
· .·is no other criterion of cure than the complete 
adoption by the subject of this measure of 
yours (1977a, p.135). 
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It will be assumed in this thesis, therefore, that 
abhorrence of homosexuality does not ;l:ollow_auto-
matically upon the existence of homosexuality, but 
requires explanation. Indeed, even if the psycho-
analytic literature cited above were not confused 
but correct in regarding homosexuality as naturally 
abominable or abhorrent, there would still be room 
for additional explanation, since psychoanalysis 
leaves room for over-determination of human phenomena. 
In Lacan's words, 
By ref erring only to the development of 
the organism, the typology fails to 
recognize •.• the structure in which the 
subject is caught up respectively in 
phantasy, in drive, in sublimation. I 
am at present developing the theory of_ 
this structure (note 1966) (1977a, p.177, 
insertion in original). 
The present attempt to describe the mechanisms of 
homophobia is not so much given justification by 
the above arguments, therefore, as shown to be 
vitally needed in addition to being justified. This 
will be supported in Lacanian terms in the a~propriate 
chapter (Chapter Five, sections 5.1 and 5.2). 
1.5 Radical Psychoanalysis 
There are two psychoanalytic works which addres~ 
themselves to the problem of homophobia. The first 
is by Hocquenghem (1978). This emerges from the 
-17'-
explicitly and radically subversive, post-Lacanian 
perspective of Deleuze and Guattari (1977), so that 
its arguments support aims extraneous to those of 
this thesis. The same problem applies in the case 
of the other major psychoanalytic work, by Mieli 
(1980). Both writers account for homophobia in terms 
of repressed homosexuality in the homophobe, but this 
does not account for the rejection of homosexuality by 
those in whom it is not repressed, although possibly 
latent, that is, homosexuals or latent homosexuals 
themselves. It is in fact the very desire to repress 
or deny that requires explanation. 
1.6 Details of the Present Approach 
This thesis will therefore involve a s~ecific and more 
detailed exploration of the mechanisms of homophobia 
than has so far been attempted. Where other work on 
the topic has dealt with the social functions served ~Y 
the stigmatisation of homosexuality, and the detailed 
t 
ways in which such stigmatisation is experienced and 
dealt with, this work will attempt to describe the 
mechanism by which the experience of abhorrence is 
aroused with such force by the categorisation. This 
account, that is, attempts to provide an expla,natory 
link between the social processes through which homo-
sexual stigmatisation occurs, and the orocesses by 
which phenomena become emotionally significant to 
individuals. 
-18-
Once this has been done, the resulting conceptualisation 
will be applied to the process of change from 
abhorrence to acceptance of homosexuality in self and 
others. Such acceotance clearly does occur. There is 
a large body of work demonstrating such a transition to 
acceptance, which includes the references cited earlier 
on the relative health of homosexuals as well as the 
following references: Cass (1979), Coleman (1982), 
Dank (1971), Jacobs and Tedford (1980), Lee (1977), 
MacDonald (1982), Troiden (1979). 
In attempting this description of the mechanisms of 
homophobia and its resolution, Lacanian psychoanalysis 
is a peculiarly appropriate framework within which to 
work. As mentioned earlier; Lacan emphasizes the 
relation of the individual to others, to society at 
large, and to the symbolic formations in that society, 
most crucially that of language. This clearly provides 
a suitable framework within which to consider the 
I 
effects on the individual of such a symbolic act as 
placing him/her in a stigmatising c~tegory~ 
For it is only after the linguistic analysis 
of the phenomenon of language that one can 
legitimately establish the relation that it 
constitutes in the subject, and at the same 
time delimit the order of the "machines" 
(in the purely associative sense that this 
term possesses in the mathematical theory of 
networks) that may realize this phenomenon 
(Lacan, 1977a, p.187). 
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Furthermore, the importance of language in the 
Lacanian framework allows an understanding of the 
ways in which language itself operates to be brought 
to bear on the topic. In particular, ideology, 
insofar as it operates through language, will be 
shown to be of great importance in answering the 
question at hand. A particular conce~tion of ideology 
will be adopted here, because of its elucidation of 
the concepts "natural" and "unnatural", which are self-
evidently relevant to the topic of aversion to homo-
sexuality. This conception is that of some post-
Althusserian theorists of ideology, notably Barthes 
(1972a), Bennett (1979), and Coward and Ellis (1977). 
The aim of this thesis, then will be to combine a 
r 
psychoanalytic perspective with an ideological perspective 
in explaining why homosexuality arouses such a powerful 
abhorrence in some of those to whom it may be attributed 
and in some of those directly or indirectly asso9iated 
with or in contact with them, in Western cultures. 
Such a synthesis of Lacanian psychoanalysis .and 9ost-
Althusserian theory of ideology has already been 
attempted and perhaps achieved by the group of writers 
associated with the French journal Tel Quel, and, 
indeed, sketched by Althusser himself (197lb). The 
most important of these for our purposes is Julia Kristeva 
(1980), and an introduction to their collective contri-
bution is to be found in Coward and Ellis (1977). Their 
synthesis has, however, been established for different 
purposes to the present ones, the purposes of literary 
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criticism, and consequently different aspects both 
of Lacan and of post-Althusserian theory of ideology 
-
have been emphasised. The synthesis of the two 
theoretical areas has therefore been argued afresh 
here, and aspects of Lacan and post-Althusserian 
ideological theory emphasised and elaborated which 
are more appropriate to the aims of this thesis. 
Thus, in the chapter on Lacan's theory of the consti-
tution of the human subject, his view that the subject 
may only be con~eived of in the same way a& a linguistic 
unit, the signifier, will be emphasised. So will his 
view that the subject cannot help conceiving itself in 
a way antithetical to this true state of affairs. A 
great deal more detail will be given, but almost all of 
this will be given only in order to allow an understanding 
of the views outlined. above, and in order to clarify the 
meaning and use of Lacan's terminology. It will therefore 
be specified where the matter under discussion in that 
t 
chapter is not centrally important to the thesis, and 
serves rather to exolain or give a context for the matter 
which is of central importance. Only a small fraction of 
what Lacan has to say, then, is takeri Up and used here. 
Similarly, in the chapter on ideology, the general 
operation of ideology, insofar as it operates through 
language, and the role of the concepts of the "natural" 
and the "unnatural" will be elaborated. The linguistic 
dimension of ideology will be considered in terms of 
-language only insofar as language is relevant to Lacan's 
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conceptualisation of the human subject. Almost 
everything else which the relevant theorists of 
ideology have to say will be explicitly ignored. 
There are many highly controversial areas in this 
field, some of which will have indirect bearing on 
the arguments laid out here. But if the various 
possible viewpoints in each of the controversial 
areas were given due consideration in thinking through 
the present analysis of homophobia, this thesis would 
be many times its present length, and, indeed, would 
deal less with its present psychological topic than 
with sociological or historical materialist to?ics. 
The best that can be done, then, given that one must 
start somewhere, is to specify which assumptions have 
been taken as premises, which assumptions are 
irrelevant here though they may be crucial considera-
tions in other contexts, and where this conceptualisa-
tion articulates with the conceptualisations of other 
theoretical areas. All of this will be attem9ted. 
1.7 Some Notes on a View of Science 
The last point mentioned in the preceding section, the 
articulation with other theoretical areas, will be 
pertinent thro~ghout the thesis. It will allow work 
which tests the assumptions on which this work is based, 
to feed back into this conce~tualisation and support or 
correct it. And it will allow the rigour of this work, 
insofar as it is valid, to feed back into the areas from 
which it derives, and the areas to which it is adjacent, 
to correct and refine them. 
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Fcir the scientific value of this theoretical type 
of thesis does not lie solely in its validity as 
a description'of reality. It lies rather in its 
epistemological consistency and rigour, its ability 
to make the world intelligible in a systematic way. 
This is why at bottom Lacan is preferable in the 
present view to interactionism. And this view, 
indeed, is the broadly structuralist or semiotic 
view of science proper both to Lacan and to some of 
Althusser's successors. 
What is structuralism? Before being 
a philoso~hy, as some tend to see it, it 
is a method of analysis ••. one could say a 
structure is a combination and relation 
of formal elements which reveal their 
logical coherence within given objects 
of analysis (Ehrmann, 1970, p.ix). 
I 
Interactionism leaves the human subject irreducible 
to analysis, whereas Lacan:'s psychoanalysis makes the 
subject eminently accessible to analysis. This does 
not make Lacan's framework correspond more closely to 
reality than that of the interadtionists. But it 
does make parts of the world intelligible where inter-
actionism does not. Thus it is Lacan's epistemological 
sophistication which makes him scientifically more 
respectworthy in the oresent view, rather than the 
correspondence of his theory to reality. 
This is n~t to say that a theory may be scientifically 
acceptable which has no relation to the world whatsoever. 
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It must, on the contrary, make the world intelligible, 
and therefore must not be in more than apparent 
contradiction with the phenomena of the world. But 
there is always more than one construction that can 
be put on phenomena, each of which constructions may 
correspond equally well to the world. It is at that 
point that the present view of science becomes pertinent, 
that is, the extension of the world's intelligibility 
through epistemological rigour. 
The idea that reality may be empirically explored in an 
unequivocal way is what ~Le~i~Strauss~c~lls·•~tetile 
empiricism', that is, the notion that the 'real' world 
consists of a single undeniable reality" (Hawkes, 1977, 
p.55). 
Structural anthropology opens the door to 
the notion that all societies construct 
their own realities in accordance with 
mental or psychological principles that 
determine form and function, and that they 
then covertly project these .upon whatever 
the real world may in fact be (ibid., p.56). 
The scientist is not exem9t from constructing reality. 
"Nor should we ever forget that in science established 
truths do not exist. The scientist does not supply 
true answers; rather he asks true questions" (Levi-
Strauss, 1970, p.40). Finallyj Lacan's word on the 
matter is that - speaking of the world signified by 
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language, which gives the world meaning for the 
scientist who studies it -
The dominant factor here is the unity of 
signification, which proves never to be 
resolved into a true indication of the 
real, but always refers back to another 
signification. That is to say, the 
signification is realized only on the 
basis of a grasp of things in their 
totality (1977a, p.126). 
The phenomena, that is, always underdetermine the 
construal that may be made of them, so that the 
internal consistency of the theory or construal and 
its consistency with other theoretical areas, becomes 
the means of assessing its scientific worth. 
Thus the scientific value of this theoretical thesis 
lies in its susceptibility to the refinement of its 
I 
epistemological premises by the contributions of work 
in other theoretical areas, and in the contribution 
it may make to the epistemological refinement of such 
other work, because of the detailed working through 
of the logical implications of its own premises. In 
this way the conceptual equipment with which the world 
is made intelligible is perpetually sophisticated by 
being tested in many diff~rent and related applications. 
This has already been the case for a long time in 
linguistics, anthropology, historical materialism, 
psychoanalysis, mathematics, and· so on, as any anthology 
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of structuralist works will testify (De George & 
De George, 1972; Ehrmann, 1970; Hawkes, 1977; 
Kristeva, 1980; M~bksey & Donato, 1972). 
The related point may be made that different levels 
of analysis, eveQ within the same field of research, 
can fruitfully be articulated in the same way. The 
present account offers only one very specifically 
limited level of analysis of the experience of 
homophobia. In any concrete case a great number of 
considerations other than the ones dealt with here 
would have to be adduced to provide a full or even 
satisfactory explanation of homophobia. Individual 
life-histories, particular ?Sychodynamic configurations 
in the individual which make for, for example, especially 
low or high tolerance for gender ambiguities or familial 
rejection, the greater or lesser threat to occupational 
security, and a host of other factors will certainly play 
a part in each particular case of homophobia. But there 
is only space here to deal systematically with one level 
' 
of analysis, one of the factors to be taken into account. 
And only by dealing systematically with one level, and 
thinking it through in detail to its logical conclusions, 
can it serve as an elaboration useful in the sense that 
it can provide a test of the consistency of its own 
concepts and premises, which can in turn feed in to 
refine the consistency of other levels of analy~is, and 
which can be rigorously tested by their separat~ 
elaborations. This is strictly analogous to the 
articulation of adjacent theoretical areas discussed 
•· 
above. It is to the degree that limitation and 
J 
.. ·, .. 
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specificity of focus are maintained, that a 
theoretical elaboration has useful bearing on other 
levels and in other areas of analysis. 
As Goldmann puts it, 
In order to conduct a scientific study, 
I must first make distinctions. It is 
impossible to make an analysis of or to 
est~blish a dialectic fro~ a mixture •.• 
If I am studying Jansenism .•• I know very 
well that each individual .Jansenist belongs 
to numerous other g.roups ~ but what interests 
me, in analysing the Jansenist group is 
whether what they have in common, in . . 
comparison to what separates them, will allow 
me to understand certain patterns of 
behaviour which result precisely from the _ 
fact that they are together. What we have 
here is the conceptual necessity to divide 
our object of study and such ~ division is 
indispensabl~ if our work· is to.be 
~cientific · (1972, p.102). 
And Pratt clarifies the possibility of making such 
distinctions: 
A melody is a segregated and independent 
whole, whereas the notes that go.to make 
up the melody are dependent elements ... 
The.same distinction does not apply with 
equal force, if indeed it applies at all, 
of the human subj.ect insofar as it is relevant to the 
understanding of homophobia and its, resolution, and 
will attempt to justify that interpretation. Chapter 
Four will explain the view of ideology being taken, 
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and especially those of its concepts for which it has 
been chosen. This will complete what may be considered 
the introductory section of this thesis. 
Chapter Five will elaborate the mechanisms of homo-
phobia, what we may call the gay predicament, by. 
combining the psychoanalytic and ideological poles of 
. explanation.. Chapter Six will elaborate on the 
movement towards acceptance of homosexuality, what is 
·known in the case of the gay individual as the "coming-
out" process, in terms of the conceptualisation 
developed in'Chapter Five. Chapter Seven will consist 
in a comparison of the now-developed theory of the gay 
predicament and its resolution with existing models, 
attempting ~o show how this model contradicts, 
complements or coincides with others. This will serve 
to show what immediate contribution it makes, even 
before research is undertaken on its basis. Finally, 
Chapter Eight will include concluding comments; such 
as suggestions of research directions which the 
present conceptualisation may suggest and make it 
fruitful to follow. 
This arrangement of the contents is covertly 
unconventional, in that material which belongs in the 
Introduction and in Chapters Five and Six has been 
placed in Chapter Seven, where the present analysis is 
compared with others. This is necessary in view of the 
complexity of the theoretical framework adopted here. 
Some aspects of a critique of psychoanalytic·<approaches, 
.· 
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for example, can only be pursued after Lacan's 
framework is clear, and hence cannot be placed in 
this Introduction. And the development of an 
understanding of homophobia in Chanters Five and 
Six is sufficiently complex to become intolerable 
if the support of other complex analyses is adduced 
at the same time. Thus material which would make. 
the present conceptualisations more convincing or at 
least apparently more respectworthy, has been left 
for Chapter Seven, on comparisons with other under-
standings. Only small studies, which can simply be 
referred to and so easily incorporated into the text, 
will be used to support statements in Chapters Five 
and Six themselves. Chapter Seven, then, is far less 
an account of other conceptualisations than a 
commentary on this one. 
In view of the complexity and unfamiliarity of Lacan's 
technical usage of terms familiar from other cont~xts, 
such as "imaginary", and "the real", some authoritative 
definitions of some of his terms will be appended to 
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Thus languages "do not simply name existing categories, 
they articulate their own" (ibid.). That is, languages 
org~nise the world for their speakers. We must therefore 
explain not only how signifiers become linked to signifieds, 
but also how signif iers acquire a consistent definition at 
all, given that there are no pre-existing signifieds which 
can give them their meaning. Saussure's answer is that 
signifiers are given their definition by their difference 
from other signifiers, and similarly for signifieds. Red, 
the signified, for example, is given its definition by 
its difference from pink, orange, and so on. The signifier 
"kill" is given its definition by its difference from 
"kiss", "mill", "cull" and so on. Whereas the Chinese 
may not perceive the difference in meaning between the 
words "lick" and "rick", because they cannot distinguish 
between the sound-patterns of the signifiers. As 
Saussure puts it: 
in language (l~ngue), in a language state 
(etat de langue) nothing exists but differences. 
A difference evokes in the mind the idea of the 
positive terms between which it holds. In 
language there are.differences, nothing but 
differences, but without positive terms. This 
is a paradoxical fact ;(quoted in Percival, 
1981, p.23). 
The signifier, then, has no positive being of its own: 
"both signifier and signified. are purely relational or 
differential entit~es" (Culler, op. cit., p.23). This 
cannot be sufficiently emphasised: 
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the linguistic system beinq what it is, wherever 
one begins one will find nothing simole but 
always and everywhere this same complex 
equilibrium of reciprocally defined or 
conditioned terms. In other words, language 
is a form and not a substance. One cannot 
steep oneself too deeply in this truth, for 
all the mistakes in our terminology, all our 
incorrect ways of designating aspects of linguage, 
come from this involuntary assumption that 
linguistic phenomena must have substance 
(Saussure, quoted ibid., p.47). 
In Lacan's words, "the being of language is the non-
being of objects" (1977a, p.263). 
A consequence of this relational character ·of language 
is that 
Not only does each language produce a different 
set of signifiers, articulating and dividing 0 r -
/ I Ac 1..--t=?.CI /Jl L 
the continuum of sound in a distinctive way; 
each language produces a different set of 
signifieds; it.has a distinctive and thus 
"arbitrary" way of organizing the world into 
concepts or categories (cuiler, op. cit., p.23). 
The analysis of language in terms of the relations between 
the terms at any given time is known as a synchronic 
analysis ("study of the linguistic system in a particular 
state, without reference to time" (ibid., p.35)). This 
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is distinguished from a study of the historical 
processes Of development of a language, the "study 
of its evolution in time" (ibid.), whic.h is known 
as a diachronic analysis. 
As Culler argues, there is a "connection between the 
arbitrary nature of the sign and the profoundly 
historical nature of language" (ibid.). And he exolains: 
if there were some essential or natural conn-
ection between signifier and signified, then 
the sign would have an essential core which 
would be unaffected by time or which at least 
would resist change. This unchanging essence 
could be opposed to those· "accidental" 
features which did alter from ohe period to 
another. But in fact, as we have seen, there 
is no aspect of the sign which is a necessary 
property and which therefore lies outside time. 
Any aspect of sound or meaning can al~er; the 
history of languages is full of radical 
evolutionary alterations of both sound and 
meaning •.• Because it is arbitrary, the sign is 
totally subject to history, and 'the combination 
at a particular moment of a given .signifier and 
signified is a contingent result of the 
historical process (ibid., pp.35-36) •· 
Again, for the purposes of this thesis, this profound. 
historicity"of language cannot be overemphasised. 
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It may be concluded from the above that, not only 
does language organise or construct the world of its 
speakers, but that it is.the signifier ·which produces 
the signified, since there are no pre-existing concepts. 
As Lacan puts it, 
The thematics of this science is henceforth 
suspended, in effect, at the primordial 
position of the signifier and the signified 
as being distinct orders separated 
initially •.• And that is what was to make 
possible an exact study of the connections 
pro9er to the signifier, and of the extent 
of their function in the genesis of the 
signified (1977a, p.149). 
Of course, "In a sense, the notion of a synchronic 
state is a methodological fiction" (Culler, on. cit., 
p.37). For in the case of each language 
We are abstracting from a reality which 
consists of a very large number of native 
speakers, whose linguistic systems may 
differ in various ways. Nevertheless, the 
linguistic system of French is a definite 
reality, in that all these speakers understand 
one another, whereas someone who speaks only 
English cannot understand them. Since we 
want to represent this fact and s~eak of the 
system which these native speakers have in 
common, we produce statements about the 
.__ _______________ ------------ ---- ·-. --··---. -- --- --
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linguistic system in a ?articular synchronic 
state (ibid., pp.37-38). 
But the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of 
language, being methodological distinctions, are 
always present together. "Sr;>eech always implies both 
an established system and an evolution; at every 
moment it is an existing institution and a 9roduct of 
the past" (Saussure, 1972, p.60). 
2.2 Language in Practice 
Saussure makes a distinction between language insofar 
as it is performed and observable, that is when it is 
a~tually written in texts or spoken in utterances, and 
language insofar as it is a linguistic, grammatical 
,system which allows correct or incorrect speech acts 
to be performed and recognized by others. He calls the 
former oarole, actual speech, and the latter langue, 
language. 
But what is language (langue)? It is not to be 
confused with human speech, of which it is only 
a definite part, though certainly an essential 
one. It is both a social oroduct of the faculty 
of speech and a collection of necessary' 
conventions that have been adopted by a social 
body to permit individuals to exercise .that 
faculty (Saussure, ibid., p.61). 
And "Execution is always individual, and the individual 
is always its master: I shal1 call the executive side 
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speaking (carole)" (ibid., p.65). In this thesis, 
"language" will always be used to refer to both lanque 
and parole, unless it is used in conju~ction with or 
in opposition to "speech", or when specified to refer 
to langue. 
It follows that "Language is the social side of speech, 
outside the individual who can never create nor modify 
it by himself; it exists only by virtue of a sort of 
contract s·igned bv the members of a community. Moreover, 
the individual must always serve an apprenticeship in 
order to learn the functioning of language; a child 
assimilates it only gradually" (ibid., p.66). But langue 
has no existence other than in its manifestations in 
speech: "The nature of the langue lies beyond, and 
determines, the nature of each manifestation of parole, 
yet it has no concrete existence of its own, except in 
the piecemeal manifestations that 'speech affords'" 
(Hawkes, op. cit., p.21). 
When Lacan speaks of language, he refers ultimately to 
the language commonly spoken by people, from which the 
Saussurean properties of language are ultimately deduced. 
Thus when he says "the unconscious is structured as a 
language ..• it is not as some special part of language •.• 
Language is language and there is only one sort of 
language; concrete language - English or French for 
instance - that people talk" (Lacan, 1972b, p.188). 
• 
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It follows from the preceding section that language 
as it functions in speech can only produce meaning 
once differences have been established between its terms. 
But even once this prerequisite is satisfied, more 
factors enter into the production of meaning. Firstly, 
speech and writing take time: "verbal utterance •.• is 
forced to deliver its elements in a certain order or 
sequence which is itself significant" (Hawkes, op. cit., 
p.25). Thus, the "mode of the relationship between 
signifier and signified can be said to be essentially, 
albeit minimally, sequential in nature" (ibid.). "It 
follows from this that each word will have a linear or 
'horizontal' relationship with the words that precede and 
succeed it, and a good deal of its capacity to 'mean' 
various things derives from this pattern of positioning" 
(ibid., 9.26). This horizontal unfolding of meaning is 
known as the syntagmatic aspect of language. It is 
frequently assimilated to the diachronic aspect, since 
both essentially involve the passage of time (Hawkes, 
ibid., p.27; Lemaire, 1977, p.34). 
The "horiz6ntal", sequential dimension of language is 
contrasted with a "vertical" dimension, in which each 
word in the sentence is given its primary definition by 
its difference from all the other words which could have 
re9laced it in the sentence. This is clearlv the synchronic 
aspect of language, as discussed above. It is also known 
as the paradigmatic aspect of language (ibid.). ·Thus the 
units of language 
-39-
(whatever their inner structure and their 
extent, quite different according to cases} 
have no significant existence except by 
their frontiers: those which separate 
them from other actual units of the dis-
course ••• and also those which distinguish 
them from other virtual units, with which 
they form a certain class (which linguists 
call a paradigm); ••. in a certain relation 
of affinity and dissimilarity (Barthes, 
1972b, p.151). 
The paradigmatic axis, then, is characterised by 
selection from a class of words which could ~eplace 
each other in a sentence, as is "shoved", "pushed", 
"oulled'' "stunned" "shunned" and so on in the case 
- ' ' 
of the sentence "I grew angry and shunned him". And 
the syntagmatic axis is characterised by combinations 
of words in a sequence. "The selection is produced on 
the base of equivalence, similarity and dissimilarity, 
synonymity and antonymity, while the combination, the 
build up of the sequence, is based on contiguity" 
(Jakobson, 1972, p.95). 
Jakobson further assimilates these "two basic modes of 
arrangement used in verbal behaviour" (ibid.) to the figures 
of speech, metaphor and metonymy (Hawkes, op. cit., p.77). 
"Broadly speaking, metaphor is based on a ~reposed 
similarity or analogy between the' literal subject ••• 
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and its metaphorical substitute" (ibid.). This 
matches selection by equivalence in the paradigmatic 
axis. And "metonymy is based on a proposed contiguous 
(or 'sequential') association between the literal 
subject ••• and its 'adjacent' replacement" (ibid.). 
This matches combination by contiguity in the syntagmatic 
axis. 
Lacan makes use of these synonymities in applying 
linguistic concepts to psychoanalysis, princi~ally by 
assimilating metaphor and metonymy to condensation and 
displacement, respectively. "The same structural laws 
of condensation and displacement .•. are the laws of the 
unconscious. These laws are the same as those which create 
I 
meaning in language" (Lacan, quoted in Lemaire, op. cit., 
!? .19 2) . And, 
It is a question of rediscover~ng in the laws 
that govern that other scene ... which Freud •.• 
designates as being that of the unconscious, 
the effects that are discovered at the level .•• 
of ••• language: effects constituted by the 
double play of combination and substitution 
in the signifier, according to the two aspects 
that generate the signified, metonymy and 
metaphor (Lacan, 1977a, p.285). 
There are further precisions of meaning made oossible 
by the socio-historical contexts of speech-acts and 
texts, which are not purely linguistic in nature. "That 
which is transmitted cannot be separated from the forms, 
' ~ . " 
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the means, and the concrete conditions of the 
transmission" (Medvedev, quoted in Todorov, 1981, 
p.174). For "in fact, prior to the speech~act, 
the speaker and the addressee literally do not exist 
as such; it is only the discursive process which thus 
defines them in relation to each other" (Todorov, ibid., 
p.173). Thus, if I say, "I want you to break that log", 
many of the words in my utterance are defined only by 
the concrete circumstances in which I speak. 
Furthermore, "No member of the verbal community will 
ever discover any ·words in language which are totally 
neutral, devoid of another's asuirations and evaluations, 
or free of another's voice ••• A word reaches one context 
in terms of another context, penetrated by the intentions 
of another" (Bak~tin, quoted ibid., p.170). 
Thus difference between signs makes meaning possible in 
language, and concrete contexts - the sentence, the paradigm, 
the dialoguing interlocutors, the surroundings, the epoch, 
the existing intonations of the words - develop the precise 
meaning each text or utterance bears. "From which we can 
say that it is in the chain 6f the signifier that the 
meaning 'insists' but that none of its elements 'consists' 
in the signification of which it is at the moment capable" 
(Lacan, 1977a, p.153). The whole utterance, that is, 
and the whole text, or the whole discourse, is res9onsible 
for the signification of each element, each-signifier; 
the signifiers on their own are not responsible for their 
signification. Lacan gives the example of "co~tract", in: 
~the expressions: 'marriage contract', 'contract bridge', 
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'breach of contract', or •.. the word 'contract' 
progressively reduced to the articulation of~its 
first syllable: contract, contrac, contra, contr ... " 
(1977a, p.63). All this is contrasted with the word 
"contract" as a command to contract the pupils of 
one's eyes. 
Because of this contextualityJ change in language is 
easily conceived of, for as new contexts appear ~nd 
new combinations of interlocutors, so new meanings can 
emerge. 
Given that the sign is defined entirely by its context, 
purely linguistic and otherwise, and that it is capable 
of inhabiting any number of contexts, it is possible for 
a language to contain a number of sub-languages, in each 
of which the words will carry meanings or significations 
peculiar to these contexts, in addition to the significa-
tions they bear in other contexts. Thus, for exam?le, 
the meanings o.f the terms used in the language of natural 
science will differ to some degree from the meanings of 
the same terms used in poetry. Furthermore, these 
differences may show some roughly specifiable pattern. 
For example, the language of natural science may tend 
towards the reverse.~ "No doubt, for any speech cornmuni ty, 
for any speaker, there exists a unity of language, but 
this overall code represents a svstem of interconnected . .. -
subcodes; each language encompasses several concurrent 
patterns which are each characterized by a different 
function" (Jakobson, 1972, p.88). Such subcodes will be 
called discourses in this thesis. They will be referred 
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· .to when the particular characteristics making the 
pattern peculiar to a discourse distinguishable from 
other such patterns are of salient interest. For example, 
"ideological discourse" or "the discourse of ideology" 
will refer to language insofar as it has the characteristics 
of ideology. 
Lacan gives an idea of the nature and relationships of 
such discourses: "With the second property of the 
signifier, that of combining according to.the laws of a 
closed order, is affirmed the necessity of the topological 
-~,, 
substratum of which the term that I o'rdinarily use, 
namely, the signifying chain, gives an aoproximate idea: 
rings of a necklace that is a ring in another necklace 
made of rings" (1977a, p.153). 
The concept of bricolage is a helpful one here. 
The process involves a "science of the 
concrete" ••. which ••. orders, classifies 
and arranges into structures the minutiae 
of the physical world~ •. The structures, 
"improvised" or "made-uo" (these are 
rough translat~ons of the orocess of 
bricoler) as ad hoc responses to an 
environment ..• '.'explain" the world and 
make it able to be lived in (Hawkes, op. 
Cit. I p.51) • 
This provides an analogy with the function of 
language as that which organises our world. And 
the fact that it is a process suggests that alter-
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native organisations are possible, which, together 
with the concept of a number of such organisa17ional 
structures making up the bricolage, provides an 
analogy with what is meant above by "discourse"~ 
This is usefully elaborated by the following: 
Together, object and meaning constitute 
a sign, andi within any one culture, such 
signs are assembled, repeatedly, into 
characteristic forms of discourse. However, 
when the bricoleur re-locates the significant 
object in a different position within th~t 
discourse, using the same overall repertoire 
of signs, or.when that object is placed 
within a different total ensemble, a new 
discourse is constituted, a different message 
conveyed (Clarke, quoted in Hebdige, 1979, ~.104). 
These quotes on bricolage suggest that signs need not be 
of th~ nature of the language we speak and write. For "if 
language is a system of signs, then not only sounds or 
written texts, but also all meaningful· social practices 
and cultural phenomena may constitute particular signs of 
language" (Larrain, 1979, ~.130). For ~xample, a woman's 
wearing or not wearing make-up has a significance in 
.Western cultures, as will a man's eating supper at a 
Wimpy bar as opposed to at home or at a steakhouse. The 
same conditions for the possibility of meaning apply. to 
non-verbal signs as to verbal. 
Thus the questions may be asked which extend .the field· 
of linguistics to the field of semiology or semiotics, 
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of the first governs the pathways of the 
second (1977a, ?.126). 
2.3 Some Implications of the Foregoing 
Language not only organises or constructs the world 
of the speaker; it also organises the very concept 
'Of speaker or subject of the sentence. For the word 
"I" is defined by its difference from equiva1en~ terms 
and by its context, as is any other word. And the 
subject will be referred to with other words by him/herself 
and others, as well as ~y certain styles of.speaking, 
writing, dressing, behaving and being responded to or related 
to, all of which will characterise the person in a certain 
roughly consistent way. When the designation of the 
subject by "I" is referred to in this thesis, all these 
other means of referring to or characterising the subject 
will be taken as understood. 
And it may be emphasised that language organises the world 
not simply because it is organising by nature, but also 
because it gives meaning and significance, so that it is 
only through language that it is possible for the world to 
have organisation at all. "As well as being a system of 
signs related among themselves, language incarnates meaning 
in the form of the series of positions it offers for the 
subject from which to grasp itself and its ;elations with 
the real" (Nowell-Smith, quoted in Belsey, .1980, p.61). 
Another implication of the preceding pages is that 
language pre-exists the.individual, who enters into an 
organisation of the world entirely independent of her/his 
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needs or motives. For "the arbitrary nature of the 
sign explains ••• why the social fact·alone can create 
- l - ' ... . ~ 
a linguistic system. The commun~ ~y _is ~ec:e.s.sary if 
values that owe their existence solely to_usage and 
general acceptance .. are to be set up" (Saussu~e, ·quoted 
in Belsey, op. cit., p.41). And such a conventional 
system, language, clearly is already existent by the 
t1me the contemporary individual, and most of his/her 
predecessors, are ·born. That which·organises his/her 
world, therefore, does so in ways established before 
his/her particula~·needs.and contributions existed to be 
taken into consideration. 
' . ·-· . 
Hence Lacan can say (what will be elaborated in detail 
in the next chapter) : 
Needs.become subordinated to the same 
conventional· conditions as those of the, 
signifier' in.its double fe~istei: ·~he 
synchronic register of opposition between 
. \, ., -
' ·irreducible elements, and the diachronic 
register of substitution and ~ombin~tio~, .. 
through which. language, even if it does 
not fulfil all functions, structures 
everything concerni~g rela"t:ions be.tween., 
. 
human beings (1977a, p.255). 
'Arid 0he can-speak. of· the entry into language-as that 
which_"not only suspends.the satisfatticin· of ne~ds 
.from.the signifying apparatus, btit also that whidh 
frangments them, filters them, models them·upon the 
defiles of the structure of the signifier" (ibid.). 
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It follows from the distinction between langue and 
parole that there is a tension between the social, 
general aspect of language and the individual, particular 
aspect of language. As argued above in this section, the 
individual enters a language which pre-exists her/him. But 
since selection and change is possible in view of the 
dialogical and contextual nature of language, the individual 
can develop a oarole of her/his own. But the tension 
between the individual.and the general will always be present, 
since the same words belong to both. Peirce's concept of 
"generals" may clarify this: 
a test for something's being a general is whether 
it is repeatable as opposed to being a unique 
individual. It is fairly obvious that words of a 
human language are repeatable, that the very same 
word can be spoken or written many times 
(Skidmore, 1981, p.45). 
Thus Todorov can say, "the authorities fight the diversity 
of discourse by aspiring to a common language (or rather 
~diom)" (op. cit., p.176). 
And Lacan can speak of the goal of analysis as being to 
speak "full speech" as opposed to "empty speech". He 
speaks of a developmental stage "in which the ! is 
precipitated in a primordial form ... and (later) language 
re~tores to it, in the universal, ~ts function as subject" 
(1977a, p.2, insertion added). He goes on, "But the 
important point is that this form situates the agency of 
the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional 
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direction, which will always remain. irreducible for 
the individual alone, or rather, which will only rejoin the 
coming-into-being ••. of the subject asym:9totically, whatever 
the success of the dialectical syntheses by which he must 
resolve as I his discordance with his own reality" (ibid.). 
And he states that "the antinomy immanent in the relations 
between speech and language becomes cl~ar. As language 
becomes more functional, it becomes improper for speech, 
and as it becomes too particular to us, it losei its 
function as language" (ibid., p.85). Finally, he speaks 
of the 
true subject, that is, the subject of the 
unconscious ••• in the Language of his symptoms 
which, although it is in a serise deciphered 
by the analyst, is more a ~rocess of the 
subject's coming around to address himself. 
to him in a more and more consistent way ••• 
What the subject who is speaking says, 
however empty his discourse may be at ·: 
first, takes on its effect ·from the process 
of approaching to the Word which is realized 
in his discours~, a coming closer to the Word 
into which he will fully convert the Truth 
which his symptoms express (that is, the 
oarole vide will become a oarole pleine) 
1quoted iri Wilden, 1968, p.142, Wilden 1 s 
insertion) . 




borne in mind that "the Word" is an alternative 
translation of parole, so that i~·should be read as 
"speech" to make it· consistent with th~ ea.rlier citings 
of Lacan and comments on them. Parole vide, . ·and· 
parole pleine, have.been translated as "empty speech" 
and "full speech" respectively. 
This link with .Lacan,.which will be taken up_ in Chapter 
.six, 'uggests.further points of contact between_psycho-
analysis and li_nguistics. Firstly; the. process of 
change of lariguage referred to earlier is ~iven an added 
dimension by the degree to which psychoanalysis shows 
the individual to.be capable of reworking language. It 
shows this to be possible to a radical extent, in that 
the processes at work. in the unconscious, displacement 
and condensation, a~e the.equivalent respe~tively of 
metonymy and metaphor, but do not require the 
conventions of meaning to .. ef~ect-their ~ubstitutions:and . . 
combinations. Thus the German for a· "shine" on the nose· 
can come to be unconsciously equated with the visibility 
··· of· a nose, for the entirely adv.entitious ·reason that the 
English "glarice" and: the G~rman "Glanz" (shine) are 
homophonous, so that. "shine", through this purely external·· 
connection.in.sound, can replace "possible to be glanced 
. at" in meaning. Thus changes can occur beyond.the 
:_constraints:of·m~aning. 
Secondly, the ~ndividual, ·therefore, by the operation of 
the unconscious as revealed by psychoanalysis, is .. 
"different, ··irreducibl~, for one is borne by a simply 
singular speech, not merging with th.e others, but then 
exposed to the black thrusts of a desire that borders 
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will be necessary to clarify and use Wittgenstein's 
emphasis on use of a word in temporary preference to 
Saussure's emphasis on difference. It is therefore 
useful to note that the two approaches are complementary. 
At the level of speech-acts and sentences, meaning may 
be taken "in the sense that in performing them people 
intend to communicate certain things" (ibid., p.34). 
Ultimately, however, .this is dependent on the meaning 
established for words by difference. Difference remains 
the precondition for further factors to make a contribution. 
For "Saussure is talking •.. about the conditioris of meaning 
as meaning operates immanently and unconsciously within 










3. LACAN'S VIEW ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SUBJECT 
Lacan's endeavour can be described from a number of 
different viewpoints: purely psychoanalytic, 
philosophical, scientific, linguistic, and more. For 
the present pur?oses two ways of seeing his contribu-
tion stand out. 
Firstly, he may be seen as attempting to establish 
psychoanalysis as a science, using only concepts ?roper 
to its own object of study, which is the unconscious 
(Freud, 1923). To this end he rejects Freud's use of 
an energic model of the human constitution, and replaces 
it with a linguistic one. This is ap9ropriate to 
psychoanalysis, for, as Freud points out when speaking 
---=;;>?:· 
of the analyst and patient, "Nothing takes place between 
them except that they talk to each other" (1926, p.187). 
The effects of the unconscious which allow the analyst to 
infer or construct the unconscious formations and_dynamics 
are usefully found, it may be argued, only in language, in 
the communication between patient and analyst, for example 
in slips of the tongue and the dream text related by the 
patient. Thus, through linguistics, Lacan integrates the 
object of psychoanalytic science with its methodology, so 
that the findings of psychoanalysis are obtained in an 
epistemologically rigorous way. 
Secondly, Lacan may be seen as attempting to explain the 
passage of a human being from a speechless (literally 
"infant") condition, to a condition in which it can sneak 
and enter into all the symbolically mediated activities 
and exchanges of human society. He can do this because 
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the disruptive or bewildering human phenomena on which 
psychoanalysis works, dreams, jokes, 9arapraxes and 
·neurotic and psychotic symptoms, suggest for their 
explanation infantile experiences which still live on 
unconsciously and produce these disruptions. Such 
unconscious formations cannot be studied directly. 
They can only be studied via their effects on conscious 
discourse, as suggested above in outlining the first 
view of Lacan's endeavour. They are thus inevitably ~~ 
theoretical constructs, the truth of their existence 
assessed solely on the coherence of the expl~nation they 
provide of what is observed (Freud, 1937b). 
Lacan's linguistic emphasis allows him to determine the ~ 
points at which the theoretically constructed unconscious 
formations may no longer be meaningfully spoken about in 
a scientific context. The reason for this is that language 
is necessary for· meaning to be possible. Infants are 
incapable of using language, except in an inconsistent way, 
the systematic relation of which to our language is 
impossible to establish. Thus we can never know with 
certainty what their ex9eriences are. And when, ultimately, 
they are in a position to recount their experiences to us, 
if only in retros9ect, their ex9eriences are already 
mediated by language, a system of symbols which re-
organises these experiences according to its-· own laws. 
These laws impose a meaning on the infantile experiences 
which is not inherent in them, but comes to an indeterminate 




The Lacanian account of infantile development is ~~ 
therefore to a very large degree a kind of myth, rather 
than rigorously scientific. But it serves to make the 
effects studied in the analytic session intelligible, 
and to assist an understanding of the nature of the 
speaking human subject. 
Lacan's concern to explain the acquisition of speech in 
individuals is far from arbitrarily connected with his 
language~based epistemological premises. For the subject-
matter of psychoanalysis, as well as the means of 
investigating it, are the discourse of the patient in the 
analytic session. Thus, as the patient's history emerges, 
the aspect.of it with which the analyst will come into the 
most direct contact, which will require the least inference' 
and theoretical construction to be uncovered, is the 
patient's changing relation to language. For it is in 
the form of the patient's speech that the ?atient's history 
is revealed to the analyst. The patient's history is 
already. embodied in the material with which the analyst 
must work. 
Thus·Lacan produces an epistemology and theory which are 
pre~~minently suited to the psychoanalytic method of 
making intelligible the human subject's deveioping relation 
to language, and hence his/her relation to the symbolic 
· structures of the relevant social formation. Both his 
epistemology and his'theo;-yuof the. constitution of. the 
subject will be discussed at length in this chapter. 
This combination of two views of Lacan's contribution 
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may be summarised by saying that his epistemology 
dictates his ontology, within a scientific context. 
For his epistemology dictates that only that which 
may be spoken about or "languaged" is meaningful and hence 
has a place in scientific discourse. Thus science may only 
speak of the being of the human subject insofar as she/he 
speaks. And this, through a process which will be argued 
in this chapter, leads Lacan to maintain that the subject 
e ' 
has the being of a linguistic unit, the signifier, as far 
as science is concerned. 
The account of Lacan given below will consider only a 
fraction of what Lacan has to say. Detailed considerations 
of the relation of his work to areas not directly of 
concern here may be found in Lemaire (1977) on his 
relation to structuralism, Stewart (1980) on his relation 
to hermeneutics and phenomenology, Coward and Ellis (1977) 
on his relation to linguistics, ideelogy and the theory of 
subjectivity, and Wilden (1968), on his relation to 
contemporary philosophical trends. 
This chapter is concerned only with limited aspects of 
Lacan's theory of how the human subject in general is 
formed as a subject, and with certain implications of 
.. ) 
that theory for the nature of the subject onceiit is 
constituted. Clearly, this account, even though of such 
limited aspects of Lacanian psychoanalysis, must inevitably 
be. only one of a number of possible interpretations of 
Lacan's ambiguous and complex statements. But the support 




In any event, the validity of this interpretation of 
Lacan will lie in a large measure on the intelligibility 
it brings to the phenomena of homophobia on which it is 
brought to bear in this thesis, and in its own internal 
consistency. Such an assertion is in accord not only 
with a structuralist and semiotic approach to science, but 
also with the psychoanalytic methodology itself. As Freud 
said, anticipating structuralism in this as in so much 
else, "The value of a 'fiction' of this kind ••• depends on 
how much one can achieve with its help" (1926, p.194). 
Whether the ensuing account is "truly Lacanian" or not, then, 
is beside the point. 
This chapter will argue that the subject can be meaning- ~ 
fully thought of only in terms such as may be applied to 
the units of which language is composed. It will further 
be argued that the overwhelming desire of the human 
subject is, paradoxically, to think of itself in ways 
antithetical to this. Finally, an attemot will be made 
to demonstrate that an implication of the foregoing is 
that the subject becomes dee?lY committed to the social 
structures embodied in language, before it is in a 
position to be circumspect about making potentially 
unsalutary commitments. 
Lacan sees the resolution of the Oedipus complex as that 
which makes the infant a speaking subject .. This cha9ter 
will therefore be organised to describe pertinent aspects 
of Lacan's re-construction of pre-Oedipal life, how this 
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is disrupted by the Oedipal complex, and how the 
complex is resolved to make the child a s~eaking 
subject, a participant in the human world mediated 
by symbolic relations. Some implications of this 
resolution will then be drawn. 
3.1 The Mirror Stage 
Lacan, like Freud before him, constructs his theory to 
make sense of the facts produced by the psychoanalytic 
method. "Facts" should be understood here as findings 
which may be repeated by applying the rules and 
principles of the psychoanalytic method. They are not 
simply detected or revealed, but, as suggested in the 
Introduction (section 1.7), they are actively produced 
in accordance with theoretical criteria of what makes 
valid research and interpretation of phenomena. Whether 
they are fapts by the rules of other methodologies,·such 
as that of neo-positivism, is therefore irrelevant. 
Lacan, then, is concerned to make sense of a number of 
facts about infantile life produced in the analytic 
session, in conjunction with a number of observations of 
the behaviour of infants. 
The facts produced in analysis include phantasies of the 
body as dismembered or fragmented, 1 • of castration, of 
_l. "Dismembered limbs, a severed head, a hand cut off at 
the wrist .•. feet which dance by themselves .•• all the~e 
have something peculiarly uncanny about them, 
especially when, as in the last instance, they prove 





being the phallus, of the parents' perfection, and 
of their terrible aggressive or sedu6tive qualities. 
The observations include the infant's apparent excited 
fascination upon glimpsing its own image in a mirro:o 
at a time after its sixth month, its successful imitation 
of its peers before it is sufficiently well co-ordinated 
to perform the same movements spontaneously, and its 
apparent identification with its peers, crying when 
another child falls, for example. 
Lacan weaves his theory around these data, integrating 
it with the account already developed by psychoanalysis. 
This section will consist in a desa:ription of aspects of 
infantile life and development as reconstructed by Lacan. 
Initially, according to Lacan, the infant seems to 
.experience itself as a play of disjointed sensations and 
as a set of body~fragments that have no consistent relation 
to one another. He speaks, for exmaple, of phantasies of 
"a fragmented body-image" which may "appear in the form of 
disjointed limbs" (1977a, p.4). Between about the sixth 
and eighteenth month of life, the infant appears to become 
aware of the unity of its body. It can do so, however, 
only._through its perception of the bodies of others since 1:::-0 
it cannot see its own body in toto. These other bodies 
include those of other infants of approximat~ly its dwn 
age, that of its mother, and the image of its own body 
reflected in a mirror. 
But it has as yet no means of distinguishing between 
itself and the world of objects external to itself. 
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This is a differentiation which has to be learnt. 
It consequently cannot be thought to make a ·distinction 
as yet as to whether the unified body-image it perceives 
is that of others or its own. Analytic experience 
"shows us that experience of oneself in the earliest 
stage of childhood develops, insofar as it refers to one's 
counterpart, from a situation experienced as undifferentiated. 
Thus about the age of eight months, we see •.• those gestures ••• 
by which a subject reconstructs the imperfect effort of the 
other's gesture •.. that are all the more remarkable in that 
they precede the complete co-ordination of the motor 
apparatuses that they bring into play" (Lacan, 1977a, p.18). 
Furthermore, it may be thought to be powerfully motivated 
to acquire such unity of being as the body-image displays. 
For its fragmented body and arbitrary sensations must be 
deeply distressing to it. Needs appear with no context or 
experience of effective action to mediate them and give 
them some meaning of temporariness, so that they must be 
experienced as absolute absence of satisfaction, absolute 
lack. Lacan speaks of "a certain dehiscence at the heart 
of .the organism, a primordial Discord betrayed by the signs 
of uneasiness and motor unco-ordination of the nee-natal 
months" (1977a, p.4). And he mentions, "the confrontation 
of the subject with an absence of object, with a lack of 
being in which he is stuck or caught, in which he loses 
himself and to which anything is preferable 11 (quoted in 
Wilden, 1968, pp.150-151). 
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The infant therefore identifies, as seems to be 
observable, with the unified body-image it experiences 
in those who we would see as others. The "specular 
image •.• is linked as a unifier to all the ••• elements 
of what is called the fragmented body" (Lacan, 1977a, 
p.196). It may be considered to assume the image as 
its own both because it cannot properly distinguish between 
itself and others so that such identification is simply a 
fact of life for it, and because it is motivated to do so. 
This occurs with all the motivation of its distress at the 
absolute arbitrarily descending lack it experiences. 
The motivation becomes significant when, later, a sense 
of the infant's separateness begins to creep into its world. 
This identification is the beginning of the ego in Lacan's 
understanding. 
We have only to understand the mirror stage 
as an identification~ in the full sense that 
analysis gives to the term: namely, the 
transformation that takes place in the 
subject when he assumes an image .•• 
This jubilant assumption of his specular 
image by the child at the infans stage,: still 
sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling 
dependence, would seem to exhibit in an 
exemplary situation the symbolic matrix 'in· 
which the! is.precipitated in a primordial 
form, before it is objectified in the 
dialectic of identification with the other, 
and before language restores to it, in ~he 
universal, its function as subject (1977a, p.2). 
·! 
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Lacan calls this period when the orocess of assuming 
a unified image occurs the mirror stage. It is character-
ized, as suggested above, by lack of differentiation' 
between self and not-self, and therefore by unmediated 
undifferentiated relating to what we would sse as other 
than the self. Lacan also calls this a dual relat1onship, 
for reasons which will become clear later. 
Because the inf ant is seen as unable to distinguish 
between the image and what it is an image of, this type 
of relating to the world is called by Lacan the imaginary 
(or the imaginary register) . In the imaginary the image 
is treated as the thing of which it is the image. "The 
whole drama of the dual relationship is played .out here: 
consciousness collapses into its double (the other) without 
keeping its distance from it" (Lemaire, 1977, p.81, inser-
tion added). This precedes the "moment of the separation 
of the gratifyi~g object from the sign" (ibid., p.165). 
"The imaginary relationship which has •.• been assimilated 
to a dual relationship is specified by the absence of 
mediation between the self and the thing, the self and the 
object of desire, or the self and the idea" (ibid., p.227). 
This will contrast with the type of relating to the world 
-
which is seen by Lacan as characteristic of language-
speakers, which he calls the symbolic. In the symbolic the 
subject grasps that which represents something else, that· is, 
the signifier, as distinct from that which it represents, 
that is, the signified. 
Lacan infers that the inf ant gradually comes to have another 
exceedingly powerful motivation ;for wanting to be a unified 
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being. . His reas·oning is as follows. The most constant 
image, and the only necessary one, that enters its world, 
is that of the mother. Her.presence involves satiety of 
need, repletion. And there is the same lack of differ-
entiation between self and other here as discussed above, 
and the same motivation of distress to be escaped, so that 
the infant identifies with the mother, experiencing only 
one being in what we would see as the two of them. But 
the infant gradually, with the increasing refinement of its 
perceptual abilities, comes to an awareness that the 
mbther is not entirely one with it. The infant cannot any 
longer unequivocally experience the mother and itself as a 
unity. There can no longer be an immediate experience of 
unity upon the mother's entering into the infant's field 
of perception, because other experiences, which are 
beginning to have durable effects on the infant, contradict 
that experience of unity. 
The inf ant is therefore becoming capable of desiring 
unity with the mother, not only of immediately achieving 
it by imaginary identification. That is to say, once 
it has begun to have a lasting awareness of a gap between 
. itself and its mother, it can be motivated to unify with 
her not only by a need to escape distress, but also by a 
lasting wish, drive or desire to bridge the gap and unify 
with the bringer of repletion. Insofar as the experiences 
of separateness from the mother are always·yresent, having 
made a durable impression on the infant, the experience· of 
the gap wilL be present, and so will the desire to bridge it. 
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Given the power of the infant's motivations, almost all 
the difference between absolute repletion and absolute lack, 
that desire becomes an exceedingly powerful motivation 
for wanting to be a unified being with the mother . 
. Although as Lacan construes it, a separation between the 
mother and self has begun to see~ into the infant's 
world, the child must still be seen as relating almost 
entirely in the imaginary register. This is unquestionable, 
for reasons which will become evident in the next section. 
Consequently the inf ant must still be in a world in which 
imaginary unity, the dual unmediated mirror-relationship 
of which there was formerly no question at all, is possible. 
But now, with the seeping in of the gap, for the infant to 
perceive such a relationship still to be, it follows that 
the mother must collude with the infant, so that the 
threatening separation can be ruled out, obliterated -
foreclosed, Lacan would say. She must not make her 
separateness evident. And to ensure this, she must 
therefore desire the infant as it desires her. Lacan 
maintains, therefore, that the infant, still in the grip 
of .the imaginary, desires the mother's desire. That is, it 
desires to be recognised by the mother as the exclusive 
object of her desire. In consequence, it desires to be 
that object, so that she might recognise it as such. 
"Desire is the desire for desire, the desire of the Other" 
(Lacan, quoted in Lemaire, ibid., p.164). This is /~ 
~
because "the first bbject of desire is to be recognized 
by the other" (Lacan, 1977a, p.58). 
-66-
We have now reached the !)Oint where we can assert 
that, in the present view, the infant in the imaginary 
desires to be a unified, consistent beirig, an object. 
It is this desire "which constitutes the eqo and its 
objects with attributes of permanence, identity, and 
substantiality, in short, with entities or 'things'" 
(ibid., p.17). It is seen to desire this with all the 
motivation of its distress as being confronted by its 
needs with absolute lack,. and with all the motivation of 
the satiety, repletion, which its mother brings. 
It may be added at this point that the object of the 
mother's desire is the phallus. A fairly lengthy 
digression is necessary to exolain this. 
Since the mother may be assumed to have gone through 
the same infantile development as her child's, now 
under discussion, her desire must be understood to share 
the same original motivations as the child's. The idea 
that she too is unconsciously confronted bv this lack, 
or "want-to-be", as Lacan puts it, allows him to speak 
of "the mother's want-to-be, to which of course she was 
herself introduced" (1977a, p.207). This will be 
substantiated in the cours~ of this chapter. Conse-
quently she, too, wishes at a very fundamental level that 
.the lack with which _she .is confronted by her needs be 
filled, made replete. Desire, in whom-ever it is found,_ 
is still "d~sire for desire, the desire of the Other ••• 
Desire reproduces the subject's relati6n to the lost 
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There is some controversy over this last assertion, 
that such a different social structure could exist 
(Mitchell, 1975; Coward, Lipshitz & Cowie, 1976). 
This debate will not be entered into here. -'rt is 
not relevant to this thesis since the first reason given 
above is sufficient to establish the distinction between 
penis and phallus. 
To conclude this digressive argument, then, and to 
return to the main line of thought, the object of the 
mother's desire is thought to be that which signifies 
an absence of lack, and that is the phallus. The object 
which the infant wishes to be, therefore, must also be 
the phallus, insofar as it wishes to be the object of 
its mother's desire. Or, more accurately, the infant 
~ 
probably gradually learns to accommodate itself,. shape 
itself, to be what the mother desires, and insofar as it 
does so successfully, it must inevitably come closer and 
closer to shaping itself in the mould of the phallus, 
since she will ind.icate to it, despite herself, what she 
desires. For, "in the reduplication of the subject of 
speech ••• the unconscious finds the means to articulate 
itself" (Lacan, quoted in Lemaire, p.95). Again, in 
Lacap's words, "the child, in his relation to the mother, 
a relation constituted in analysis ••. by his dependence ort 
her love, that is to say, by the desire for her desire, 
identifies himself with the imaginary object of this 
desire insofar as the mother herself symbolizes it in the 
phallu~" (1977a, p.198). 
' 
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Of course, i.n this. view,. the presence on the child's 
•· .. .' . I· "{.•··' ·.. . . - .. -. ··:.. ' . .- ,- ~. _., .. 
body of ·the penis. or cli tori.s, which repres·ent the phallus, 
~ ~ '.., • ! .. • ., • l ._ ,,.. -~ ·: . l \..,._- ., '. l -~ '; ~ , • .. - _.. ) r .:_ .,._, ;(';t r - ~ l 
then becomes of inestimable importance to the chil.d in·· 
~ J ·~ ·.~ 'I. : !·.-.·~ -~.,,,"-_}-,~-~~... ._..,, .,'l.1 . i .. _ i, r::· .. _.,. .. f :· • 
helping it become recognised as the.phallus by its mother. 
•- ... ~·~ • :' -. -~· - -~ .~' ~:. ~ ~: .L ·_: • ~' ••• 1;,, .. ~ 1. • . .', . .-:.: •. · ,· 
This makes the threat of. castration,. should it occur, a 
. . ..... -~-· .... ~LT·~··-.~)'_.,-· t ~~; ~~ --.- ••• _· 
terrible one, as will be discussed, in the next secti6n~ 
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And all this i.s in keeping wi.th µaca:h' s epistemology. 
For the material worked with in the analytic session 
is .the patient's speech. And the psychoanalytic rules 
for producing the fac~s relate to what is done with 
th b . t' h . 1 . 2 e su Jec s speec in ana ysis. And, finally, the 
linguistic theory Lacan adduces originates specifically 
in an application to speech and language. Thus the 
science of Lacanian psychoanalysis uses only concepts 
proper to its own object of study, the unconscious of 
the subject who speaks in analysis. 
Lacan's explanation of the transition from infantile 
life to the life of a properly speaking subject will be 
outlined in this section. 
Although,. in Lacan.'s view, the infant can relate to the 
mother in an immediate unditferentiation from her, thus 
living as though its desire for repletion were fulfilled, 
it is not alone in desiring primary possession of the. 
mother's affections. The father, argues Lacan, is a third 
element in.the mother-child relationship, and he forces 
his presence upon them in a. variety of ways. Firstly, he 
takes the mother from the infant for a great proportion of 
the time. Secondly, he gets to sleep with the mother and 
is never excluded from. her bed, as the infant usually or 
frequently is. ·Thirdly, the mother's desire is clearly to 
a great extent for him. 
2. "the interpretations made by psychoanalysis are first 
and foremost translations from an alien method of 
expression into the one which is familiar to us. When 
we interpret a dream we are simply translating a 
particular thought-content (the latent dream-thoughts) 
from the 'language of dreams' into our waking speech" 
(Freud, 19i3, p.176). 
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As Lacan sees it, this intervention of the father.' s 
at first poses him simply as a rival in the infant's 
eyes. Against his claims, the infant can assert and 
live out its own being as that which fulfils the mother's 
desire, completes her lack, and is, in short, the necess-
ary complement of her being. 
This imaginary way of life, however, is rudely inter-
rupted by the threat of castration. This may be argued 
as follows: The infant masturbates in association with 
images of its heart's desire, the mother. It also 
values highly the organ it stimulates, penis or clitoris, 
as this is the most likely signifier of the negation of 
lack desired by the mother. It is reprimanded for this 
self~stimulation, and cannot help but associate that 
reprimand with the two most salient aspects of its activity, 
its phantasy and the significance as phallus of the organ 
it was stimulating. When it perceives that the mother is 
lacking a penis, given that she is the most developed form 
of little girls, who also lack all but rudimentary penises, 
the possibility of being punished for its ~elf~stimulation 
by losing the most salient aspect of it, the precious 
organ, becomes for the infant a reality. Castration, it 
may be emphasized, must be the most terrifying possibility, 
for it would deprive the infant of the means to attaining 
its most powerful desire, to be the object of the mother's 
desire, the phallus, which is represented on the body by 
the penis. 
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It ~an be said that this signifier is chosen 
because it is the most., tangible element in 
the real of sexual copulation, and also the 
most symbolic in the literal (typographical) 
sense of the term, since it is equivalent 
there to the (logical) copula. It might also 
be said that, by virttie of its turgidity, it 
is the image of the vital flow as it is 
transmitted in generation (Lacan, 1977a, p.287). 
And so• in the psychoanalytic view, in consequent terror 
of castration, the infant usually fends off or repudiates 
the phantasy of union with the mother, for which phantasy 
it is understood to perceive itself as repeatedly 
reprimanded. It represses this phantasy or image of 
union and being the phallus, placing a barrier between 
the phantasy and its own consciousness. In Lacan's 
words, "the urverdrangt (primally repressed) finds its 
signifier by receiving the mark of the Verdrangung 
(repression) of the phallus" (ibid., p.288). 
But the infant, the argument goes, has not done away 
with its overruling desire for completion through the 
mother's desire. This still lives on unconsciously. 
Indeed, it is made all the more permanent by. virtue of 
its being unconscious, since it is no longer susceptible 
to reality testing. But the child is now impelled to 
find a means of gaining thi.s object, desire for which 
still and forever dominates its motives, without its own 
terrified conscious detecting it. 
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The male child i.s. seen. to do so by identifying with. th.e 
father. In this way it compromises by learning to wait 
for someone like the mother, instead of the mother 
herself, and by learning to be like him who has the 
phallus, instead of learning (impossibly) to be the 
phallus. "In the qu~st for the phallus 1 the subject 
moved from being it to having it" (Lacan, quoted in 
Lemaire, p.95). 
The process through which the female child goes is 
rather more complex to account for than the male child's 
(Freud, 1924, 1933). But the end result, as far as it 
is relevant here, is the same. In Lacan's words, "the 
clinical facts •.• reveal a relation of the subject to the 
phallus that is established with~ut regard to the 
anatomical difference of the sexes, and which, by this 
. very fa&t, makes any interpretation of this relation 
especially difficult in the case of women" (1977a, p.282). 
Because of this complexity, only the male example of the 
Oedipal resolution will be given here, to avoid making 
the argument of this chapter more complicated than it already 
is. This will not injure the aim of reaching general 
conclusions about the na.ture or being of the human subject. 
These, however, (lre the child's more conscious motivations. 
In the depths of its unconscious the original desire, 
uncompromising, is seen by psychoanalysis still to act, 
albeit through the d.ista.nt representation of the 
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compromising conscious derivati.v:es of it. 3 Tllis 
wLLl be elaborated at several points in the rest of 
this chapter. 
This process is of course the transition through the 
. Oedipus complex (or simply the Oedipus, as Lacan calls 
it), and there is an all-important corollary of it. 
This is the entry into speaking language. Lacan 
reconstructs this as follows: 
The child has been impelled by the castration-terror 
to make a radical separation between itself and the 
mother. It is therefore no longer in the imaginary 
register in a predominant way, but relates to the most 
important parts of its world in a manner which distin-
guishes between self and non-self. 
There is a further complexity to this, owing to the 
persistence of the original operation of desire -in the 
unconscious. The child's desire, persisting as it 
does, does not permit the real abandonment of the mother 
by the child. It does not permit, that is, the child to 
assert an unequivocal separation. This is implicit in 
the fact that the child is motivated to identify with the 
father because it is motivated not to lose its original 
object of desire. Consequently it may be said that the 
child has taken. the identification with the father as its 
3. "The ego is not in a position to exterminate these 
unsubdued mental powers, but it turns its back on 
them, lets them remain at the lowest psychological 
level, defends itself from their demands by the 
energetic erection of protective and antithetical 
barriers or seeks to come to terms with them by 
means of substitutive satisfactions" (Freud, 1919b, 
p.260). 
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immediate desire, but that this desire has simultaneously 
the unconscious meaning of a circuitous route to the 
mother's desire. The identification with the father may 
therefore be said to stand for the mother's desire as far 
as the infant's desire is concerned. 
To digress momentarily in order to put this more 
precisely, the identification with the father is not under-
stood as becoming a duplicate of him. Presumably only 
certain of his characteristics have significance for the child, 
and the outstanding one of these must be thought to be his 
claim to possess the phallus which is desired by the mother. 
The child therefore desires to be like the f~ther insofar 
as he has the phallus. And that is not the father as he 
really is. No one possesses that which can complete 
another's lack, and which is signified by the phallus. 
But the father does, in this view, represent to the child 
whoever may possess the phallus, because, it is thought, his 
relationship to the mother brings him closest to it in the 
child's eyes .. So the child desires to identify with the 
father insofar as he signifies him who possesses the phallus. 
The child is as yet presumably incapable of making this 
dis~inction, and that does not affect the process under 
discussion. But it is an important distinction in our 
speaking about this process. 
Lacan calls this signifying function of the· father "the 
Name-of-the-father", distingui.Shing it from the real 
father. Thus the penis is at the disposal of the father, 
while the phallus is said to be disposed of in the Name-
of-the-Father. 
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To take up the thread of the argument, then, the 
Name-of-the-Father, rather than the real father, may 
be said to stand for the mother's desire as far as the 
infant's desire is concerned. 
The phantasy of the primal scene is the 
imprint, as it were, upon which the Oedipus 
will be structured. Precipitated into the 
unconscious by primal repression, this 
phantasy can be named by the Name-of-the-
Father, as it is none other than the phantasy 
of the desire of the mother (Stein, quoted in 
Lemaire, ibid., p.89). 
Thus the child has learnt to substitute one term for 
another, and to make it signify the other for the first 
time in a durable or consistent way, as signifier bound 
to. signified. 
Furthermore, as Lacan construes it, the mother's desire, 
in turn, may be said to. stand for the phallus for the 
infant. This too is. now fixed in the unconscious. The 
child may therefore be said to have created a triple-layered 
substitution: Name-of-the-Father stands for mother's desire 
stands for phallus. The mother's desire has been elided 
from this chain by its repression in reaction to the 
castration terror. Consequently the Name~of-the-Father now 
stand.s •for or signifies the phallus. The· Name-of-the-
Fa.ther has replaced. the mother's desire as a signifier. 
of the phallus,. or, more a.ccurately, has elided it: the 
mother.•s desire is present as a link, but cannot be 
noticed as present. 
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The child has therefore created a metaphor. In 
Lacan's words, "the metaphor of the Name-of.,.the-Father .•. 
substitutes this Name in the place first symbolized by 
the operation of the absence of the mother"_ (1977a, p.200). 
This is not strictly speaking the child's action: the 
metaphor has been created willy-nilly by the child's 
desire, as the only way of preserving its object and aim 
·while avoiding the castration attendant upon that 
preservation of object. In Lemaire's summary, "Through 
the paternal metaphor, the child names his desire and 
renounces it. His true desire and the multiple phantas-
matic forms it took are pushed back into the unconscious. 
This is the pr;i.mal repression •.. which substitutes a symbol 
and a Law for the Real of existence" (Lemaire, ibid., p.87). 
The use of "the Real" in the prece'ding quotation should be 
clarified here: for Lacan, "the Real is not synonymous with 
external reality, but rather with what is real for the 
subject" (Wilden, 1968, p.161). 
An additional point is that, as discussed above, the 
child is seen to have learnt to relate to a world of 
objects separate from itself. That is to say, it has 
learnt to name objects and identify them by their difference 
·from each other. The combination of .this ability to oppose 
things to each other and define them by their difference 
from each other, and of .the ability to operate metaphorically, 
is the basis of an ability to use language,· as suggested in 
Chapter Two. "This .•• primal repression •.. determines access 
to language" (Lemaire, p.87). The child can therefore be 
said to have entered into language; it is no longer an 
infant. It is now in a position to name itself as 'I' in 
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opposition to the other pronouns and proper names, 
each of these being separate from itself and from each 
other. This, in this view, is a momentous event with 
far-reaching implications for the nature of this human 
being. 
It is crucial to note that in terms of Lacan•s account 
it is not the child that has acted here so much as the 
child's desire, and the intervention of the father. 
For the child has been radically divided into conscious 
and unconscious, and the meanings of its actions and the 
objects of its actions are completely distinct in the two 
realms. What has brought this about is the operation of 
desire: what we speak of as the child has been constructed 
by that operation. The child has been created by the 
creation of the paternal metaphor. Thus Lacan can speak 
of "the split (Spalturig) which the subject undergoes by 
virtue of being a subject only insofar as he speaks" (1977a, 
p.269). There was, indeed, no such being as a human child 
before that metaphor eventuated, and consequently it 
cannot be said to have created the metaphor. "The moment 
in which desire becomes human is also that in which the 
child is born into language" (Lacan, quoted in Lemaire, 
p.168). And,, "It is by being named in the.father-mother 
dialogue that the subject becomes 'he'" (Miller, quoted in 
Lemaire, p.70). 
Furthermore,: desire itself, as it is found in psycho-
analysis, is! only fully brought about in this entry into 
language. "besire is an effect in the subject of the 
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condition that is imposed on. him by the e:>e.istence of 
the discout~e, to make hi~ need pass through the defiles 
of the signifier" (Lacan, l977a, p.264). For one can 
only desire something to the extent that it is not oneself. 
And radical separation of self and other, as opposed to 
mere hints ot separation dominated by imagiriary identif ica-
' 
tion or uriity, can only be conceived of, in this theory, 
' 
upon entry into language, which is the same as passing 
through the Oedipus. As Lacan puts it, it is then that 
"desire in the subject must pass through the defiles of 
the signifie~" (quoted in Lemaire, p.170). This is a very 
simplistic account of the emergence of desire, but the 
elaboration of its emergence is irrelevant to this thesis. 
The subject, 
1 
as we shal;t. henceforth call the. subjec.t of 
desire, has now entered into a new way of relating to the 
world. Laca;n calls this the symbolic register, .as 
opposed to the imaginary register, since it is character-
ised as Lacan identifies it, by the use of symbols, notably 
in language.; Beca.use there is a differentiation between 
self arid non~self, and between objects, in this register, 
i 
the relations in it a.re mediate, that is, involving 
medi_ating distances between objects, as opposed to the 
i 
immediate relating of .the imaginary .described earlier. And 
it is no lanker a dual mode of relating, but a triadic one, 
since a third term, mos.t importantly and pr~ma.lly the 
father, has intervened in the relation of the child to its 
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objects (of which the most iinf>orta.nt is the mother) • 4 
By internalizing the Law, the child identifies 
with the father and takes him as a model. The 
Law now becomes a liberating force: for, once 
separated from the mother, the child can 
dispose of himself. He becomes conscious that 
he is still in the making and, turning towards 
the future, integrates himself into the social, 
into Culture, and re-enters into language 
(Vergote, quoted in Lemaire, p.84). 
4, In 1924 Freud issued a circular to his "Committee" 
of trusted followers, in which he suggested an 
interpretation of the controversial work of Rank 
and Ferertczi which bea.rs a remarkable similarity 
to elements of Lacan's contribution. "Some instinct 
must be associated with the birth trauma which aims 
at restoring the previous existence. One might call 
it the instinctual need for happiness, understanding 
there that the concept 'happi-ness' is mostly used in 
an erotic sense. Rank now goes.further than psycho-
pathology and shows how men alter the outer world in 
the se.rvice of this instinct, whereas neurotics have 
(sic) themselves this trouble by taking the short cut 
of phantasying a return to the womb •. ·If one adds to 
Rank•s conception the one of Ferenczi, that a man can 
be represented by his genital, then for the first time-=;;;:. 
we get a derivation of the normal sexual instinct which 
falls into place with our conception of the world. 
Now comes the point where I find the difficulties 
begin. Obstacles, whi.ch evoke anxiety, the barriers 
against incest, are opposed to the phantastic return 
to the. womb: now where do these come firom? Their 
representative is evidently the father, reality, the 
authority which does not permit incest" (quoted in 
Jones, 1961, p.526, insertion added). 
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3~3 The Problem of· Meaning in Speaking of the Subject 
One valuable aspect of Lacan's approach is that it 
takes into account the epistemological problems in 
investigating through the medium of language· entities 
who themselves operate through that medium. By taking 
these problems into account Lacan arrives at far-reaching 
conclusions. A rudimentary argument leading to his 
conclusions will be outlined below, a·nd his statements 
will follow. .Some important implications drawn out by Lacan 
from this, .in his theorising of the constitution of the 
. subject, will then be argued. 
I 
It was mentioned at the end of the first section of this 
chapter that it is very d.ifficult to speak about the 
experiences and rea.ctions of the infant which cannot yet 
speak. In fact it is impossible to speak about these 
things except in a very indirect way, even a mythic way. 
This is so becau~e meaning itself only exists once -language 
exists. There can for example be no such thing as a true 
statement or a false one until there is such a thing as a 
statement. And, s·imilarly, there cannot be a meaning of. a 
proposition until there is such a thing as a proposition. 
·This is not to say .that language occurs first, preceding 
meaning which occurs after. It is simply to say that 
meaning is not conceivable without language. 
It may be argued that there can be meaningful' experiences 
before they can be articulated or before their meaning 
can be expressed in signs. There are two important 
objections to this. 
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Firstly, the "meaning" which. such experiences would 
·bear would not be the "meaning" which is meant by 
language-speakers' use of the word. The "meaning" 
language-speakers mean is given by common experience 
in the use of words or signs. Given such commonly 
understood usages, there are criteria for distinguish-
ing between what is meaningful and what is meaningless. 
And, of course, the step of deciding whether a state-
ment is true or false cannot be taken until it can be 
established whether that statement is meaningful or 
not. (An example, which may be helpful, of a meaning-
less statement which is nevertheless grammatically 
sound is Chomsky's "colourless green ideas sleep 
. . 
furiously" (cited in Pettit, 1975, p.102). The truth 
or falsity of this statement cannot conceivably be 
discussed}. The "meaning" of "meaningful experiences 
which cannot be expressed in signs" is not of this 
type just qiscussed above. For it does not rely on 
criteria given by common usage of language, simply 
because it is by definition not capable of express-ion 
in language. Furthermore, we can have no way of 
establishing what rela.tion if any that "meaning" has to 
the "meaning" meant by language-speakers. For to 
establish the nature of such a relationship,· which we 
would have to do by using language, also requires the 
potential use of language-speakers' criteria of 
meaningfulness, whicn are again inapplicable to non-
languagable experiences. 
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Thus we have no means of knowing what we are talking 
about wheh we speak of "meaningful ·experiences which 
cannot be: expressed in signs". Whether they exist 
or not is therefore beside the point: we can make 
no use of· such a statement in any context where its 
truth or falsity or the truth or falsity of its 
implications are of interest. That is, we cannot use 
it in a scientific or any discursive context. 
The second, and related objection, is that it follows 
from the above argument that the one who undergoes such 
I 
"meaningful" but unlanguagable experiences, cannot her/ 
himself experience them as meaningful in the sense given 
to meanin~ by language users. She/he is also not in a 
position to know what that "meaningfulness" of the 
experienc~s entails, what she/he her/himself means by 
it, ·and what the nature of the experience was. This is 
so becaus~ there are no criteria for him/her to -apply, 
to give ttj.e .use of the word a meaning. She/he cannot, 
that is, ~now whether the experiences are meaningful. 
This i.s so just because she/he does not know wha.t she/he 
I 
I 
means by saying it, just as one cannot comment on whether 
a gworkurri eats joils or not - and we will not be able to 
until gworkum and. joils are defined in language. 
It has been argued above that for. someone to speak 
meaningfully about something, and to experience. something 
i 
meaningfuI,ly, it is absolutely necessary that she/he be 
I 
capable of' speaking a language. This assertion. is, I 
believe, furidamental to Lacan's analysi~ of the subject, 
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and to the way in which he theorises about the inf ant 
before language is accessible to it. The argument 
' i 
given abov~ in support of this assertion is clearly 
only a sketch of an argument. There is, however, 
an entire Wittgensteinian corpus of work wh.ich argues 
for, and uses this assertion, of which the seminal work 
is probably Wittgenstein's own Philosophical Investigations 
(1958). Lacan himself is clear in his adherente to it. 
"For .•. the originality of the analytic method ••• depends on •.• 
the means.~.of the word, insofar as the Word confers a 
meaning on the functions of the individual" (Lacan, 1968, 
p.19). The sketch given here will therefore suffice to 
give the tenor of such fuller arguments, albeit crudely 
and even simply incorrectly. What is necessary for this 
thesis is the fact that Lacan adheres to this tenet of 
linguistic,philosophy. 
Lacan stat~s that "speech constitutes truth" (1977a, p.43); 
and elsewhere he says, "the symptom is a return of truth. 
It is to be interpreted only in the order of the signifier, 
I 
which is meaningful only in relation to another signifier" 
(quoted in Lemaire, p.188). That is, "Lacan uses 'signifier' 
in a contextual_ theory of meaning, and would obviously 
subscribe to Wittgenstein's slogan: 'The meaning is the 
use'. Thus he also uses 'signifier' to avoid the 
implication that any given word 'contains' or 'has' a mean-
ing of its: own, outside its d.iacritic refe.rence to other 
I 
signifiers~' (Wilden, l,968, p.235). And finally, "The 
more closely one grasps things, the more clearly one sees 
that, somewhere in the d.iscourse made by the other, there 
. ' 
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with it. The crmich of the matter for µacan, however, is that 
. ( 
the converse applies. There is an all-1.np:)rtant conscious part 
of us (to use grossly misleading teJ:Jninology) which has meaning, 
but no being. '!his is the conscious subject of desire. 
Iet us illustrate this with what we are dealing 
with here, namely, the being of the subject, that 
which is there beneath the meaning. If we choose 
being, the subject disappears., it eludes us, it 
falls into non-meaning. If we choose meaning, the 
meaning survives only deprived of that part of 
non""il'\eaning that is, strictly speaking, that which 
constitutes in the realization of the subject, the 
unoonscious. In other words, it is of the nature 
of this meaning, as it emerges ••. to be ... eclipsed 
by the disappearance of being, induced. by the very 
function of the signifier (Lacan, 1977b, p.211). 
The reason lies in the fact that the part of us which has meaning 
only has it because it is in language. Lacan gives a way of 
elaborating this by explaining the dynamic aspect of the splitting 
of conscious and unconscious, separation. In order to enter into 
the symbolic and language, Lacan maintains the child's desire 
creates_a metaphor, the paternal metaphor, in which the Name-of-
the-;Father replaces the nother's desire in signifying the phallus. 
'Ibis metaphor is not to be conceived of simply a phenanienon outside 
of the child, whiCh the ch.ild could for exanple now observe and 
discuss. · '!he nature of the child. must be seen as having been 
organised according to the structure of this metaphor. For the 
only "'ffelY that the child could construct this metaphor, given that 
- ------- -------------------------------
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it related pred.ominal'ltl y: . in the ~ginary prior to the copstitution 
of that metaphor, was by reorganising itself to make a .new m:xle of 
relating, a new register, possible. And this reorganisation, as 
was argued in the preceding section, consisted in a radical 
split into conscious and unconscious.. 
·is spl.it we have already discussed in tenns of its static .aspect,. 
the vel of alieriation. We assimilated. it then to the split between. 
what is in language and what is not. But by taking into account 
separation, the.dynamic operation of desire just described above, 
by which the vel of alienation .is enabled to occur, additional 
in'plications of the split emerge. 
The nost important of these implications, for the m::>rnent, is that 
the excluded portion of the child is understood to be the child's 
! 
original desire. It is the desire before it has contorted, distorted 
and ):Udden itSelf by the creation of the paternal metaphor, before it 
has lost its inunediate nature by being diffracted in the defiles of 
the signifier. "It is worth recalling that it is in the oldest 
demand that the primaiy identification is produced, .that which is 
brought about by the rrother' s. c;ronipotence, that is to say, .the 
identification that not only suspends the satisfaction of needs from 
the signifying apparatus, but also that which fragments them, filters 
them, J!O(iels them upon the defiles of the structure of the signifier" 
(Lacan, 1977a, p.255). 
Again, 
desire is situated in dependence on demand - wh.ich, by 
being articulated in signifiers, leaves a metonymic 
remainder that runs under it, an eler.cent that is not 
indetex:minate, · which is· a condition both, absolute and. 
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unapprehensible, an.elemmt necessarily ;tackih9, 
unsatisfied, impossible, miseonstrued. Cmeconnu) , 
an element that is called desire (Lacan, 1977b, p.154). 
This quote also makes clear that the part of the child which is 
in language is'ortly that which has been substituted for the 
excluded part. For, as was argued in the preceding section, the 
patemal metaphor and with it the split into conscious. and 
unconscious, was created by the rendering unconscious of the 
desire for the rrother's desire and. the substitution for it of the 
Name-of-the-Father, which nCM represented or signified it. So 
what remains conscious, in language, are signifiers o~ what is 
unconscious. 
It may be added that these signifiers clearly have other uses in.· 
addition to signifying what is unconscious. But those uses do not 
affect our present argument, since from the point of view of 
desire all signif iers used by the subject signify what is 
unconscious, and the other uses of signifiers do not contradict this. 
'lb return to the main argument, it follCMS that the subject of 
desire does not exist insofar as she/he is in language. For all 
that exists in language are substitutes for true desire, which is 
repressed into a split-off unconscious. The subject of desire 
which is rnanif ested in language is the subject of a substitute for 
) 
desire, what La.can calls the subject of demand, where demand is 
need expressed in language. The subject of the true, original 
desire, is only to be found in the uneonscious. And the true 
subject of desire has being. . The only being possessed by the 
subject that is manifested iri language is not its ,own, but that of 
language· itself •. 
And 
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The fading of the subject. (splitting) comes about 
in the suspension of desire, because the subject 
is eclipsed in the signifier of demand. and in. the 
fixation of the phantasy · (Lacan, quoted in Iemaire, 
p.165). 
The signifier ••• functions as a signifier only to 
reduce the subject in question to being no rrore 
than a signifier, to petrify the subject in the 
same rroverrent in which it calls the subject to 
function, so to speak, as subject (Iacan, 1977b, 
p.207)~ 
We are now at the point where the tnreaqs of this section can COin::! 
together. The subject that is manifested in lanauage is not only, 
as it obviou.Sly is, the subject that speaks and of which we speak. 
It is also the only subject that can speak and of which we can 
speak. This is so because the subject of the true desire is 
unconscious and kept so by its own operation in constructing the 
patemal metaphor. Consequently, the only subject of which we can 
speak.and the only subject which can itself speak, has no being 
other than that of language. 
Furthe:rnore, this is the only subject of which we can say that it 
can act and understand the meaning of its action. For the subject 
in the unconscious is not in language and consequently has no 
necessary relation to the meaning meant by language-speakers. 
Thus the human subject, insofar as we can speak about it meaning-
fully, and insofar as it can.meaningfully act, has meaning but no being. 
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The subject of .speetji, cm;l, action., tPet'l, has n-o bei!lg other th.an 
that of language. That is to say, .the "I" of the spoken statement 
is not merely a sign;i.fier signifying the subject; it is on the 
contracy all of the subject that appears in the world of meaning, 
the synibolic register. Md, it is all o:f the subject that can act 
meaningfully. For "the characteristic of the subject of the 
unconscious is that of being, beneath the signifier than develops 
its networks, its chains and its history, at an indeterminate place" 
(Lacan, ibid., p.208). Consequently, insofar as we discuss and 
analyse the Subject in any discursive context, we are speaking -
and can only speak - abc>Ut scrnething that has the characteristics 
of a. li!lguistic unit. Lacan takes the signifier as this unit, 
partly because a pure signifier is conceivable, while a pure 
signified, without a signifier, is not. The relevant characteristics 
of the signifier were discussed. in Chapter 'IWo. The two rrost 
important in. this context are, firstly, that the signifier has no 
positive being of its own, but is defined only by its difference 
franall the other signifiers with which it is in a synchronic 
relation. In Lacan.'s words, "the signifier is constituted only 
from a·synchronic ••• collection of elements in which each is sustained 
only by the principle of its opposition to each of the others" (ibid., 
p. 263) • And secondly, that the signifier has no necessary consistency 
over time, since it can occupy different and contradictory synchronic 
positions depending on changing contexts. "The signifiers were able to 
constitute themselves in simultaneity only by virtue of ••• constituent 
diachrony" (Lacan, 1977b, p.46). The first of these characteristics of 
the signifier we called in the preceding chapter the paradigmatic 
aspect, or synchronic aspect, and. the second we called the syntagmatic, 
or diachronic aspect. 
Thus the "I" of the spoken statement (the enonce, as the spoken 
-95-
statenent is frequently called) has no positive beinc; of its 
own, but is only defined by its dif;ference fran a.ll the other 
pronouns, proper names, and other synchronic tenns. And, again, 
as argued al:ove, this is the nature of the subject entirely, 
insofar as she/he has access to ireaning. 
These last two points are crucial to the argument of this thesis. 
· 3. 4 · The Entraprent of Desire ·in Contradiction 
A central fact produced by psychoanalysis which reinains to be 
considered is that the subject, despite the fact of her/his possessing 
. only the being of a signifier, believes her /himself to have a 
consistent, positive being, at least in Western cultures. She/he 
believes that she/he has what may literally be called an identity -
that which remains the same. This section will describe how Lacan 
. . 
deals with this fact and how he theorises its contradictory relation 
to what he oonstrues to be the true state of affairs. "Truth", it 
should be added, has the sane status here as "fact". Truth is the 
facts p~uced by theoretical 'VX:>rk;_ it is not revealed. 5 I.a.can's 
conclusions will be elaborated. on a little. 
That this account is dependent on theorising, and does not claim to 
be absolute reality, will be taken from. now on as read, and not 
perpetually indicated in the text. For, to recur to Freud's words, 
"It seems unnecessary for :me to appeal here to the 'as if' which has 
bec:xxce so popular. The :value of a 1 fiction' of this kind ••• depends 
. . 
on how much one can achieve with its help" (l,926, p.194). 
. 5. "Furt:Per reflection. tells us that the adult's ego-feeling 
cannot have been the s~ frcm the beginning. It must 
have gone through a. process of developnent, which, cannot, 
of course / be dem:>nstrated but which admits of being · 
constructed with a fair degree of probability" (Freud, 
19:3(), p.66). . . 
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The subj~, it .was concluded in the' preceding section, has 
meaning insofar as it speaks, but no being. This is 
the subject of the spoken statement, the enonce. And 
the subject where it really is, where it has being, in the 
unconscious, has no meaning. This is a consequence of the 
ra.dical split between conscious and unconscious brought 
about by the primal repression involved in creating the 
paternal metaphor. 
Although the split is radical, however, what is conscious 
and speaks language, the subject of the enonce, was 
originally brought into being as a substitute for or derivative 
of the now-unconscious subject. This was argued in the 
preceding section to follow from the nature of the paternal 
metaphor. Thus the unconscious subject, although split off 
from the subject of the. enonce, still speaks in a derivative 
form through it. 
For a minimal composition of the battery of 
signif iers. suffices to install in the 
signifying chain a duplicity which overlaps 
with its reduplication of the subject, and 
it is this reduplication of the subject of 
speech that the unconscious as such finds 
the means to articulate itself {Lacan, quoted ,,, 
in Lemaire, p.119). 
The unconscious subject lies behind all the statements 
o& the subject of the enonce. 
Lacan therefore distinguishes this unconscious subject 
by calling it the subject of the act of speaking, of the 
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enunciation itself rather than the statement, the 
subject of the enoncia.tio"n. This subject may be 
inferred from its effects on the speech and acts of 
the subject of the enonce, in parapraxes, jokes, dreams, 
and neurotic and psychotic symptoms. When the subject 
is not specified here, it will be the true subject, the 
subject of the: enonciation, that is being spoken of. 
· In the last section the automatic splitting effect of . 
language and meaning was discussed, and Lacan's name for 
it, the vel of alienation, mentioned. He calls it the 
· vel for a reason significant in this context.. Vel, 
the Latin for "or", is appropriate to designate a type 
of choice. The specific type of choice which Lacan 
introduces is 
a choice whose properti.es depend on this, that 
there is, in the joining, one element that, 
whatever the choice operating may be, has as 
i.ts consequence a. neither one, nor the other. 
The choice, then, is a matter of knowing whether 
one wishes to preserve one of the parts, the 
other di.s.appearing in any case. 
L~t u~ illustrate this with what we are dealing 
' 
with here, namely, the being of the subject, 
that which is there beneath the meaning .. · If we 
choose being, the. subject disappears, it.eludes us, 
it falls into non-meaning. If we choose meaning, 
the .meanin:g survives only deprived of .that part 
of non-meaning that is·, strictly speaking, that 
which constitutes in the realization of the 
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subj ect, the unconscious. In other words, 
it is of the nature of this meaning .•. to 
be ••• eclipsed by the disappearance of being, 
induced by the very function of the signifier ... 
'Y()ur freedom or your life! If he chooses 
freedom, he loses both immediately - if he 
chooses life, he has life deprived of 
freedom (Lacan, 1977b, op.211-212). 
The, subject, then, may choose .to enter language, and so 
lose being, or not to enter language, and so not gain meaning. 
Remembering that the vel of alienation is one aspect of the 
Oedipal resolution, we can now again take into account the 
other, dynamic aspect, separation. Separation, it will be 
recalled, is that operation of desire by which the subject 
brings about the split by constructing the paternal metaphor. 
It does this in order to preserve the object and aim of 
d.esire while avoiding the castration attendant upon this 
preservation. And it is impelled to do so with all the 
force of the need to escape absolute lack, with all the 
force of its desire to be complete and satiated in the 
mother, and with all the force of its terror at the threat 
of losing the organ which signifies the possibility of 
fulfilling those n~eds and desires.. The subject is there-
fore impelled into this no-win choice, the veL of 
alienation, and into being irrevocably split into the 
subject of meaning or the subject of being. 
It will be recalled from the section on the mirror stage . 
that the primal object of desire is to be the object of 
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the mother's desire, and hence to be an object such 
as she might recognise. On the basis of this desire 
the ego is developed, an imaginary coherent and consistent 
image, with which the subject identifies in the imaginary 
register. 
The drama of the subject ••. is that he faces 
the test of his lack of being. It is because 
it fends Off this moment of .lack that an 
image moves into position to support the 
whole worth of desire:. projection, a function 
of the Imaginary (Lacan, quoted in Lemaire, p.72). 
It will be recalled too from the section on the problem 
of meaning, that the subject is in fact not such a 
consistent being, but only has the being of a signifier. 
That is, it has no positive being of its own, but only 
definition given to it by its difference from all the 
other terms with which it is in relation. Furthermore, 
'it has rio necessary consistency over time, but can be 
defined in contradictory ways in different contexts. 
Indeed, even the "ego •.. is" in fact "intermittent" 
(Lacan, 1977a, p~313). These we called the paradigmatic 
(or synchronic) and syntagmatic (or diachronic) aspects 
respectively. Furthermore, as we have just argued, it is 
the subject's desire which impells it to enter the 
symbolic and language and so to become a signifier insofar 
as it has meaning. Thus the subject becomes "subordinated 
to the same conventional conditions as those of the 
si~nifier in its double registe~: the synchronic register 
of opposition between irreducible elements, and the 
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diachronic register of substitution and combination, through 
which language, even if it does not fulfil all functions, 
structures everything concerning relations between human 
beings" (Lacan, 1977a, p.255). 
The subject is therefore impelled by desire to occupy two 
simultaneous and contradictory positions. In the one, it 
6 believes itself to be a consistent positive being, the ego. 
This is in the imaginary. 
The only homogeneous function of consciousness 
is the imaginary capture of the ego by its mirror 
reflection and the function of misrecognition 
which remains attached to it (Lacan, quoted in 
Lemaire, p.73). 
And 
The ego is absolutely impossible to distinguish 
from the imaginary captures which constitute it 
from head to foot: by another and for another 
(Lacan, quoted ibid.). 
6. "Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain 
than the feeling of our. se1~ of our own ego. This ego 
appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked 
off distinctly from everything else. That such an 
appearance is deceptive, and that on the contrary the 
ego is continued inwards, without any sharp delimitation, 
into an unconscious mental entity which we designate as 
the id and for which it serves as a kind of facade -
this was a discovery first made by psycho-analytic 
research .•• But towards the outside, at any rate, the ego 
seems to maintain clear and sharp lines of demarcation" 
(Freud, 1930, p.66). And "The ego is here playing the ~ 
ludicrous part of the clown in a circus who by his 
gestures tries to convince the audience that every change 
in the circus ring is being carried out under his orders" 
(Freud, 1914, p.53). 
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Furthermore, what is signified by the "I''. with. which the 
subject designates him/herself, and by all the phrases and 
I 
aspects of verbal and non-verbal style that present the subject 
in. various ways, is mis.recognised by the subject as the ego. 
The I signified by language, that is, is identified with the 
imaginary object that is the ego. The "imaginary process •.• 
begins with the specular image and goes on to the constitution 
of the ego by way of subjectification by the signifier" (Laca~, 
1977a, p~307). 
In the other position, the subject is in fact committed to 
having no positive being at all, naving taken the choice of 
the vel of alienation. This is in the symbolic. Lacan calls 
the misbelief of the first position a meconnaissance, a misrecog-
nition. 
The contradiction outlined above is complex. firstly, there 
is a trap for desire in the imaginary meconnaissance.. For 
nothing can in reality give the subject's desire complete satiety: 
the subject is, irrevocably upon being born, char~cterised or 
marked by a. lack, So the imaginary ego, developed to lure the 
mother's desire, is a futile construction. This ~onstruction, 
however, cannot be abandoned. For it has not been destroyed upon 
entry into the symbolic, but repressed into the unconscious, 
the contents of which are eternal, since they are not susceptible 
to reality-testing and modification (Freud, 1915b). The entry 
into the symbolic has therefore removed the possibility of 
abandoning the subject's original and futile means of achieving 
,7 
the object o~ i.ts. d.esire. 
..-192.,.. 
Secondly, the entry into the syutbo:U::c was not merely a 
path to reach a goal of desire alternative to the p:t:ima;J.. 
goal, and which just b,appened to contradict the primal goal. 
It wa.s, on the contrary, a path taken to avoid losing that 
. ~ J?rimal goal, upon the threat of ca.stration, a direct 
threat to remove.all apparent possibility of reaching the 
goal. Thus the subject's d.esire, in. preserving its goal, 
brought about the negation or loss of even what the imaginary 
had to offet by way of achieving that goal. In effect the 
subject has exchanged a real castration for a symbolic one. 
Third.ly, the subject's desire, by becoming committed to the 
symbolic, and consequently re leg a.ting the primal desire. to 
the unconscious, has deprived that primal desire of meaning.· 
It can therefore only find meaning in representatives and 
substitutes on the level of spoken language. This means that 
it can never be satisfied, for whatever the spoken demand, 
it cannot mea.n what the unconscious desire is a desire for. 
Thus the entry into the symbolic, the means of preserving the 
primal goal of desire, is the very thing which causes the 
uri.satisfi.ed desire perpetually to be renewed. 
7. "We sha.11 not be wrong, perhaps, in saying that the weak 
point in the ego's organization seems to lie in its 
attitude to the sexua.l function, as though the biological 
antithesis between self-preservation and the preservation 
of the species had found a psychological expression at that 
point" (Freud, 1940, p.186). This quotation, while 
supporting the text, also displays a different use of 
terms like "the ego" to Lacan's, indicating his selective 
usage of Freudian.concepts to.develop a topology of the 
psyche which is arguably different from Freud's own. 
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The subject is therefore trapped in a triple. sense. It has 
made permanent a futile means to an impossible aim and object. 
It has per~nently removed itself further from attaining this 
object that it has permanently institutionalised, directly 
opposed itself to attaining that object, in the very attempt 
to preserve that original object. And it has rendered its 
need for that object permanent in the attempt to preserve the 
possibility of satisfying and removing that need. These three 
are inextricably in a self-perpetuating circle. The permanency 
of each is ensure9 by the permanency of each of the others. 
J\nd all this is motivated and supported by two desperate 
motivations of the subject's. The first is to fill the lack 
which engendered desire, a lack now permanently fixed by the 
split between conscious and unconscious, being and meaning. 
The second is to avoid castration, which would mean the clear 
impossibility of filling the lack. This castration is now 
permanently effected on the symbolic level, by the radical 
split from the mother, entailing abandoning the quest to be 
the phallus for her. The preservation by loss entailed in 
the triple trap is mirrored in the results of the double 
desperation which motivated its inception. 
The subject may therefore be said to be invested in language 
with a double desperation and a triple captation. 
I 
Two additional points need to be made to complete this chapter. 
The first of these is an elucidation of Lacan's concept of the 
Other. Upon entering into language, the subject enters an order 
which is constituted by commonly accepted usage of signs. And 
each element of this order, each sign, is only defined by its 
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relati.ons with all the other signs with which it can combine 
or which can replace it. This was elaborated in Chapter Two. 
It is clear that this order, the symbolic, must have existed 
before the subject entered it. For there would otherwise be 
no such thing as agreed usages and established definition by 
relations. 
The subject therefore enters an order which, while defining 
him/her, and giving him/her all the meaning she/he has, was 
originally completely other than the subject. "Symbols in 
fact envelop the life of man in a network so total that they 
join together, before he comes into the world, those who are 
going to engender him 'by flesh and blood'; so total that 
they bring to his birth ... the shape of his destiny; so total 
that they give the words that will make him faithful or 
renegade, the law of the acts that will follow him right to 
the very place where he is not yet and even beyond 
~. 
hi·s death; 
and so total that through them his end finds its meaning in 
the last judgement, where the Word absolves his being or 
condemns it" (Lacan, 1977a, p.68). This is one sense of what 
Lacan means by the Other, with a capital o. "The Other is, 
therefore, the locus in which is constituted the I who speaks 
to him who hears •.. But this locus also extends as far into the 
-
subject as the laws of speech, that is to say, well beyond the 
discourse that takes its orders from the ego, as we have known 
ever since Freud discovered its unconscious field and the laws 
that structure it" (ibid., p.141). 
It follows from the argument of .this chapter that the subject 
is invested in the Other with a double desperation and a triple 
captation. 
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For "the J?rima.ry iden.tificati,an. .•.• brou9ht a.bout by the mother's 
omnipotence •.• suspends the. satis!acti.on. of needs from the 
signifying apparatus" (ibi.d., p. 255) • 
The subject is therefore trapped in something, by virtue of which 
alone it is a hwrian subject capable of meanin9, and which at the 
same time operates or functions in ways entirely of its own. 
These are the ways o'.( symbolic formation·s: "the _.human organism 
in the most intimate recesses of its being, manifests its capture 
in a: symbolic dimension" (Lacan, 1972, p.39). This includes all 
the aspects of the social formation, economic, political, 
ideological and signifying. The subject is given meaning by the 
Other, and hence by social structures. "For where on earth would 
one situate the determinations of the unconscious if it is not in 
those nominal cadres in which marriage ties and kinship are 
always grounded for the speaking being that we are, in the raws 
of the Word where lineages found their right, in this universe of 
discourse with which these laws mingle their traditions? And 
how would one apprehend the analytical conflicts and their 
Oedipean prototype outside the engagements which have fixed, 
long before the subject came into the world, not only his destiny 
but his .identity itself?" (Lacan, quoted in Wilden, 1968, p.126). 
More simply, Lacan speaks of "the function of being for the Other, 
of situat1ng the subject in it, marking his place in the field of 
the group's relations, between each individual and all the others" 
(1977b, p.206. 
This is a more precise terminology for what has already been 
argued. In substituting the Name-of-the-Father for the mother's 
desire, for exa.mple, we said that the child entered into language. 
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Implicit in this is that the Name-of-the ... Father, being a 
signifier, is defined not a? a real positive bein·g but only 
by its relation to all·other ~ynchronously related signifiers. 
Consequently the child has in fact invested its desire in a 
whole network of signifiers, albeit a network which will 
become more elaborate and deta.iled. This may be put more 
neatly by saying that the subject's d.esire is in the Other 
in fact arises in the Other, sin.ce, as argued earlier, desire 
proper originates upon the entry into language. Furthermore, 
the phallus signified by the mother's desire is also a signifier, 
as is the mother's desire which signifies it. It may again be 
said therefore that, insofar as the subject desires to be the 
phallus to be desired by the mother, it desires the desire of 
the Other. 
Again, the unconscious contains repressed signifiers - although, 
as argued in connection with the imaginary, only their effects 
on conscious di.scourse can be spoken about, and not their precise 
nature in themselves - so that the unconscious, too, is in a 
sense the Other. Lacan speaks of the Other in ways so flexible 
as not to be uniform in a number of respects. "The Other, by which 
name we designate a place essential to the structure of the. 
symbolic". "If it (c;:a) speaks inthe Other it is because.it is 
there that the subject, by means of a logic anterior to any 
awakening of the signified, finds its signifying place". "Desire 
is the desire for desire, the desire of the Other and it is 
subject to the Law" (La:can, quoted in Lemaire, p.157, p.164). 
But only very limited uses of the concept of the Other are 
relevant to this thesis, principally its implication that the 
subject is trapped in social structures. This will be further 
argued in the next chapter. 
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The second point is that the subject is not only capable 
of using metaphor, but a:lso metonymy. Signifiers can only 
be substituted for one another by elided connections, once 
their distinction from each other is grasped, but they can 
be substituted for each other by connections of contiguity 
in time or place. This last is metonymy. It adds to our 
understanding of .how substitutes for and disguised signifiers 
of the unconscious elements are elaborated. as the human being 
develops. La:can assimilates metaphor and metonymy to Freud's 
condensation and displacement, respectively. 
And 
There is a homogeneous. structure in symptoms, 
dreams, parapraxes and jokes. The same structural 
laws of condensation and displacement are at work 
in them: these are the laws of _the unconscious. 
These laws are the same as those which create 
meaning in language (Lacan, quoted in Lemaire,· 
ibid~, pp.191-192). 
It is a question of rediscovering in the laws 
that govern that other scene ••. the effects that 
are discerned at· the level of _the chain of 
materially unstable elements that constitute 
language:. effects determined by the double play 
of combination and substitution in the signifier, 
according to the two aspects that generate _the 
signified: metaphor and metonymy (Lacan, l977a, 
p.285). 
Thus, in Lacan's words, "the structure of language has been 
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8 recognized in the unconscious" (1977a, p.298). 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to reach a few major conclusions. These 
are that the subject as we know it can only be thought of as ' 
a signifieri. that we cannot know or reach the being of the 
subject as this is unconscious and beyond languagei. that 
the subject's desire is trapped and invested in the Other 
with a double desperatio'n and a triple captation; and that, 
consequently, the subject is trapped in an impossible quest 
with a double desperation and a triple captation. These 
conclusions will be made major use of in the course of this 
thesis. 
Finally, let it be repeated that that part of Lacan's views 
which has been interpreted here has been ruthlessly constrained 
to the purposes of this thesis in respect to both relevance a~d 
space. It has therefore been .deadened to the point of necrosis, 
its value for all other purposes having been completely dis-
regarded. This is more a tribute to Lacan's versatility, however, 
than a comment on the validity of this interpretation for the 
purposes for which it is intended. 
8. Speaking of hysteria and contrasting it to obsessive 
compulsive neurosis, Freud states "repression does 
not take place by the construction of an excessively strong 
~ntithetic idea (as in the obsessive compulsive case) ... 
but by the intensification of a boundary idea, which •.• 
is the result of a compromise; this, however, is not 
manifested in a replacement on the basis of. some category 
of subject-matter (as in obsessive compulsive neurosis), 
but by displacement of attention along a series of ideas 
linked by temporal simultaneity •.. There is thus no need 
to assume that .the same idea is being suppressed at each 
repetitio'n of the primary attack;. it is a question in 
the first .instance of a gap in the psyche" {1896, pp. 
228-229, insertionJ'ladded). The last point makes the 
same ultimate connection between the use of or entry into 
language and the primary lack as Lacan makes. His own 
term beance ("gap") is pertinent here. 
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4 • LACAN AND IDEOLOGY 
It was concluded in the la.st chapter that the subject is 
trapped in language and the symbolic, and that the subject 
is therefore trapped in the social formation insofar as this 
is embodied in language and the symbolic. Furthermore, it 
was concluded that the subject is only conceivable in the 
same way in which a signifier may be conceived, and that the 
subject is given meaning only by language and therefore by 
the social formation. 
One aspect of the social formation which is clearly embodied 
in language and the symbolic, is ideology. An attempt will 
be made in this chapter to elaborate on the ways in which 
ideology contributes to the constitution of .the subject as 
understood by Lacan. 
For this purpose aspects of a particular post-Althusserian view 
on ideology will be adopted. This will be principally that taken 
by Barthes (1972a), Coward and Ellis (1977) and Bennett (1979). 
Only those aspects of this view that are relevant here will be 
defended. The debates which rage around the nature and 
importance of ideology will not be entered into. For the aim 
of this thesis is to answer, in a Lacanian framework, a specific 
question related to the individual experience of homosexuality 
in self and others. A specific conception of ideology has been 
chosen because the concepts it applies to some of_ the.:.:areas of 
its field of application are particularly useful in answeri~g the 
questions asked here. They a.re particularly useful for two 
reasons. Firstly, they ·are concepts which are directly 
pertirient to homophobia, concepts like "natural", "unnatural", 
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and the "constitution. of the subject". Secondly, the 
theoretica.l perspective implic'it in the formulation of 
these concepts coheres with the present interpretation of 
Lacan. This should become clea.r in the course of the chapter. 
The validity of this conception of ideology, as far as this 
thesis is concerned, _therefore, will lie in the use which 
this particular selection ot: its concepts is shown to have 
in answering the questions asked in the thesis. Whether it 
is a valid conception as a whole, or with respect to all the 
controversies over the place and nature of ideology, is of no 
consequence here. Section 4.2 will attempt to clarify the 
assumptions on which the present view on ideology is based, and 
also to specify some of the debates about ideology that are not 
relevant. This should help to clarify just what view is being 
ta.ken up here from the highly contentious area of the theory of 
ideology, and what debates are not being interfered with. 
4 .1 How Ideology Fits in with a Laca.nian Approach to· Homophobia 
Lacan, speaking of the Other, "by which name we designate a 
place essential to the structure of .the symbolic" (quoted in 
Lemaire, 1977, p.157), maintains that 
The signifier, producing itself in the field of 
the Other, makes manifest the subject of its 
signification. But it functions as a signifier 
only to reduce t~e subject in ques~ion ~o being 
no more than a signifier (1977b, p.207).:~ 
It was concluded in the previous chapter that the subject is 
constituted in and given meaning by language. Consequently 
the subject is constituted as part of a structure that 
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preceded it, the system that is language •. In Lacan's 
words, "the displacement of the signifier determines the 
subjects in their acts, in their destiny ... their innate 
gifts and social acquisitions notwithstanding ... and ... 
everything that might be considered the stuff of psychology, 
kit and caboodle, will follow the path of the signifier" 
(1972a, p.60~ Furthermore, the properties of the subject 
are therefore those of the signifier, in particular the "I" 
of .the spoken statement, the enonce. 
We may therefore learn more about the vicissitudes of the 
I 
subject by examining the properties of the signifier, and 
in particular of the signifier "I" and the other signifying 
structures that refer to the subject, such as style of speech 
and whole utterances. Some of these properties have already 
been discussed in an earlier. chapter. But of special importance 
to this thesis are the ideological properties of language, given 
that a certain attitude to homosexuality is evident and 
perpetuated in the ways in which it is spoken and written about 
and can only be communicated in signs. This chapter will 
therefore consist in an elaboration of some aspects of 
ideological discourse, with respect to their importance for 
the constitution of the "In of the: enonce~ 
. ' .. ~· '• 
4.2 A Definition of Ideology 
This section, as stated earlier, will be an attempt to 
specify the assumptions about ideology that are adopted here, 
as well as some of the 9ontroversial assumptions that are 
being avoided. This should help to clarify what is understood 
here .by "ideology". 
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Ideology will be taken here to be that aspect of a discourse 
which, for whatever reason, makes the world signified by the 
signifiers and statements in that discourse, appear 
unquestionably to have certain chara.cteristics which it does 
not in fact unquestionably have. It is the unquestionable, 
obviously-so nature of the signification that is to be 
stressed. in this definition. This will be elaborated in the 
next section. 
This initial definition may be objected to on the grounds that 
it says nothing useful, as it is possible that all language 
must inevitably signify the world as having unquestionable 
chara.cteristics. Indeed, it is arguable that human life would 
be impossible without such a signification. But it is not 
necessary to enter into this debate here. For even if all 
language is ideological, we can still identify the effects of 
ideology in particular contexts and meaningfully discuss them. 
Thus the above definition is not useless on that account. 
Ideology,· too, is not regarded here as identical to language. 
It is seen here as one way in which language operates, or as one 
level of analysis of language, suitable to answer certain types 
of question. The relation between language and ideology can, 
of course, be differently conceived for other purposes than the 
present ones. It is held here that "Ideology is a level of 
meaning which can be present in all kinds of discourses" (Larrain, 
1979, p.130). Indeed, it is an important point for the purposes 
of this thesis that language can be understood as containing a 
number of different and even contradictory ideological discourses 
simultaneously. As Coward and Ellis put it, 
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langua.ge is worked by ideologi.cal pra.ctice :. 
language at any historical moment is riddled 
with styles, rhetorics, "ways of speaking" 
which impose a. specific social position, a 
definite view of the world. These ideological 
discourses are the product of the articulation 
of ideology in language. Langua.ge is more than 
these discourses, just as ideology is more than 
just ideas (1877, p.79) . . ~ 
Ideology ca.n, however, be seen as having the characteristics 
of language, since it is only conceivable as a system of 
meanings. And meanin9, as we use the term, occurs only in 
language in the present view as argued in the preceding 
chapter. 
A relevant and contentious question is whether or not 
ideology has a s~ructure which remains identical through6ut 
history, as Althusser has claimed: 
the peculiarity of ideology is that it is endowed 
with a structure and a functioning such as to 
make it a non-historical reality, i.e. an omni-
historical reality, in the sense which that 
structure and functioning are immutable, present 
I 
in the same form throughout what we can call 
history (197la, pp.151-152). 
This is a debate that will not be entered into here. For all 
that is claimed for the· definition and account of ideology in 
-this chapter is that it applies to the contemporary Western 
cultures in which aversion to homosexuality exists. The 
-;t.I,4-, 
account of the gay predicani.ent which i.s the focus of this 
thesis is not put forward as an account for all time. The 
final outcome of the debate about Althusser's conception 
will not therefore affect the validity of .what this thesis 
attempts to do. 
There is another preliminary point whi.ch needs to be made. 
This is that Althusser's view is adopted here, that the 
ideological level of practice is relatively autonomous with 
respect to the political and economic levels of practice in 
the social formation. This is ·another extremely controversial 
assertion, with a debate centering on just what is meant by 
relative autonomy, and what the specific relationship is that 
holds between these levels of practice (for example, Hirst, 
1976; Larrain, 1979). Again, this debate will not be engaged 
in here. It is sufficient for the present purposes that 
ideology can arguably be viewed as autonomous to the point at 
which its effects can meaningfully be spoken of without 
immediate reference to the effects of the other levels of 
practice. This much is clea.r from the study of a number of 
areas (Coward & Ellis, 1977, p.67ff; Coward, Lipschitz & Cowie, 
1976). 
For it is no longer a matter of politics and 
ideology being superstructures which are 
supported/produced by the economic base, pre-
supposing that they will be forced to undergo 
their.revolutionary change when. the economic 
base is in revoluti.on. It is ra.ther a matter 
.. of seeing·' th~ articulation of _the th~ee ' 
practices which depends on the historically 
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specif i,c conjuncture. For the contradictions 
within each practiCe weigh upon the specific 
contradictions of .the others (Coward & Ellis, 
ibid• I p • 6 9) • 
This is not to say that ideology is or is not ultimately 
constituted by the economi.c relations of the social formation. 
No assertion in this connection need be made here. All that 
is being sai<;1 is that ideology may be spoken of as a factor 
in its own right, with its own "specific effectivity" 
Althusser, quoted in Belsey, 1980, p.133, emphasis in 
original) • Although the economy may be argued to be in the 
last instance determining of the other levels of practice, 
The economic dialectic is never active in the 
·pure· state; in History, these instances, the 
superstructures, etc. - are never seen to step 
respectfully aside when their work is done or, 
when the Time comes, as his pure phenomena, to 
scatter before His Majesty the Economy as he 
strides along the royal road of the Dialectic. 
From the first moment to the last, the lonely 
hour of the "last instance" never comes (Althusser; 
quoted ibid., pp.133-134). 
A point related to the a.bove is that ideology is taken here 
to be material. This is again a point of controversy (Larrain, 
1979), but all that this is taken to mean here is that ideology 
has real effects on people and the way they feel and behave. 
This will be amply demonstrated in the course of this chapter. 
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In Laca.n' s words, "l.anguage is not inunateria.l. It is a 
subtle body, but. body it is. Words are trapped in all 
the corporeal images that captivate the subject; they may 
make the hysteric "pregnant", be identified with object of 
penis-neid, represent the flood of urine of urethral ambition, 
or the reta.ined faeces of ava.ricious jouissance (enjoyment, 
pleasure)" (1977a, p.87, insertion added). 
4.3 Ideology as Signifier of the Natural 
A sign does not simply exist as part of reality -
it reflects and refracts another reality. There-
fore it may distort that reality or be true to 
it, or may perceive it from a special point of 
view, and so forth. Every sign is subject to the 
criteria of ideological evaluation .•. The domain of 
ideology coincides with the domain of signs. They 
equate with one another. Whenever a sign is 
present, ideology is pre~ent too. Everything 
ideological possesses a semiotic value (Volosinov, 
quoted in Hebdige, 1979, p.13). 
Ideology may therefore rela.te to reality in a number ·of 
different ways. And ideology relates to reality through 
its embodiment in signs. "Ideology is inscribed in 
signifying practices - in discourses, myths, presentations 
and re-presentations of the way 'things' are - and to this 
extent it is inscribed in the language" (Belsey, op~ cit., 
p.43). Jdeology like language in general, of which ideology 
is understood here to be one aspect, therefore operates by 
signifying reality in certain ways. 
>------ ·-··· - -·-
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As will be argued now, one signification by ideology is 
that of naturality. Ideology signifies the world as natural. 
By this is meant tha.t ideology signifies the world as 
unquestionably being the way it appears to be. As was 
argued in the chapter on. language, the world as it appears 
to us is constructed by the signification of language. 
Ideology consequ~ntly has a part in this construction by 
signification, since it is one way in which language operates. 
The particular contribution which ideology makes to this 
signification of the world, and which is addressed in this 
section, is to hide the fact of that construction of the 
world by language. Thus, language constructs the world as 
it appears to us:. and language insofar as it operates 
ideologically makes the world aopear not to be constructed 
at all. Ideology makes the world appear to be in reality 
what is in fact only a certain view or interpretation or . 
organisatiori of it. 
The difficulty is that, although bestowing a 
signification, a particular conceptual 
organization on reality, language constantly 
generates the illusion that it reflects reality 
instead of signifying it. The organization of 
the relationships between objects in the world 
outside language agpears to be the same as the 
organi~ation of the relationships between the 
concepts of objects within language and, indeed, 
the la.tter appears to be the mere mirroring of 
the former (Bennett, 1979, pp.5-6). 




we see the world is that tha.t construction had an origin 
in history and developed in an hi.storical process. It follows 
too that the world could have been differently signified by 
different discourses which had followed different historical 
paths of development. This is in fact the case in different 
cultures. "If words stood for pre-existing concepts, they 
would all have exact equivalents in meaning from one language 
't 
to the next; but this is not true" (Saussure, quoted in 
Belsey, op. cit., p.39). Thus ideology, insofar as it is also 
language, also has an origin and a history, so that the signifi-
cation it contributes to the signification of the world is in 
fact one of many possible significations. In Althusser's 
words, "ideologies .•. have a history, whose determination in 
the last instance is clearly situated outside ideologies alone, 
although it involves them" (197la, p.150). 
But ideolo~y conceals the fact that the discourses in which it 
is inscribed organise the world. It therefore also conceals 
these implications of that organisation discussed in the 
paragraph above. Thus ideology signifies the objects and 
relations of the world as having no origin in history. And 
it signifies them as not having developed their essential 
nature by an historical process, without which they would 
not have existed at all, without which some other set of 
relationships and types of object would have appeared to be 
real. Ideology therefore signifies the world as ahistorical, 
without origin, eternal, of necessity and by definition 
existing in the only way possible or conceivable. This is 
what is meant here by saying that ideology signifies the 
world as na.tural. Coward and Ellis speak of 
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The production of an ideologicaJ.vraisemblable 
which is effective precisely for the reason tha.t 
it appears as "natural", "the way things are" ••. 
The practice of ideology ha.s succeeded when it has 
produced this "natural attitude", when for example 
the relations of power are not only accepted but 
perceived precisely as the way things are, ought 
to be and will be (op. cit., pp.67-68). 
Again, 
This confusion can be expressed otherwise: any 
semiological system is a system of values~ now 
the myth-consumer takes the signification for a 
system of facts:. myth is read as a factual 
system, whereas it is but a semiological system 
(Barthes, 1972a, p.131). 
This signification applies also to the signification of the 
human subject, whether it is by the signifier "I", or "he", 
"she", "man", "woman", proper names, and so on. Barthes 
speaks of 
the bourgeois ideology ..• the process through 
which the bourgeoisie transforms the reality 
of the world into an image of the world, History 
into Nature ... The status of the bourgeoisie is. 
particular, historical: - man as represented by 
it is universal, eternal .•• : bourgeois ideology 
yields an unchangeable nature (ibid., pp.141-142). 
Related assertions may be fourid in Lacan: Although "those 
psychoanalytic effects that are decisive for the subject .•• 
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follow .•• faithfully the displacement of the signifier" 
(1972a, p~40), and "the ego is ••• intermittent" (1977a, 
p.313), there is "that which constitutes the ego and its 
objects with attributes of permanence, identity, and 
substantiality, in short~ with entities or 'things' 
that are very different from the Gestalteti that experience 
enables us to isolate in the shifting field" (1977a, p.17). 
Once the objects and relations in the world are seen as 
un'"l'.uestionably existing in the only way possible, so that 
alternative ways of being are inconceivable, these objects 
and relations cannot require or be susceptible of explanation. 
It is meaningless to explain something which by definition is 
the way it is and could not be otherwise. The explanation 
would be completely superfluous. Indeed, looking for an 
explanation would imply an historical origin and development 
of the thing being explained. This would in turn imply that 
it could .have been different ~nd cannot be taken for granted 
as existing in the only way possible. Thus the whole endeavour 
of even looking for an explanation is meaningless for a world 
signified as natural .. To put this more simply, taking the 
world for granted and as obvious automatically means that one 
does not look for explanations of it. This is not to say that 
the processes of change of these natural objects are not 
investigated once the object is already perceived to be an 
object. But to. explain the origin of the very nature or essence 
of th~:object or relation as opposed to ifs evolution once it 
already exists, is a meaningless endeavour in a world signified 
as natural. In Barthes' words, 
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Bourgeois i_deology ••. records facts or perceives 
va.lues, but refuses explanations; the order of_ 
the world can be seen as sufficient or ineffable, 
it is never seen as sigriificant. Finally, the 
basic idea .•. produces the inverted image of an 
unchanging humanity, characterized by an indefinite 
repetition of its identity (ibid., p.142). 
This may be expressed by saying that the signif ieds of 
ideological discourse are signified as being essences. They 
are seen to be things-in-themselves, which simply existed in 
the world out there before language existed, and language 
simply gave them names. These names are not seen as given 
meaning only by their difference from all the other words with 
which they are in a synchronic relationship. They are seen 
as simply mirroring the organisation of the world which simply 
exists exterior to language. The signifieds which are so 
mirrored we may call essences, as opposed to beings defined by 
potentially changing relationships. 
What the world supplies to myth is an historical 
reality, defined, even if this goes back quite a 
while, by the way in which men have produced or 
used it; and what myth gives in return is a 
natural image of this reality. And ..• ideology is ••• 
constituted by the loss of the historical quality 
of things: in it, things lose the memory that 
they once were made. The world enters language 
as a dia.lectical re la.ti on between activities, 
between human actiOns; it comes out of myth as a 
harmonious dlspl~y of essences (Barthes, ibid.j. 
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Apart from the fact that it ca.n. be demonstrated that it 
is very likely that the phenomena. of human culture have 
undergone an historical construction, emergence and 
development, the above discussion gives a ve~y cogent reason 
for assuming such a history. For at whatever point phenomena 
are conceived of as essences, at that point they become 
insusceptible of analysis. To the extent that it is 
desirable to analyse huma.n phenomena in scientific and 
academic discourse, it is therefore desirable to avoid 
conceptualising these phenomena as essences. Furthermore, 
things can only be systematically influenced and altered to 
the extent that they may be understood and explained. So 
that the practical concerns of science will also suffer to 
the extent that phenomena are conceived as essences. Thus 
both for epistemological reasons and practical reasons, each 
fundamental to scientific and academic endeavour, the 
historicity and relationality of the phenomena of human 
culture are crucial presuppositions. They are sufficiently 
important at any rate to be arguably constitutive of scientific 
discourse (Althusser, passim; Larrain, 1979, passim) and hence 
to be justifiably put forward in this thesis. 
To sum up this section, then, Althusser's formulation seems 
-~---
apt. 
What seems to take place outside ideology (to be 
precise, in the street), in reality takes place 
in ideology. What reaJly takes place in ideology 
seems therefore to take place outside it. That is 
wny those who live in ideology believe themselves by 
definition outside ideolog~: one of the effects of 
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ideology is the practical d.enegation of the ideologi-
cal characte.r of ideology· by ideology (197la, pp. 
163-164). 
4. 4 A Note on the Reasons and. Meehan.isms of the Natural Signification 
This section is more in the nature of an excursus than a serious 
attempt to explain the reasons for or the mechanisms of the 
signification of naturality. This question does not fall 
within the province of this thesis, which takes the arguable 
fact of such a signification as a basis for the explanation of 
the gay predicament, this last being the true focus of the thesis. 
The problems of the reasons and manner of the signification of 
naturality properly require an analysis situated in social 
sciences other than psychology, probably including an extensive 
consideration of economic and political practice. For the sake 
of completion, however, it will nonetheless be attempted in this 
section to sketch some arguments explaining why and how naturality 
is signified. This will indicate how the questions to which 
solutions are offered in this work may be rendered continuous 
with the types of question approached in other social sciences. 
Such inter-disciplinary continuity has obvious advantages, 
particularly in providing frameworks within which the foundational 
assumptions of this thesis may be tested and elaborated - as 
indeed they have been and. are continuing to be. 
It is clear from the statements of Barthes which have been quoted 
that he sees naturality as serving the interests of the bourgeoisie, 
that is, the dominan.t class in the cultures in which ideology 
operates iri the manner described. in this chapter. Al thusser' s 
solution, which is more to the point for our purposes, is that 
the signification of naturality ensures that "the vast majority 
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of (good) subjects work all right "a.11 by !themselves", 
i.e. by ideology ••• They 'recognize' the existing state of 
affairs (das Bestehende), that 'it really is true that it 
is so and not otherwise', and that they must be obedient 
to God, to their conscience, to the priest, to de Gaulle, 
to the boss ••• " (197la, p.169). He adds that ideology 
disguises a certain reality: 
. 
the reality which is necessarily ignored 
(meconnue) in the very forms of recognition 
(ideology = misrecognition/ignorance) is 
indeed, in the last resort, the reproduction 
of the relations of production and the 
relations deriving from them (ibid., p.170). 
In disguising the true nature of the subject, produced and 
defined in the symbolic structures of society only by a set 
""-.::.c ... 
of ~elationships ("the relations deriving from them"), as 
was argued in the last chapter, and signifying him/her as 
natural, an essence, ideology induces the subject to believe 
that she/he is not produced by larger structures but is a 
source of self-motivated actions, a being with free will. 
Consequently it is possible that "the individual is interpellated 
as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely .•. 
i.e. in order that he shall freely accept his subjection, i.e. 
in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his 
subjection "all by himself" (ibid., p.169). 
There is a controversy over this functionalist understanding of 
ideology which Althusser displays .(for example Bennett, 1979; 
f-Iirst, 1976). It is not at all intend.ed by the present use of 
Althusser's conceptualisation to defend him or to enlist his 
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support in this parti.cular {natter for this thesis. It' is 
merely .in.tended to demonstra.te. an argument which· explains 
the. signification of na.turali t·y by ideology, simply in 
ord.er to demonstrate that such an explanation is in 
principle feasible. Whether the particular explanation 
utilised here is faulty in part or as a whole is beside the 
point. 
Another level. of explan·ation is provided by Lacan himself, 
in that the primal object of desire is to be such an object 
as the mother might recognize. This object would have a 
positive being analogous to that of the natural essences 
'described in this chapter. Desire therefore leads ·to a 
positing by the individual of a natural ego. This level of 
explanation for the signification by ideological discourse 
of naturality is clearly too individualistic to be more than 
a minor aspect of the·full explanation. This operation of 
desire will however be elaborated .. later in this chapter. It 
will be used for a related and crucial purpose in explaining 
the gay predicament in the following chapter. 
Barthes suggests one way in which the signification of ,,.. 
naturali ty is achieved:. It is achieved by being "what one 
could call public philosophy, that which. sustains everyday 
life, civil ceremonials, secular rites, in short the 
unwritten norms of interrelationships in a bourgeois society" 
(1972~, p.140). That is, 
our press, our films, our theatre, our pulp 
litera.ture, our rituals, our Justic'e, our 
diplomacy, our.conversations, our remarks 
about the weather, a murder trial, a .t9uching 
~=---~· ·~· ·=-·-'-"'' ·-::.;...;.· . ._. ---'-~----""--"---------........ ..__ •. :....-------~------~·~-----· - -
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as th~y have been at different times and will be again. 
Thus the signifier-signified link appears unquestionable 
in the everyday, "lived n view. It is so obvious a link 
that the signifier appears simply to be a name for a 
signified which exists independently of the signifier, and which 
pre-existed it until a name (now the signifier we use) was 
found for it. As Coward and Ellis put it, 
the si.gnifier is treated as identical to a 
(pre-existent) signified. The signifier and 
signified are not seen as caught up together 
in a process of production, they are treated 
as equivalents: the signifier is merely the 
equivalent of its pre-established concept 
(signified) . It seems as though it is not 
the business of language to establish this 
concept, but merely to express or communicate 
it .•. Language is treated as though it stands 
in for, is identical with, the real world (op. 
Cit. I p.47) • 
Because of this apparent transparency of language, it is 
easy to believe that the organisation of the world according 
to which we live is natural, the only possible way for the 
world to be, instead of being constituted by language as it 
in fact is. 
These arguments, sketchy as they are, suggest that the entire 
ideological discourse acts a.s a. si.gnifier of naturali ty. This 
is effected at least by Barthes' catalogue of collective 
. · images, by ·the destre to be ~s.sent'~al objects, and by the 
.... · • , .. l!iifl .... :.:~ :.; . ..-.: .... ·• ' .... "' ·.; •. • . < .• . . 
legal, educational and other institutions whi.bh· ·arum in the 
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apparent security and, advantages of having free will and. 
hence being able to dictate one's. future prospects. 
"Rea.lism naturalises the arbitrary nature of the sign; its 
philosophy is that of an identity between signifier and 
signified on the level of an entire text as much as that 
of a single word" (ibid.) . 
Clearly, however, there is a single word, "natural", and its 
synonyms and synonymous phrases, which act as this same 
signifier that the ideological discourse as a whole operates 
as. And there is the opposed signifier to this, "unnatural", 
which therefore signifies in opposition to the entire 
ideological discourse of which it is a part. Again, it is 
not necessary for the purposes of this thesis to explain 
according to what mechanisms and why the signifier "unnatural" 
operates, since it is used here as a basis for addressing the 
real focus of the thesis. But a brief suggestion will again 
be made for the reasons given at the start of this section. 
Foucault suggests that at one time "prohibitions bearing on 
sex were essentially of a juridical nature. The 'nature' on 
which they were based was still a kind of law" (1978, p.38). 
But as the naturality of certain kinds of sex shifted towards 
the kind of naturality meant by the ideological signification 
described in the last section, it became possible to gain 
power over the prohibited sexual phenomena by "Not the exclusion 
of these thousand aberrant sexualities, but by the specification, 
the regional solidification of each one of them" (ibid., p.44). 
"The machinery of power that focused on this whole alien strain 
did not seek to suppress it, but rather to give it an analytical, 
visible, and permanent reality" (ibid., pp.43-44) ~ 
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This would then enlist even that. which contradicts the 
general id,eological signification of naturality in ~he 
service of that signification. The. unnatural sexualities 
are "mad.e into a principle of classification an.d intelligibility, 
established, as a raison d'etre and a natural order of disorderi• 
(ibid., p. 44) • Tha.t is, unnaturality is signified as natural, 
in the essential order of things, an eternal attribute of the 
subject so signified. "Homosexuality appeared as one of the 
forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of 
sodomy onto a kind, of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of 
the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the 
homosexual was now a species" (ibid., p.43). This contradiction 
of the naturally unnatural will be explored in detail in the 
next chapter. 
Foucault suggests a specific mechanism by which the unnatural 
·is signified as having that special status by ideological 
discourse, preventing it from being absorbed entirely back 
into the domain of the natural. It is already clear from 
Barthes' explanation tha.t natural phenomena are successfully 
signified as natural by a spreading of a whole "catalogue of 
collective images~.. What is unnatural is signified as such 
equally simply by exclusion. This is not to say that what is 
unnatural is not spoken about, but that it is not spoken about 
simply as an image simply amongst other images. When it is 
included. in everyday discourse it is highly evident as that 
which is not spoken about as unrema.rkable. It is spoken about 
as alien. Foucault speaks of "a sentence to disappear, but 
also .•• an injunction to silence,. an affirmation of non-
existence, and, by implication, an admission that there was 
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nothing to say about such things, nothing to see, and 
nothing to know" (ibid., p. 4). 
This last point Foucault i.ntroduces only to dismiss its 
truth for his purposes. I have in fact distorted Foucault•s 
arguments occasionally beyond recognition in wrenching them 
from his 'Very specific problematic. The intention here is 
again not, however, to ad.duce Foucault in support of this 
thesis or even to .present his viewpoint, but simply to 
demonstrate that an explanatory analysis of the signification 
of unnaturality is in principle possible. 
4.5 Ideology and the Constitution of the Subject 
It is clear from the discussion of Lacari's view in the 
·preceding chapter tha.t the subject· is constituted in language. 
The subject can only be conceived of as a meaningful being 
once it can designate itself with a signifier. This signifier 
only has meaning because it is already in a.synchronic· 
relationship with. bther signifiers. That with which the ~ 
subject. signifies itself, by which signification alone it is a 
human subject, ~s therefore already defined by language before 
the subject arrives. The subject is therefore constituted by 
language and in it, and hence by ideology. 
The conception of ideology drawn from here makes a parallel 
assertion to the above. In the very act of naming the subject, 
as "I", "him", -"Jane", etc., language immediately constitutes 
the subject as a subject. That is, by the fact that the 
subject i.s· addressed (even by her /himself as part of utterances 
directed to others) primarily with the use of. signifiers applied 
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,; 
to. subjects, the subject is· limited to having a certain 
type of signifier give it its definition -and meaning. And 
that meaning, cl~arly, is that of being a subject. As Lacan 
puts it, "The form in which language is expressed itself 
defines subjectivity" (1977a, p.85). Thus "if I call the 
person to whom I am speaking by wha.tever name I choose to 
give him, I intimate to him the subjective function that he 
will take on again in order to reply to me, even if it is 
to repudiate this function" (1977a, pp.86-87). 
This process is called by Althusser the interpellation of the 
subject, that is the addressing of the subject with its 
concomitant constitution of the subject as subject. Althusser 
speaks of ideology as interpellating tha subject (197la, p.160), 
but this is an operation more properly attributed to language 
in general, to what may be called signifying practice to 
distinguish it from ideological practice (Coward & Ellis, op. 
cit., p.80). With this qualification Althusser may be quoted: 
all ideology hails or interpellates concrete 
individuals as concrete subjects, by the 
functioning of the category of the subject ••• 
ideology ••• "transforms" the individuals into 
subjects (it transforms them all) by that. very 
precise operation which I have called interpellation 
or hailing and-which can be imagined along the lines 
of the most commonplace everyday •.• hailing, "Hey, 
you there!" fl97la, pp.162-1~3). 
A. further limitation is placed on the subject in this inter-
pellation by signifying pra.ctice. I.nsof ar a.s language 
provides a limited variety of organisations of the world at 
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any given :moment, the subject gi.Ven an en.try into :meaning 
by language can only perceive the world in these certain 
ways. This :may be expressed by saying that the subject 
is interpellated.by language to occupy certain positions 
or standpoints entailing certain limited perspectives on 
the world. "As well as being a system of signs related 
among themselves, language incarnates meaning in the form 
of the series of positions it offers for the subject from which 
to grasp itself and its rela.ti.ons with th.e real" (Nowell-Smith, 
quoted in Belsey, op. cit., p.61). This is clearly not a 
simple influencing of the subject but an aspect of the very 
constitution or creation of the subject: all the subject is 
is an adoption of a position or positions. 
What was it that Saussure in particular reminded 
us of? That "language (which consists only of 
differences) is not a function of the speaking 
subject". This implies that the subject (self-
identical or even conscious of self-identity, 
self~conscious) is inscribed in the language, 
that he is a "f~nction" of the language (Derrida, 
quoted in Belsey, ibid., p.59, Derrida's insertion). 
This is the point at which ideology may be said to operate. 
For ideology contributes to the organisation of the world 
by language. That is, ideology contributes to the de-
limiting of the positions which the subject may occupy in 
· 1angua.ge and hence in understanding and operating in the 
world. Ttle contribution made by ideology is that, as argued 
in secti.on 4 ~ 3, of permi ttin.g the subject to perceive the 
world. a.nd. itself as natural. So ideology does not"· simply 
"·t··· 
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deceive the subject into. beli.eving its representation of 
the world. On the contrary, it defines and constitutes 
I 
the subject so that she/he cannot help but perceive the 
world in that way. The use of the word "representation" 
in speaking about the operation of ideology can in this 
context be misleading i.n the extreme (Hirst, 1976). 
Thus the imaginary identity of ideology closes 
off the. movement of contrad.ictions, calling upon 
the subject as consistent. It puts the subject 
in the position of a homogeneous subject in . 
relation to meaning, a subject who thinks himself/ 
herself to be the point of origin of ideas and of 
actions •.• Ideology produces the individual in a 
relation to representation within the social 
process in which he or she is situated, as an 
identity (a point of self-reference) rather than 
a. process (Coward & Ellis, op. cit., p. 77). 
This constitutio~ of the subject by signifying practice and 
ideology has clear links with the constitution of the subject 
as understood by Lacan. The subject is given meaning, the 
prerequisite for speech and human action, only by language, 
and can be conceived only as a position in symbolic structures, 
that is, as a signifier. Furthermore, the subject is 
signified as natural, that is, as an essence, having a 
positive and consistent being. This is in accord with the 
positing of an imaginary ego by desire, a mAconnaissance 




as the mother might recogniz.e as object of her desire, that 
which will fill her.own lack and complete her. Such an 
object has an essential, consistent, positive being of the 
type signified by the nxn of ideological discourse. 
The fact is that the total form of the body by 
which the subject anticipates in a mirage the 
maturation of his power is given to him only as 
Gestalt ••• this Gest.alt •.• syrr.bolizes the mental 
permanence of the f, at the same time as it 
prefigures its alienating destinationi it is 
still pregnant with the correspondences that unite 
the I with the statue in which man projects himself, 
with the phantoms that domina.te him, or with the 
automaton in which, in an ambiguous relation, the 
world of his own making tends to find completion 
(Lacan, 1977a, pp.2-3). 
And, as Lacan points.out, this ego becomes identified with 
tbe nin of the ~none~ once the subject is constituted in the 
symbolic, and the signification of this "!" is, as stated in 
the above qq.ote, misrecognised in the same way as the ego, and 
for the same motives of desire. 
'-~ 
This jubilant assumption of his specular image 
bi the child at the infans. stage, still sunk in his 
motor. incapacity and nursling dependence, would 
. seem to exhib.it in an exemplary situation the 
symbolic matrix .in which the 1 is precipitated 
in a primordial form, before it is objectified in 
the dialectic of identificati6n with the other, 
anff before language restores to it, in;the 
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uni~ersal, its function aa subject. 
This --form ..• will. also be the source of secondary 
identifications •.. But the important point is that 
this form situa.tes the agency of the ego, before 
its social determination, in a. fictional direction, 
which will always remaip irred.ucibl.e for the 
individual alone., or rather, which will only 
rejoin the com:L.ng-into-being (le devenir) of the 
subject asymptotically, whatever the success of 
the dialectical syntheses by which he mcist resolve 
as I his discordance with his own reality (Lacan, 
ibid. , p. 2) • 
Thus the operation of desire as viewed by Lacan and the \ 
operation of ideology as ~scribed in this chapter are at 
one in the understanding of the signification of the subject 
by the "I" of ideological discourse. The contribution of 
ideology to the constitution of the subject may therefore be 
explored consistently with Lacan's conceptualisation of the 
operation of _desire in that constitution of the subject. 
Lacan's conception of the imaginary provides a 
route for understanding how the positioning of 
a subject in relation to language and, therefore, 
social relations is always accomplished in specific 
ideological formations. The identifications made 
by the infant in the process by which it produces 
itself in discourse a.re always already in ideology· 
(Coward & Ellis, op. cit., p.76). 
This meeting of ideology a.nd desire will· be extensively 
explored in the following chapter, in relation to the_ gay 
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predicament. 
4.6 The Transformation of Ideological Discourse 
An attempt will be made in this section to explairi the 
linguistic mechanisms by which the ideological discourses 
in which the subject is constituted can be transformed. The 
fundamental point to note is that, while the connection 
between signifier and signified at any given moment is so 
close that they cannot be experienced as separate from each 
other, that connection was nonetheless historically brought 
about. 
The understanding of the subject in signification 
produced by both Marxism and psychoanalysis 
suggests the necessity of seeing the sign as 
only one moment in the process of signification. 
It is the moment which produces and fixes meaning 
but it is not an absolute, pre-given relation. It 
is the sign, the relation between signifier and 
signified, which is fixed in the construction of 
positions for the predicating subject. Such an 
understanding emphasises the activity of the 
signifier, whose limitation to produce certain 
signif ieds therefore becomes a question of 
positionality in sociality and social relations 
(Coward & Ellis, op. cit., p.122). 
The signifier operates to produce the signified. "Linguistics 
enables us to see the signifier as the determinant of the 
signified" (Lacan, 1977a, p.299). This operation of the 
signifier is not only a function of its relational definition 
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in the synchronic network of signifiers, but also of the 
diachronic process by whi6h that particular synchronic 
arrangement of terms came about. 
There are a number of factors which play a part in that 
d.iachronic transformation of discourses from one synchronic 
structure to another. Firstly, speech always occurs in a 
specific context, and its meaning is partly given by that 
context. So for example when one addresses someone else the 
"I" and "you" of one's sentence have different meanings from 
those they would have had the sentence been spoken between 
two different people. In Bennett's words, "all language forms 
are predicated on distinctive, historically produced relation-
ships between speaker(s) and listener(s) - ... such cases as 
drawing-room conversation and language etiquette" (op. cit., 
~ . 
pp.79-80). Thus speech is moulded by specific contexts. 
And in changing its form and structure, the unspoken paradigmatic 
structure which is essential to the meaning of the spoken 
utterance, is shifted, so that many of its terms acquire a 
different definition or meaning, if only minimally different, 
in their altered relationship to each other. That is, parole· 
(speech) has a reciprocal action on the basis from which it 
arises, langue (language). 
This is the order that the a.ctual generative 
process of language follows: social intercourse 
is generated (stemming from the basis);_ in it, 
verbal communication and intera.ction are generated; 
and in the la.tter,. forms of: speech performance are 
generated; fina.lly, this generative process is 
reflected in the change of language forms 
(Volosinov, quoted in Bennett, ibid., p.80). 
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Here, then, is one mechanism of the transformation of 
discourses. 
It may be erroneously inf erred from. the above that meaning 
does not reside solely.in language, since material.context 
plays a part. This is incorrect. Language is a prerequisite 
(not temporally, but logically) for meaning to be possible. 
Once that meaning already exists, context can enter into and 
delimit that meaning more precisely. Ultimately, "the 
signifier is constituted only from a synchronic ... collection 
of elements in which each is sustained only by the principle 
of its oppositiort to each of the others" (Lacan, 1977a, p.304). 
The relational definition and being of the signifier is, so to 
speak, the minimum necessary condition for language and hence 
meaning to be possible. Whatever is added after that is 
entirely dependent on it. 
Another mechanism arises from the fact that, as Volosinov 
puts it, there are "differently oriented social interests within 
one and the same sign-community" (quoted in Bennett, ibid., p.81). 
This allows for "discrepancies of meaning which may be attached 
to the same words by virtue of the different uses to which they 
are put in different, socially produced linguistic practices" 
(Bennett, ibid., p.80). Thus the same language can contain a 
number of different and even contradictory discourses. The 
subject therefore has a choice of a number of different positions 
or perspectives to take up apd to oppose to each at.her, should 
this be desired. The play of different discourses against each 
other provides another mechanism of the transformation of 
discourse. 
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Insofar as ideology is a level of operation of language, 
it too can be transformed in these ways. The ideological 
signification of a discourse m~y be conceived to change with 
the other levels of sign~fication in language. The precise 
manner in which it may be said to_change with respect to those 
of its properties described in this chapter will be discussed 
at length in Chapter Six. For rea~ons that will be discussed 
there, revolutionary changes in ideology will not be considered 
in this context. "Mod.if i.ca.tion.s" may be a less misleading 
term than "changes". 
It may be noted in passing that this continuity of the con-
struction of linguistic discourse with the processes of change 
on other levels of the social formation opens the study of 
signification to historical materialist analysis. For "if 
language is a system of signs, then not only sounds or written 
texts, but also all meaningful social practices and cultural 
phenomena may constitute particular kinds of language" (Larrain, 
1979, p.130). Furthermore, although Lacan makes use of 
structuralist concepts, he does not share all of the 
epistemological commitments of classical structuralism. 
Indeed, his view on the subject and language is fundamentally 
a developmental one, so that the construction of subject-
positions in language and the diachronic production of the 
link between signifier and signified is given full weight in 
his understanding. Lacan speaks of "the signifier as the 
determinant of the signified" (1977a, p.299) and states that 
Between the two chains •.• those of the signifiers 
a.s oppos.ed to all the ambulatory signified that 
circulate because they are always in the process 
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of _sliding - the pirinirig-d,own or capping point 
r speak of is mythi:cal, for never has anyone 
been able to pin a meaning to a signifier; but 
on the other hanQ:., .. what on.e can do is to pin a 
signifier to a signifier a.nd see what happens. 
But in that case, something new always results ••• 
n~ely, the appearance of a new meaning •.• (quoted 
in. La:planche and Leclaire, 1972, p.155). 
Lacan's work is therefore also continuous with the semiotics 
which emphasises the historical production of the signifier-
signified link (the semiotics of the Tel Quel writers, from 
whom Coward and Ellis draw in the work so extensively.adduood 
-}' 
here) .• 
Because of these continuities-between Lacan and contemporary 
· semiotics on the one hand, a.nd between ·historical. materialism 
. . 
·and semiotics on the other, the clash between historical 
materialism and classicaL structuralism.does not apply in 
the present framework. This clash is not therefore a factor 
to militate against a synthesis between Lacan and the 
particula.r conception of ideology used here. We are in 
agreement, that is, with Larrain's representatively anti-
structuralist assertion that 
The presence of the ideological in a discourse. 
does not consist of immanent properties of the 
tex;ts,.but of a system of relationships between 
the text and its prod.uction, circulation and 
consumption (op. cit., p.140). 
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Th'e vi'.ew on ideology. put forward a.bove is consonant with 
the. statement. that .~'.structures are themselves the result 
of man's practJce" (ibid., p.150). And, indeed, it is an 
important argument in t,his thesis that, in consequence of 
this last assertion, "men may change circumstances through 
revoluti.onary practice" (ibid.) . 
4.7 Conclusion 
The continuity between the in.terpretation of Lacan and the 
selected aspects of the view of ideology given here will 
be briefly summarized in this section. Their relation to 
signifying practice was demonstrated in the preceding section 
to be continuous. In the section on the constitution of the 
subject, too, it became clear that Lacan's view is consistent 
with the view on ideology put forward here. It is in addition 
clear from that section that ideology has material effects on 
people, at least insofar as it contributes to the constitution 
of their subjectivity and hence to their capacity to think, 
speak and act meaningfully. This conception of ideology is 
therefore again in accord with Lacan's view that language is not 
simply the bearer of communications which impinge on the subject, 
but is at the heart of the very constitution of the subject of 
desire: language is involved in the construction of that which 
receives or gives the communication which is merely the consciously 
experienced contribution of language. Finally, the signification 
of naturality by ideology is consistent with the way in which 
Lacan sees the operation of the "I" of the €none€. 
This consistency of the two approaches is sufficient for our 
purposes. It m~y be noted, however, that it may be argued that 
"it is only psychoanalysis which has gone any way to analysing 
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the formation of the subject whi.ch receives its specific 




5. THE GAY PREDICAMENT 
The acquisition of sexual orientation is not.at issue 
in this thesis. The question asked here is why it is 
that in certain cultures the acquisition of a particular 
kind of sexual orientation, once it is already 
established, should present extreme problems of self-
acceptance and of acceptance of others. 
This chapter will argue that a crucial part or level of 
the explanation may be found in the 09eration of ideology 
in these cultures, and.in the way in which the individual's 
desire impells him/her to collude with that ideological 
operation. 
For reasons outlined in previous chapters, the conceotions 
of ideological operations and of the operation of desire 
used here will be those of Barthes and some of the post-
Althusserians in the former case and of Laca~ in the latter. 
5.1 The Problem : Why is Homophobia an Issue at all? 
It is clear from Lacan's account of the constitution of 
the subject in the imaginary and symbolic registers that 
meconnaissance is an indispensable prerequisite for the 
formation of a human subject. Th~s applies no matter how 
non-neurotic, how "healthy" a person may be .. "Our 
experience shows (that) •.• the function of meconnaissance ••• 
characterizes the ego in all its structures" (Lacan, 1977a, 
p.6, insertion added). Speaking of the mirror stage in 
which the foundations of the subject's constitution are 
laid, and of its consequences after entry into the 
symbolic, Lacan states that a meconnaissance is the 
basis of the ego, and will always remain so; 
• 
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This jubilant assumption of his specular 
image by the child at the infans stage, 
still sunk in his motor incapacity and 
nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit 
in an exemplary situation the symbolic 
matrix in which the I is precipitated in - . 
a primordial form, before it is objectified 
in the dialectic of identification with the 
other, and before language restores to it, 
in the universal, its function as subject ••. 
But the important point is that this form 
situates the agency of the ego, before its 
social determination, in a fictional 
direction, which will always remain irreducible 
for the individual alone, or rather, which 
will only rejoin the coming-into-being (le 
devenir) of the subject asymptotically, 
whatever the success of the dialectical 
syntheses by which he must resolve as I his 
discordance with his own reality (ibid., p.2 1 
emphasis in original). 
The way one lives one's life has constant ch~racteristics 
only in consequence of an imaginary meconnaissance, 
"by which he transfers the permanence of his desire to 
an ego that is nonetheless intermittent" (ibid., pp.312-313). 
One's very ability to act deliberately and purposefully 
in the world at all is dependent on the meconnaissance 
of the age. "The passionate desire peculiar to man to 
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ilnpress his image in reality is the obscure basis of the 
rational mediations of the will" (ibid~, p.22). And 
"this forni.al fixation ••• is the very condition that extends 
indefinitely his world and his power, by giving his 
objects their instrumental oolyvalence and symbolic 
polyphony, and also their potential as defen.sive armour" 
(ibid. ' p .17) • 
Furthermore, the subject, as argued in Cha9ter Three, 
no matter how healthy, moral or decent, is triply 
trapped with a .double desperation in an im~ossible guest. 
And this impossible quest, for a ?ermanently lost object 
which cannot be abandoned, has an influence on every 
aspect of the individual's life (Freud, 1908, p.198; 
Lacan, 1977a, p.172). 
It follows, therefore, that, where everyone lives as a 
meconnaissance, it is meaningless for an individual 
deciding on lifestyle to speak of others' judgments of 
right and wrong ways to live as being more adequate than 
one's own, or, for that matter, less adequate. For one 
is then saying that that which is born of one very complex 
and fundamental misrecognition has more truth value than 
that; which is born of another similar misrecognition.· 
It is of course possible to establish criteria by which the 
truth values of differing judgments can b.e evaluated rela-
tive to each other. But this misses the point at issue, 
which is that the negative judgment in some cultures on 
homosexuality has an emotional impact of such power as to 
bring about brutal material effects on many lives. And 
there is the correlative point that that particular 
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negative judgment is held with tremendous tenacity 
by the large majority of people in such cultures, to 
the point where violent. action may be taken to implement 
it. Some of the large body of literature supporting 
this statement was cited in the Introduction· (e.g. 
Bullough, 1979, chaps. Three and Seven; Hart & Richard-
son, 1981, pp.41-45; Plummer, 1975). 
The question, then, is why it is that there should be 
such a prevalent feeling in some cultures, of such force, 
that homosexuality is abominable. And why it is that 
many, if not all, homosexuals themselves are impelled to 
repudiate this aspect themselves, at some stage of their 
lives, with the same force or more. 
5.2 First Approaches 
This section will present a brief account of homophobia 
which is not the account offered by this thesis. This 
'" alternative analysis is given to suggest the ·complexity 
of the issues involved in explaining homophobia. It 
will also help to pinpoint the contribution made to the 
explanation of homophobia by the use of the present 
framework. 
Clearly, part of the explanation for the powerful 
aversion to homosexuality must lie in the way in which 
human subjects are constituted •.. It must lie, that is, 
in the mutual operation of desire and language on the 
infant. 
As outlined in Chapter Three (p.66), Lacan holds that 
the ego consists in a misrecognition of a uriif ication • 
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of the subject's characteristics. This misrecognition 
is built first on the identification wi t'h the coherent 
image of the subject perceived in mirrors or -·in others, 
during the mirror stage, and secondly on an identification 
with the signifier "I", which, as argued in Chapter 
Three, gives th~ illusion of signifying a consistent 
being. Furthermore, this imaginary ego is invested by 
the subject's desire with a double desperation and a 
triple captation. This multiple trap, it was argued at · 
the end of Chapter Three, involves on the one hand_an 
impossible quest to be the mother's complementary object, 
and on the other hand the impossibility of relinquishing 
that futile quest since it has been repressed into the 
unconscious, and so made eternal (Freud, 1915b). The 
subject cannot help therefore but cling to an image of 
him/herself as a consistent being, a coherent unity, 
harbouring no fundamental contradictions. 
Homosexuality, however, is construed in the relevant 
cultures as a contradictory way of being to hetero-
sexuality, which in turn is automatically and emphatically 
expected to become pa:i;:-t of each person's way of relating 
to o~hers. This observation is easily confirmed (e.g. Hart 
& Richardson, op. cit., pp.93-110). To explain this is not 
within the bounds.of this thesis. 
Homosexuals, too, are different from any other,, oppressed 
group at least in that they can "pass" as heterosexual~ 
and in that their defining characteristic is to be found 
in a large proportion of those who claim to b,e different -
from them, as shown by, inter alia, the Kinsey reports 
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(1948 and 1952). "Ultimately homosexuals are a 
minority quit~ unlike any other, for we are a~part 
of all humans - not metaphorically ••• but actually" 
{Altman, 1971, p~236). Consequently a gay person is 
likely to enhance by his/her example the possibility 
of other people's recognising their own repressed or 
suppressed homosexual feelings. These feelings or 
potential feelings are likely to have been excluded 
by the subject from among the characteristics_ of his/her 
ego, as being contradictory to the heterosexuality 
which is emphatically expected to be there. Thus an 
evocation of them in the subject by another is likely to 
threaten the desperately desired coherent outlines of 
the ego, and hence the possibility of fulfilling the 
desire for the mother's desire. This would account 
for the power of the reaction to homosexuals. 
The same reasoning could be applied to the gay person's 
self-rejection. But it then needs to be explained why 
other characteristics, for whatever reason not anticipated 
to be within or ~redicable of the ego, do not bear a 
comparable degree of threat when recognised to be present 
in the subject. Few people, for example, are dee~ly 
-
perturbed at the thought that other people might be 
extroverted where they themselves are introverted. Nor 
is it common for a person who has always perceived him/ . 
herself ~s primarily attracted to blond peo~le to spend 
years coming to terms with the fact that she/he is 
gradually finding dark-haired people just as attracfive. 
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Clearly the explanation"for the effect of the 
prohibition on homosexuality cannot lie simply in 
a threat to the imaginary coherence of the ego. 
Nor is it sufficient to point out that it is forbidden, 
and is therefore not comparable to the examples above, 
for it is the 9owerful effect of that prohibition that 
we are attempting to explain, given that it is already 
there. There must be an additional factor specific to 
homosexuality or at least specific to a limited set of 
attributes which includes homosexuality. 
This point can be made clearer by a few intuitively 
accessible examples. It is obvious that there will 
usually be different responses to the following statements. 
It should be taken that they.are made in common social 
intercourse, as to someone met casually at a dinner pa~ty, 
as opposed to in exceptional circumstances like talking 
to a therapist or to a self-accepting homosexual. 
These are the statements: "My sister is very selfish by 
nature, but she compensates for it very well", as opposed 
to "My sister is homosexual but compensates for it very 
well". Or, "My son is socially very insecu:t;"e/neurotic but 
manages to esta_blish relationshi-ps that satisfy him",' as 
opposed to "My son is homosexual but manages_ to establish 
relationships that satisfy him". Or "I refuse to become 
sexually. involved with someone who is not a member of my 
.religious group/colour", as opposed to "I refuse to become 
sexually involved with someone who is not of my sex". 
The reactions to the second statement in each case are 
far more likely to include degrees of shock than are reactions 
---- ---------------------
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to the first statement. There is, indeed, a comic 
element to them, just because they are statements 
unlikely to be made in conventional social settings. 
Homosexuality displays a difference from other 
attributions of negative qualities, of qualities of social 
or psychological handicap, and from other categorisations 
of human type. This difference requires explanation. 
It will be argued in the next section that the operation 
of ideology provides the missing explanatory element. 
5.3 The Operation of Ideology 
It is pertinent here to remember an earlier ooint: 
The understanding of the subject in 
signification produced by both Marxism 
and psychoanalysis suggests the necessity 
of seeing the sign as only one moment in 
the process of signification. It is the 
moment which produces and fixes meaning 
but it is not an absolute, pre-given 
relation. It is the sign, the relation 
between signifier and signified, which is 
fixed in the construction of positions 
for the predicating subject. Such an 
understanding emphasises the activity of 
the signifier, whose limitation to produce 
certain signif ieds therefore becomes a 
question of positionality in sociality and 




As argu~d. earlier, one consequ~nce of this fixing of 
the relations between signifier and signified is that the 
signified appears to have an existence or being which is 
independent of its production by the activity of the 
signifier. It becomes seen as a dinq an sich, not 
produced as what it has become, but an essential being~ 
In other words, again as argued earlier, it is one of the 
fundamental qualities of ideological discoutse th~t it 
represents what has been historically acquired as natural, 
that is as being timeless, without origin, of necessity 
and by definition the only way of being possible, and 
therefore not requiring or indeed not even susceptible of 
explanation. That which is described by ideological 
discourse as natural is thus an essence, not a structure 
or a position in a structure. As Barthes puts it, in "the 
bourgeois ideology ..•• the process through which the bour-
geoisie transforms the reality of the world into an image 
of the world, History into Nature .•• : man as represented 
by it is universal, eternal ••• : bourgeois ideology 
yields an unchangeable nature" (1972a, pp.141-142). And 
Coward and Ellis speak of 
The production of an ideological vraisemblable 
which is effective precisely for the reason 
that it appears as "natural", "the way things 
are" ••• The practice of ideology has sucpeeded 
when it has produced this "natural attitude", 
when for example the existing .relations of 
power are not only accepted but perceived 
9recisely as the way things are, ought to be, 
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and will be (op. cit., pp.67-68). 
This of course immediately constitutes a contradiction 
immanent in ideology, for the phenomena of human 
culture are all historically developed, in few of an 
infinity of possible contradictory directions, including 
the phenomenon of ideology itself. In Althusser's words, 
and, 
ideologies •.. have a history, whose determination 
in the last instance is clearly situated ounside 
ideologies alone, although it involves them 
(197la, p.150). 
what seems to take place outside ideology (to 
be precise, in the street), in reality takes 
place in ideology. What really takes place in 
ideology seems therefore to take place outside 
it. That is why those who live.in ideology 
believe themselves by definition outside 
ideology; one of the effects of ideology is 
the practical denegation of the ideological 
character of ideology by ideology (ibid., 
pp.163-164). 
That very cultural product which attempts, and so 
often succeeds in its attem~t, to disguise the fact 
of history, is itself a product of that fact. 
And, insofar as ideology aims to present the world in 
a certain light, it casts a shadow on certain phenomena 
and viewooints - it is selective in its representation 
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of the world. It is contradictory, too, therefore, 
because it attempts to disguise its selectivity, the 
fact that it constructs its signifieds in a particular 
way. 
It is these contradictions in language qua ideology 
which, it is argued here, collude with the operation 
of desire to bring about the predicament of the gay 
individual, constituted as she/he is in the language 
in which ideology is inscribed. 
Clearly, in the process of signifying its signifieds 
as natural, the ideological discourse as a whole becomes 
a signifier of naturality, over and above whatever else 
it signifies. And of course there is a particular 
signifier within the discourse of the same concept, the 
word "natural" itself. While this word "natural" may be 
employed independently of the analogous deployment of 
the whole discourse, it is always backed up by the whole 
weight of that discourse's signification of naturality, 
simply by virtue of this latter's ubiquity. 
This dual mode of signifying naturality multiplies the 
possibilities for contradiction in this connection in 
the operation of ideology. 
"Natural", like any other signifier, only bears meaning 
by virtue of its difference from an oppositional term, 
in this case "unnatural". To put this less technically, 
ideology can only be selective or inclusive at the cost 
of excluding. In this case, moreover, it is an exclusion 
from "the way things are, ought to be and will be". Such 
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an exclusion, when it is both effective and contra-
dictory, must lay the foundation for powerful effects 
on those who live in and through it. 
It will be the aim of the next section to explain why 
that exclusion is in fact effective, given that it is 
already operating, and of the next section to elaborate 
the effects of its contradictions as outlined above. 
5.4 The Operation of Desire 
The explanation for the emotional effectiveness of 
ideological exclusion from what is "natural" follows 
readily from Lacan's account of the constitution of 
the subject. As Lacan argues, the individual is 
constituted in language. Given that ideology may be 
seen as one level of analysis of language (Chapter 
Four, section 4.2) r the subject is therefore constitut~d 
'in ideology. And this constitution in language and hence 
in ideology as argued at the end of Chapter Three and 
referred to above (Section 5.2) is clung to with a 
double desperation and a triple captation. The subject's 
desire motivates this entrapment of the subject and it 
invests the imaginary ego with the same desperation and 
captation in the same process, since the ego is 
identified with the "I" of speech. "This imaginary 
process ••• begins with the specular image and goes on to 
the constitution of the ego by way of subjectification 
by the signifier" (Lacan, 1977a, p.307). 
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And the characteristics of the ego, with which the 
."··
0
::::-c.,. subject's desire has so irreversibly invested it, are, 
.:::;, Qi t., 
'-?~~ 
<::...., tf ~ -? \..argued earlier, precisely those of an essential 
~ ~ Qi') . Ji J" ':'-.. 
'l"llo.o t?"O'G (]) o"" 0 c:;"/) o"" 1.)hat which can be the object of the mother's 
' ~$.<::~'§', 
•... 0·LJ,'65~·~ .. ~. 
~ ~'<'J,t . imply is what it is, "an unchangeahle 
'~ i 
In Lacan'::.: words, there is "that which constitutes 
the ego and its objects with attributes of permanence, 
identity, and substantiality, in short, with entities 
or 'things' that are very different from the 
Gestalten that experience enables us to isolate in 
the shifting field" (1977a, p.17). 
The operation of desire, therefore, has an aim which 
coincides exactly with that of the operation of 
ideology, that is, to assert the essential nature of 
the subject. That is, precisely that the subject-is 
natural. The ideological signification of naturality 
will therefore be clung to by the subject with all the 
impetus of her/his deepest desire. 
Consequently, should the ideological discourse contrive 
to signify a characteristic or oredicate as unnatural -
that is, as changeable, not permanently consistent, not 
an eternal essence - the subject cannot help but 
repudiate any participation on its part in that 
characteristic or predicate, and repudiate it with all 
the force of its desire. 
It is in the operation of desire, therefore, that an 
ex~lanation for the powerful psychological effects of 
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exclusion from natuiality by ideology is to be found. 
5.5 The Natuie of the Effects of the Operations of Ideology 
and Desire 
In the operations of both desire and ideology, it follows 
from the above arguments, an im9ossibly contradictory 
assertion is made, that of the eternal consistency of the 
individual as ego. In both 09erations the subject's 
definition only as difference in a synchronous network 
of signifiers (as argued in Chapter Three, section 3.3) 
is denied, and a positive essence asserted in its place. 
And in both operations the subject's definition as 
changing contextually according to its position in the 
syntagmatic chain of signifiers, and as developing from 




, is denied, and a consistent, eternal 
essence asserted in its place. Synchrony and diachrony, 
therefore, are both denied in the 09erations of both 
ideology and desire, each of which itself operates only 
by signification, of which synchrony and diachrony are 
constitutive. 
9. "Further reflection tells us that the adult's ego 
feeling cannot have been the same from the 
beginning. It must_have gone through a 9rocess 
of development, which cannot, of course, be 
demonstrated but which admits of being constructed 
with a fair degree of probability" (Freud, 1930, 
p.66). 
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A langu~ge, Saussuie says, "is a system of 
puie values which are determined by nothing 
except the momentary arrangement of its 
terms~ (Course, 80; Cours, 116). Because 
the language is a wholly historical entity, 
always open to change, one must focus on 
the relations which exist in a particular 
synchronic state if one is to define its 
elements .. (Culler, 1976, p.36). 
This double denial is effected by the signifying of 
naturity. The contradiction .it constitutes, then, is 
the contradiction which was ref erred to above as bringing 
about the predicament of the gay individual. This 
assertion will now.be elaborated. 
Ideological discourse, it has been arg.ued above, operates 
as the signifier "natural": it disguises its signifieds 
universally as bearing that characteristic. ~onsequently, 
the "I" spoken by the individual, occupying as it does a 
place in linguistic discourse, must participate in 
signifying its signified, in this case the subject, as 
bearing that characteristic of naturality, timelessness, 
ahistoricity, not having an origin requiring or even 
susceptible of explanation. The subject of the €none€, 
that.is, must signify the subject of the enonciation 
as natural, simply by virtue of its existence as a subject 
of speech. This applies not only despite the potentially 
contradictory positions the subject may occupy in discourse, 
but precisely 'to deny such a possibility of contradiction. 
r----------·---·-··----~-·~···~=~~~~----------------------------
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And, on the psychoanalytic side of the coin, the 
subject's desire is doubly and triply impelled to 
invest the subject with the same signifidation of 
naturality or essentiality: the ego is imagined to 
be the subject. 
It follows from both the ideological and psychoanalytic 
perspectives that the only tenable position for the 
subject is to experience as natural whatever is signified 
by the discourse she/he is constituted by. This applies 
more particularly to characteristics predicable of the 
subject or, more accurately, of the ego, which is taken 
for the subject - characteristics such as gay or straight. 
It will, of course, appear peculiar to state that an 
attribute like "gay" must be experienced as natural. 
But this i~ the crux of the contradictory position the 
gay subject experiences, and, it will be argued here, it 
is a realisation without which the gay p~edicament cannot 
be clearly understood. The rest of the thesis will attempt 
to show that this way of conceiving the operation of 
ideology on homosexuali~y brings great clarity to the 
understanding of homophobia. This appears to be an 
original conception, which follows logically from the 
present view on ideology. Its usefulness and consistency 
should emerge in the following pages. 
It follows clearly from the preceding pages· that since 
.gayness is signified by ideological discourse, it must 
. . . . 
be signified as natuial in the same way as everything 
else signified by such discourses, that is, through the 
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"fixing" by the signifier of the signified as an 
esse~tial thing-in-itself. This meaning of 
naturality is that on the. basis of which the argument 
up to now has been conducted: that is, timelessness, 
essentiality, insusceptibility of explanation. 
Two vital sets of contradictions ensue from this, which 
will be elaborated in the rest of this chapter. Firstly, 
the gay subject is signified as natural as well as 
unnatural in the same respect. The signifier "unnatural" 
is made to operate on gayness by.the cultures in question, 
so that its meaning is produced as both and simultaneously 
natural (by the operation of the discourse as a whole) , 
and unnatural (by the operation of a specific signifier). 
Secondly, the gay subject is signified as natural .in two 
mutually exclusive respects. She/he is signified as an 
essence by the flI" of ideological discourse, a significa-
tion supported by the m€connaissance of the imaginary 
ego, which is identified with the "I" of speech with all 
the passion of the subject's desire. And she/he is also 
signified as gay. This signification of gayness is, like 
all other significations within the ideological discourses 
in question, additionally a signification of naturality. 
But; because gayness is simultaneously signified as 
unnatural by other ideological discursive operations, 
while the essence signified by "I" is unambivalently 
signified as natural, the subject is operated. on by two 
antithetical signif iers of naturality at onca. 
No attempt will be made in this thesis to explain 
comprehensively why the gay/straight opposition is linked 
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with the urinatural/natural opposition. The place of 
economic and politiCal practices in this' begs to be 
researched in a first approach to answering that 
qu~stion, and such research falls too far out of the 
psychological scope of this work. It will be taken as 
sufficient here that the signifier "urinatutal" is made 
to operate effectively on gayness. The deployment of 
naturality and unnaturality by ideology and the 
knotting of this deployment with libidinal desire is 
taken here as the starting point of an explanation and 
an elaboration, an explanation of the powerful emotional 
effects of the prohibition and exclusion of gayness and 
an elaboration of the nature of these effects. 
To continue, then, it is clear that the gay individual 
is interpellated into two sets of contradictory subject-
posi tions in the discourse that constitutes her/him •. 
And each being a position in which the subject's desire 
is captivated, each is made untenable by the existence 
of the other. In Lacan's words, "'one cannot serve two 
masters', that is, one's being cannot conform to two 
actions that lead in opposite directions" (1977a, p.130). 
5.6 Those in Contact with Gay People 
Before the gay predicament is further elaborated, it 
should be explained that the same analysis applies both 
to those who experience homosexuality in themselves and 
those who are merely in contact with gay others.. This 
is quite simply because of the centrality of the Other 
in the Lacaniai;>. framework. Or, put more simplistically, 
this is because~of the inescapable identification of a 
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subject with.other subjects. Since this is crucial 
to the applicability of the present analysis, it will 
be heavily supported by references to L~can in this 
section. 
It should be recalled first that 
the mirror stage is a drama ••• which manufactures· 
for the subject ••• the succession of phantasies 
that extends from a fragmented body-image to a 
form of its totality •.. and an alienating 
identify, which will mark with its rigid 
structure the subject's entire mental develop-
ment (Lacan, 1977a, p.4). 
The mechanism of this process is explained as follows: 
"We have only to understand the mirror stage as an 
identification ••• : namely, the transformation that 
takes place in the subject when he assumes an image" 
(ibid., p.2). The product of this identification is, 
of course, the ego that is so vital to the achievement 
of the primal desire, recognition as the object of the 
mother's desire, and any threat to which ego consequently 
has such powerful effects. 
-
Furthermore, the 
moment in which the mirror-stage comes to 
an end inaugurates, by the identification 
with the imago of the.counterpart and the 
drama of primordial jealousy •.•• the dialectic 




It is this moment that decisively tips the 
whole of human kriowledge into medi~tization 
through the desire of the other, constitutes 
its objects in an abstract equivalence by 
the co-operation of others (ibid., o.5}. 
This moment, too, because of the importance to the 
subject of the ego's apparent consistency, 
turns the I into that apparatus for which 
every instinctual thrust constitutes a 
danger, even though it should correspond 
to a normal maturation - the very 
normalization of this maturation being 
henceforth dependent, in man, on a 
cultural mediation (ibid., pp.5-6). 
Thus the consistency of the subject's ego is always 
to some degree vulnerable to challenge •. For "this 
narcissistic moment in the subject is to be found in 
all the genetic phases of the individual, in all the 
degrees of human accomplishment in the person" (ibid., 
p.24). 
And Lacan maintains that one of the sources of 
aggressivity in people is the unsuccessful rivalry 
undergone by the infant for the mother's affection and 
recognition (ibid., pp.19ff.). Thus a threat to the 
ego's appearance of consistency is precisely suited to 
e¥oking aggression - a frequent response to homosexuals. 
The subject, then, its understanding of the world and 
of itself mediated through the desire of the other, 
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and its objects constituted "by the co-opetatidn 
of others" (ibid., p.5), is always to some degree 
dependent on identification with others to confirm 
that vital essential nature of his/her ego, its 
identity. And others are then in a posititin to evoke 
primordial emotions in the subject by disconfirming 
her/his essentiality. For in "the notion of an 
aggressivity linked .•. to the structures of systematic 
meconnaissance and objectification that characterize 
the formation of the ego" (ibid., p.21), "we can see 
the subjective function of identification operate" (ibid.). 
Even the statement "'I'm a man •.. can at most mean no 
more than, 'I'm like he whom I recognize to be a man, 
and so recognize myself as being such'. In the last 
resort, these various formulas are to be understood 
only in reference to the truth of 'I is an other'" 
(ibid., 23). All through life the subject needs the 
identif icatory confirmation of others to maintain the 
meconnaissance of the ego. 
It is therefore understandable that when another 
individual embodies an inconceivable representation of 
human nature, as is done by making the unnatural 
visible, that confirmation via identification is 
undermined; challenged and threatened and it follows 
that primordial emotions may be evoked in consequence. 
Furthermore, it follows from the above discussion that 
subject in contact with gay others, be it directly, or 
through conversation, or through the media, may well 
enter, vicariously and by identification, into what 
has been analysed here as the gay predicament. This 
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. will beoone Gl~ in ~t follows ~ately below. · 
'll,l;i.s.p;rocess of identificationnas been d;iseussed so far nore 
clearly in ter.ms of the ima<;ri:ncu:y than the symbolic. An 
uriderstanding of the ;relation o;f the preceding discussion to 
the symbolic presents no difficulties, however, since the "I" 
of the symbolic diseour5e designates the subject insofar as it 
is misrecognised as the imaginary ego. "This .imaginary 
process ••• begins with the specular image and goes on to the 
constitution of the ego by way of subjectification by the 
signifier" (ibid., p.307). 
The subject's identification, it may therefore be said, "will 
always be an identification with signifiers" (ibid., p.256), as 
Lacan says of the patient in analysis. That is, given that the 
subject is "a subject defined only as a locus of relationships" 
(Wilden, 1968, p.182), which is precisely how a signifier is 
defined, it follows that the subject in contact with gay other 
subjects may cane to occupy s.llnilar p:>sitions in discourse to 
j 
those occupied by these gay others. 
This concerns a quite different function from that of 
the primary identification referred to a.l:x:>ve, for it 
does not involve the assumption by the subject of _the. 
insignia of the other, but rather the condition that 
the subject has to find the constituting structure of 
his desire in th.e same gap opened up by the effect of 
the signif iers in those who come to represent the 
Other for him (La~, l977a., p.264). 
Thus the same analysis applies to the hom::>phobia experienced by 
those in.direct or indirect.: contact with gays as to the horrophobia 
,. . . . . ··- . 
experienced by gays themselves. And an additional oarnponent of 
""'l.65,..; 
aggtessivity .{(lay be .attributed to tll.e ·reaction of those in 
oontact with ga:y others. Indeed~, research may show that the 
depression of those newly realising their own honosexuality 
may derive in part from the same source of aggressivity. 
. 5 .7 Elalx>ration of the contradictory Effects 
The fit". st set of contradictions a;r:;ises from the simultaneous 
sigpification of gayness as natural and. unnatural. Being 
natural, gayness has no origin, no history;_ it is a timeless 
essence and therefore requires no explanation. But, being 
unnatural, it ®es require to be explained, to be put into 
relation to that which the ideological discourse has signified 
as eternal and the only way to be. 
'!'A.is last is in a sense a definitional consequence of the 
~stence of such a categc>ry as natutality at all. If a certain 
. way of being is the only Wa.y ·of being, then. it follows that any 
other way of being exclud.ed therefrom can only have a meaning, 
can only be conceived, if its exclusive otherness is only 
appa;rent,. so that in reality it is only a deviation fran the 
only way to be, bearing a. definite relation to it. Md an 
e:Xplanation for.the deviation can then be sought by adducing an 
extraneous cause or influence which accounts for the apparent 
othemess, the apparent exclusivity, of the alternative way of 
being. The essentiality of the natural way of being is thus 
. vindicated. An exanq;>le of such an explanatory process in the 
case of harosexuality is the principle that gays are in fact 
afraid of nalibers of the opp0site sex, (Socarides, 1979, 1981) 
arid: that this extra fa~r sufficiently explains their deviation 
f;r;an heterosexuality which is in reality hidden at their core. 
The fact of being positively drawn to members of the same sex 
, ..... 
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is rendered iI1Significant:.. the ~a explanatory factor of . 
(negative) fear serves to negate the unnatural attraction. 
The existerice of the unnatural attraction is thereby.masked. 
It is important to be clear that the issue here is not whether 
tlle. "natural" way of being, in th.is ca.se lleterosexuality, is 
in .. fact being .deviated from, but that the explanatory process out-
. lined above serves ·to vindicate the itnplications of the way of 
being's having been signified as natural in the first place. It 
is not at issue here whether the explanations are correct or not. 
What is at issue is the ideological operation which occurs in 
the search for explanation, over and above the scientific value 
of the search. 
To return, then, gayness, being both natural and urmatural, is 
both insusceptible of explanation and in need of explanation. _ 
Nid. the pun on "need" is more than co-incidental. For the .gay 
subject's desire is most deeply invested in the imaginary· 
consistency, essentiality, coherence of his/her ego, ·as 
elaborated in earlier chapters. And now the "I" of the symbolic 
register, the register of ideological discourse, with which that 
ego is identified. and knotted with all the strength of the 
multiple desperation and captation of desire elaborated earlier, 
is signifying a subject which is urmatUral - inessential, not 
existing in the only way there is to exist, not conceivable as 
a coherent, consistent being at all. Thus, for the gay 
individual, all her/his.desire (ultimately to be the essential 
object of the mother's. desire) impells a repudiation of the 
unnatural signification qperating on her/his gayness, a drawing 
of it into relation with wnat.is natural about the subject 
signified by "I", ap explanation. of .it. 
\ 
'"".167-
But it cannot be, as long as the subj·ect is bound. in such a 
kind. of ideological diseourse. ror 'sinCe gayness is also 
signified as natural,.and therefore insusceptible of' explanation, 
' - . ' 
it can never be dl:'awn into explanatory relation with ·anything 
el..se. J\n essence need. not bear any relation, indeed. cannot 
bear any relation., to any other essence. Md we have no 
criteria. for deciding whether in any given case it does or does 
not, so that it would be a meaningless.proposition even to think. 
'!his Wittgensteinian point. is by no means an abstraction, but 
rather strikes at the root of the matter. 'As Wittgenstein himself 
says, it is not "that human agreement decides what is true and 
. what is false" - "it is what human beings say that is true and 
false;., and.they agree in the ·language they use. That is not 
e agreement in opinions but in fonn of life" (1958, 88 ) • Or, to 
make a m:::>re properly appropriate Lacanian point, it is crucial 
to rercember thioughout the following chapters ·that the subject 
is constituted in every way harcologous to a signifier. Arid if 
the subject is not indeed itself precisely a signifier (an 
imfx:>rtant "if" - the ambiguity is perhaps indispensably valuable 
to the Laca:nian'discourse/theory), it is so inextricably bound up 
with the ways of operating and being operated upon of the signifier, 
that language and its operations are at the very heart of desire. 
Thus-the cibove discussion, of .explanation as applied to haro-
sexuality, is far from. "merely" a. conceptual point, for the opera-
tion. of concepts is IYQSt finnly tied to the operatiOJ'l.Of desire • 
. f.S Lacan puts it, "TAe .use of the Wo;t;d requires vastly nore 
vigilance in. the science o:f ~ .. th.an it does anywh.ere· else, for 
it.engages in: itthevecy being of its object" (quoted in Wilden, 
1968, p. viii)~ lnd if J"iarophobia· can be regai:Ped as a ·synptan or · 
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collection of symptoms (and .ev.en. CQ1Ilron speech can be so 
- ·-
regarded, states Freud, 1907, p.85) and "if the ·s~ can 
be read, it is because it is already itself inscribed in a 
proce5s of writing. lnsbfaJ;" as a particu1ar formation of the 
unconscious, it.is not a signification, but its relation. to 
a signifying structure which determines it. If I may be 
permitted a pl_ay on words, I WOUld say that it is always a 
question Of the agreement Of the subject With the Verbe". 
(Lacan, quoted in. Wil.den., 1968, p.lJ.6). 
The imaginary ego of the gay person, then, and the desire that 
so fully invests it, are trapped.by the operation of ideology, 
its fixing of-particular significations, into negating their 
. very ra,ison d'etre in the process. of, as always, affioning it. 
It is in reacting to the Possibility of this predicament, I 
would suggest, that the hom:>phobe too abaninates harosexuals. 
'l'o surrmarise, insofar as gayness is at all coherently signified, 
it is signified as being naturally unnatural, that is, etemally 
in need of explanation, a requirement which clearly cannot be · 
met. The gay person, his/her desire colluding as it does with 
·the operations of ideological discourse, is placed in an 
untenable emotional contradiction. 
J\nd others, reacting to gays, find and accept contradicto:cy 
explanations:. hcmos~lity is a sickness, but nonetheless norally . 
:reprehensible;. it is genetic, but nonetheless licentious;. it is 
de~ipable only .:i;.{l. tel:lns of s~l acts with other people of the 
. saJIJe sex, but nonetheless indicates inadequacy of the person's 
character trait.S in. general;.·. J:iqipsexua.ls ar:e degenerate, but 
nonetheless no different . (Cheael:>ro, 1980). 
Th;i.,s elal:lora:tion has applied to the first set .of contradictions 
a;i:;ising frQU.the sigpi!icatioi:l,of.naturality, that is, the 
sigriification ot gayness as both natural and unnatural. The 
second. set of contradictions mentioned earlier consists in the 
signification of the subject as natural in two mutually 
-, 
exclusive respects, that is, as an essence signified by "I" 
and supported by the .meccmnaissance of the imaginary ego, 
identified. as it is.with the "I" of speech, and as gay, which 
hapPenS. to be a predicate of that "I". 
l\s. is clear ;f:ran the al:x:Ne discussions., the gay person is 
signified as natural by the signifier "I" in the same way that 
all signifiers in the ideological discourses being considered 
. . . ' 
fix their sigriifieds as being natural, essential things-in'."' 
themselves. This· means that the subject is signified as being 
~less, ahistorical, insusceptible of explanation. And she/he 
is. naturally gay, which is equally insusceptible of explanation. 
But gayness is also placed in the unnatural camp, so that 1t and 
that which is signified by "I" are mutually exclusive. The 
subject is in 'this way· placed in a contradiction for which 
resolution cannot .even be begun to be attempted. For two 
essences, as argued above, can never be brought into explanatory 
relation with. each other. 
This, viewed.more emphatical.ly.framthe psychoanalytic 
perspective, means that tPe subject's desire is trapped with. 
equal passion in two brutally contradictory positions. For the 
i.magfna;cy ~o, . Ulisrecogpised. as an essential being with all the 
~sion of desire, is. i.d~tified: with the "I11 which operates 
.in the ideological diseourse al.s.o to signify an essentiaL being. 
l\nd. the predicates of the. ego( including gayness, are siJ:nilatly 
- ---'-····--:;·-·- -- - - -·- ---·· ·----.----~------ --
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invested by desire in. a misrecogp;ttion of essentiality or 
naturality, .as wel,l as similarly operating as ·ideological · 
.. . .. . 
signif.iers of. essentiality. . Once the subject is ccmnitted to 
being two irreconcil.ably d.i!~e~t .essences, it cannot be such 
an object .as the nother tnight recognise as the object of her 
desire. The :possibility of ~ing ;reCQ911ised. as· either of the 
two objects the subject's desire commits it to being, is 
contradicted by the.nere existence of the other object which 
the subject's desire commits it to being. So that the 
linguistic point made. in the preceding paragraph .is also 
.. 
properly a psychoanalytic one. 
5. 8 · · A Ieview in. terms of Diachrony and. Synchrony 
\.. 
It was argued in section 3.5 that the oontradictions llnplicit 
in the denial of ·synchrony and diachrony in the operations both 
Of ideology and of desire lie at the centre of the gay predicam:mt. 
It will be useful to recall that viewpoint at this stage of the 
discussion. 
The signif iers of ideological d,iscourse signify their signif ieds 
as essences, by fixing them and. concealing their production by 
the signifiers. That is, as argued in an earlier chapter, the 
ronstruction of OOth signifiers aJrl signifieds by difference 
-
alone - in other words, synchrcmy - is denied. And the production 
of synchronic networks in history - that is, diachrony - is 
denied in the same signification of essentiality or. na:tur.al.ity •. 
Th.is applies, of c0urse, to all sicjnifications of the.subject, 
includipg "I" an~ in the case ~der c;l;i.scussion, "gay". 
'tAe denial of s:}'nclu::Ony beccmes cl~ ·at the :point where the 
gayness of the subject is.sigti.ified as naturally.unnatural. And 
the denial of diachrony becomes clear at the point where the 
subject is sigrii.fiedas natural - ahistorical -.in two mutually 
exclusive respects which cannqt, because o;f their· nat\.lral.ity, 
be drawn into any rela:tiori.with each Other. The ,denial Of 
syncfu:Ony and that of diachtc>ny are of course inutUally 
i.Ilplicit. They. are· two apProaches Of analysis to the same 
ob]ect, language, not t.wo distinct properties of that object • 
. Viewing this again fran the rrore ~Aa,ticaliy psychoanalytic 
perspective, the desire:...impelled subject already demes synchrony 
in the misrecogilttion of the ego as a positive essence~·arid not 
.-. ' . . ' -
as constituted. only by difference and by the identification of 
the ego with the i:aeological signifier "I". And diachi"ony, the 
historicity· of the ego, is denied. int.he same operation of desire. 
And, again, the subject's desire is caught up in language with a 
multiple desperation and captation (argued at the end of Chapter 
Three, and briefly re-defined above, section 5.2), precisely in 
order to assert that same essentiality of the subject, that same 
denial of.synchrony and diachrony, that constitutes the 
meconnaissance of. the imaginary ego. The desire-impelled subject 
must, therefore, resist unveiling that double deillal perpetrated 
by ideological disoourse, ·a,g its own ego w0uld be called 
radically into question, and with it the veiy feasibility of its 
desire. 
Thus the subject, constituted in. syp.chrony and. diachrony like the 
diseourse in which th.at constitution occurred, colludes with 
ideol<;igy in. the double denia;I.· itnplicit in the.representation of 
their· own ahistoric.ity and essentia.lJty. 
In this· doubl.e · denial1 crucial and .even definitive in the operations 
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of desire and ideol0gy,. eaGh. o! tjl.es.e ;Last .I.ays the seedp 
of itS .own undennirdng. in the i:ranent of its birth. The suJ:;>ject, 
in the nanentum of its 'very attempt to establish its coherence, 
fragments itself further. . The repression of diaChrony and 
synchrony is followed in the econctny of structures by the · 
return of the repressed in a compromise of oppositional terms, 
at the point.where the .psychological and ideological lose 
distinetion.10 The progeny of the· laCk in which desire is 
constituted are.,··· it seems, inevitably ech0es of the fragmented 
lxxly. 
5.9 5are Suggested.Elatorations of Na:tUrality/Unnaturality 
The preceding analysis· has been undertaken in terms of naturality 
and. unnaturality as linked. simply to heterosexuality and ~ 
sexuality respectively. The link between the two pairs of terms 
is, however, nore canplex than this. One crucial example is 
that heterosexuality is linked. to a certain set of oonf igurations 
of <Jender I SeX categories. These may be seen to be bi9logical 
sex, gender identity, gender role, and sexual behaviour and. 
orientation (De Cecco, 1981;_ Marshall, 1981, pp.l34ff., slightly 
m:xlified; Shively.& De Cecoo, 1977). "Now it is quite clear 
. . 
that even in the present day these components are often assumed 
to~ logicctlly iinked .•• It is this pattern of expectations 
which produces.a. particular.definition of the nor.m" (Mro::shall, 
1981, p.134). 
10. "We shall not be wrong, ~naps, in saying_that·the weak point 
in.the ego's_organiza,tion.s.eeros to lie in its attitude to the 
. sexual ·funetion.1 .as though· the biological antithesis between 
. self-preservation. and. the preservation of .the speriies had 
. found a,psychologicaJ .. expressi.on at that point" (Freud, 1940, 
p.l86). . ' 
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This is cl.ear in the ca.seof piological aex and gerider role, 
where certain behavioilrs. are usUally ~ed. o;e Irefl, by 
themselves ancl others, and equally certain 1,imited and di;fferent 
benaviours are expected: of women. (Collen, ;I.973; Frieze & ~ay, 
1976; Larson., l981; .Mill.er, l973;_ ?leek, 1976; _. Rebecca, 
Jlefner & Olesharisky,· 1976; : Shively·, Rudolph & De Cecco, 1978; 
Stoller, 1973) • This difference in. masculine and feminine 
behaviours is part of what is generally taken as natural in 
heterosexuals.·. Rebecca, Jiefner, and. Oleshansky ·(1976) make a 
representative statement: "a. polarized oppositional view of sex 
roles .•• charaCterizes many individuals and. institutions today, 
and. is regarded as the end. point in much scientific work on 
sex roles" (p.197}. 
Fram a purely psychoanalytic viewpoint, these distinctions are 
not natural, but are constructed in the individual's course of 
developnent, as is .everything else human arout her/him. Apart 
. fram. which, the evidence .is .ovexwhelrning that gender roles and 
gender identity are not linked to biological sex naturally. 
In addition, masciilinity and femininity appear not to be opposed 
dircensions: one can be both and simultaneously highly feminine 
and highly masculine, or vice-versa (Freund, Nagler & Langevin; 
Larson, 1981; Oldham., Farnill & Ball, 1982; Shively & De Cecco, 
1977; Shively, Rudolph & De Cecco, 1978; Storms, 1980; Zajai 
& Steiner, 1974). 
fl<ltpsexuality, of course, contradicts the assu:npti;.on that these 
gender/sex categc:>ries are natural;Ly all :Linked in the stereo-
. typi.cal configUratiOJ:lS,, by conQ:-adicting the gender role that 
"pat:urally goes with n, .the hanosexual' s biological sex.· And gays 
do this in. a m:>st fundanental Way - by sexually desiring tjle 
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category of person. "na.tura;IJy" clesired oP.ly by one of t:Ae 
opposite biological sex to them5e1 ves. Thus part of P,anophobia 
is evoked by that specific aspect of hOIIPsexuality, the 
uneonventionality of gender roles and behaviour ~· (Laner & Lanei", 
1980; Larson, l.981.; Millham. & Weinberger, 1977 i. Weinberger 
& W:llham, 1979). 
It should be added. that hOIIPsexuali ty· is abhorred fo:r: broader 
reas.ons than this ·alone;_ the hoiros~l orientation evokes 
ne~ative reactions distinct f~ reactions to gender 
unconventionality (Qxxiyear, Abadie & Barquest, 1981; · Laner 
& Laner, 1979, 1980; McPonald, 1982;_ Storms, 1978; 
Weinberger & Mi.llham, 197~) • 
Thus the above analysis of the gay predicanent could be 
considerably extended by analysing the detailed ways ·in which 
hatrPsexuality/heterosexuality are linked to unnaturality/naturality. 
Presumably there are many rrore c:lim:msions to be considered than 
the gender/sex categories. Further research will need to be 
undertaken to specify them and think through their ~lications. 
The present conceptualisation of the operation of the natural/ 
. -
unnatural opposition will still apply as a broader context within 
which tO situate such analyses. They may therefore be integrated 
into_ the und~standing developed in this thesis. 
s .. 10 sunma;ry · 
The al:xwe arguxrent l!iay . be s~ised in. the abstract; as follows. 
That which is. ftmilamental to the OJ?e;(ation of ide0logy, that- is 
the positing of essen.ce .or natw;-e, is al.so fundamental. to the 
OJ?E!ration of desire. The opera:tion of ideology an¢! that of 
desire OCCUX" and are knotted in. the same diseourses. :Fundamental 
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contradictions in .. ideol0gy are ther.efo;re al.so fundaiilental 
contradictions in desire. ·The gay predicarcent is. the consequepce 
of such a fundamental contradiction. The effects on gays of 
this contradiction can. be ·fUJ:th,er articulated by analysing 
the continuity between the operation of desire and that of 
ideology. 
It may be added, by Wa.y of conclusion., that this continuity of 
the two operations ultimately oomes down to Freud's formulation: 
"For society must taJ<e as one of its most important educative · 
ta.sks to tame and restrict the sexual instinct when it breaks 
out as an urge to reproduction, and to subject it to an 




6 THE CHANGE FROM ABHORRENCE TO ACCEPTANCE 
The gay subject who is not self-acce~ting with respect 
to her/his being gay, it was concluded in the last 
chapter, suffers by virtue of occupying irreconcilably 
contradictory positions in ideological discourse. The 
ways in which these contradictory positions articulate 
with one another may be specified with precision, as was 
done in that chapter. It is indisputable that some or 
many gays and some or many of those in contact with them. 
reach and maintain a state in which they no longer 
experience an abhorrence of homosexuality in any degree 
comparable to, their former experience of abhorrence. 
Clearly, the process of changing from the homophobia 
explained by the articulation of irreconcilably 
contradictory positions, to the acceptance of homosexuality, 
must involve a change to occupying relatively non-
contradictory positions in ideological discourse. This 
can only be achieved by altering the discourse in some 
way, since the meconnaissance of the ego is inescapable 
for the human subject. 
This chapter attempts to elaborate in what ways the 
ideological discourse inhabited by gays and those in 
contact with them must be changed as the subjects in 
question come to occupy non-contradictory discursive 
positions, and how the commitments of their desire relate 
to these changes. In order to do this it will be useful 
to establish the relevant limits within which it is 
possible for change to occur, both for desire and for 
ideological discourse, and the first sections will be 
devoted to this consideration. 
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6.1 The Limits of Change with Respect to Desire 
This section will argue that the subject's desire 
cannot abandon the meconnaissance that is the ego, 
and hence cannot abandon the consequent meconnaissance 
of naturality. This will be argued on the grounds 
that: human beings are inconceivable without the ego; 
there is in any event a very strong motivation to cling 
to the misrecognition of the subject's being that the 
ego is; and abandoning that misrecognition would not 
resolve the gay predicament anyway. 
It is not possible to consider a human being without an 
imaginary ego, with all the characteristics of meconnai-
ssance and the imaginary mode of relating attributed to 
the ego by Lacan. The imaginary ego is an essential 
prerequisite for human existence, since it is the basis 
for all the identifications which make possible the 
complete entry into language, via the subject's use of 
"I" to designa~e itself. The "assumption of his specular 
image by the child ..• would seem to exhibit in an 
exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I 
is precipitated in a primordial form .•• This form ••• will 
also be the source of secondary identifications, under 
which term L would place the functions of libidinal 
normalization" (Lacan, 1977a, p.2). The later 
identifications (for instance with the father or mother) 
cannot take place without the prior existence of ~his 
ego deriving from identification with the mirror image, 
because, as Lacan points out, the subject cannot even 
conceive of the father as a rival for the mother,.· as 
someone who may conceivably be identified with as a 
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route to the mother, unless the subject has first 
been in a position in which rivalry is meaningful. 
This position occurs when the subject identifies with 
the unitary mirror image, opposed as it is to the 
infant's own bodily discord. The infant thus becomes 
a rival to itself, and is then in a position to know a 
rival in another and1 identify with that rival as a 
means to obtaining their mutual object: "it is clear 
that the structural effect of identification with the 
rival is not self-evident, except at the level of fable, 
and can only be conceived of if the way is prepared for 
it by a primary identification that structures the 
~ubject as a rival with himself" (ibid., p.22). In 
addition, 
as one recognizes oneself in an external 
mirrored image, this mirror-self is also 
an object in space. The specular capture 
of oneself in the mirror phase also 
institutes object relationships, not in 
the sense of object libido, but in the 
sense that to have a narcissistically 
cathected self-object one must posit not 
only recognition of self .but also recognition 
of object. And·this object, this imaginary 
I 
object, as Lacan would call it, is the ego 
(Evans, 1979, p~395). 
In short, then, human beings are inconceivable without 
the imaginary.ego: it cannot be done ·away with. "We 
call ego ••• this "I,; who ••• opposes its irreducible 
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inertia of pretences and meconnaissances to the 
concrete problematic of the realization of the subject" 
(Lacan, 1977a, p.15, emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the subject has very powerful motivations 
for clinging to the meconnaissance of itself as the 
coherent, consistent ego (Chapter Three, section 3.1). 
For "he sees his own image in the mirror at a time when 
he is capable of perceiving the image as a t~tality but 
when he does not feel himself as such but as living 
rather in that primal incoherence of all his motor and 
affective functions which lasts for the first six months 
after birth" (Lacan, 1979, p.423). And these motivations, 
including that of desiring to be the object of the 
mother's desire, are repressed deeply into the unconscious, 
again as described earlier, so that they cannot be 
recovered to the extent that the misrecognition could be 
effectively reversed. 
"We ••• learn that what repression strikes is 
precisely these phantasies, which constitute 
the specific sources of our pleasure; 
Finally we learn that the reality principle 
is powerless here, that no reality test 
will correct these phantasies, which thus 
enjoy an undisputed sway. over our existence 
and over our.perception, since repression 
strikes them even before we have had time 
to re6ognise them" (Safouan, 1981, p.77). 
The subject's desire, therefore, cannot relinquish 
the meconnaissance that is the ego, and, as .. argued above, 
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if it did it could no longer be said to be a subject. 
of human existence. The pertinent consequence of 
this is that human individuals cannot relinquish 
. 
the misrecognition of themselves as natural, as such 
.an object as might be recognised by the mother as the 
object of her desire, with all the qualities _of .. 
naturality discussed earlier. 
Indeed, the essence of the gay predicament is that the 
imaginary possibility of achieving the subject's desire 
to be natural is contradicted in ways that trap the sub-
ject in the ~ontradiction. Thus the abandonment of the 
desire to be natural, apart from being impossible~ = 
would still contradict the possibility of achieving that 
desire and so would involve terrors at least as great as 
those of the gay predicament itself. The path to.self-
acc~ptanc~, or to acceptance of gay others;~could not, 
therefore, involve the abandonment of the· desire for 
naturality, even if this were possible. 
If the gay individual is.to. resolve the contradictions 
in which.she/he. is placed by the signification of 
naturality, then, .she/he m:ust still occupy positions in 
·dis9ourse in which _his/her.desire for· naturalitycan 
still· oper_ate. 
Thus, as . the desire. to_ be natural cannot be abandoned·; 
the other factor.understood here to explain the gay 
predicament must be.considered: that is, ideological 
discourse. It appears that what must change is the 
commitment of desire to the specific.discourses which 
signify homosexual.ity as unnatural. That. is 1 a 
--- -- - - ---- - -~--
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Clearly, subcultures are not privileged forms; 
they do not stand outside the reflexive 
circuitry of production and reproduction 
which links together, at least on a symbolic 
level, the separate and fragmented pieces of 
the social totality ••• They also articulate, 
to a greater or lesser extent, some of the 
preferred meanings and interpretations, those 
favoured by and transmitted through the 
authorized channels of mass communication 
(Hebdige, 1979, pp.85-86). 
Indeed, it is possible that in order for the dominant 
ideology's signification of naturality to be: abolished, 
even in sub-ideologies within the same social formation 
as the dominant ideology, all levels of the social~ 
formation'would have to be revolutionised. The issues 
involved here are too complex to be dealt with in iess 
than another thesis. It will therefore be taken as 
beyond the parameters of this thesis to argue.the case 
in which the signification of .naturality is ~ltogether 
abolished. 
An additional consideration is that the misrecognised 
naturality.of the ego will militate against the total 
abolition of the n.atural signification, as will be 
briefly elaborated in the next section. 
It is, indeed, suf.ficient that this analysis. wi11 · 
apply at least to those people who have reached~· 
acceptance of homosexuality while remaining within 
the province of influence of the dominant ideology such 
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that naturality is still an ideological signification 
operating on them. 
If different ideological discourses are to be 
constructeq, then, it will be taken that the significa-
tion of naturality will ~ersist within them. The 
achievement of acceptance of homosexuality.must never-
theless involve the subject's escape from the occupation 
of positions in discourse made irreconcilable by the 
signification of naturality and its inevitable binary 
opposite, unnaturality. Thus these significations, if 
they cannot be abolished, must be differently organised 
in their operation upon the subject. The nature of this 
reorganisation o~ rearticulation of th~ ~ignifying of 
naturality will be the major concern of this chapter. 
It is clear from the chapter on ideology that transf or-
ma t~ons of discourse are possible in a number of ways. 
The existence of these possibilities of transformation 
will be taken for granted throughout the following 
discussion. A conception of such change which is 
particularly appropriate in view of the above argument 
may be recurred to here: 
Together, object and meaning constitute a 
sign; and, within any one culture, such 
signs are assembled, repeatedly, into 
characteristic forms of discourse. However, 
when the bricoleur re-locates the signifi-
cant object in a different position within 
that discourse, using the same overall 
repertoire of signs, or when that object 
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is placed within a different total ensemble, 
a new discourse is constituted, a different 
message conveyed (Clarke, quoted in 
Hebdige, op. cit., p.104). 
In Lacan's words, "the slightest alteration in the 
relation between man and the signifier ••. changes 
the whole course of history by modifying the moorings 
that anchor his being" (1977a, p.174). 
6.3 The First Possible Change : The Inversion of Ideology 
Two broad rearticulations of ideology are suggested by 
the account of the gay predicament developed in the 
last chapter. The first involves an inversion of the 
dominant ideology, so that what was signified as 
unnatural comes to be signified as natural. The second 
involves what will be called a particularisation of 
naturality, such that the individual is aignified·as 
natural without requiring the other members of the 
group or society to be signified as natural in the same 
respects. This section will descibe the first of these 
rearticulations in outline, as well as the process of 
reaching it, and its consequences with respect to the 
commitments of desire to discourse that the gay 
predicament involves. Further implications and details 
of this rearticulation will be elaborated in section 
6.5. The second rearticulation of ideological discourse 
will be described in section 6.4 and elaborated in 
section 6.6. 
The first rearticulation or transformation involves an 
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inversion of the dominant ideology, so that what was 
signified as unnatural. comes to be signified· as natural, 
in the latter case as emphatically as in the former. 
This is achieved by reversing the invisibility of 
homosexual.ity and the implications of that invisibility. 
It is a reversal, that is, of what Foucault calls "a 
sentence to disappear, ••• an injunction to silence, an 
affirmation of nonexistence, and, by implication, an 
admission that there was nothing to say about, such 
things, nothing to see, and nothing to know" (1978, p.4). 
As Hoffman puts it, with respect of homophobia, "Society 
deals with homosexuality as if it did not exist .•. We just 
didn't speak about these things; they were literally 
unspeakable and so loathsome that nothing could be said 
in polite society about them" (quoted in Dark, 1971, p.183). 
The simple act of meeting in groups of gays or having 
sustained contact with gays is sufficient to set this 
reversal and the movement towards acceptance in motion 
(Dark, 1971; Plummer, 1975, p .148; . Troiden, 1979; · 
Weinberg, 1978). For "the first object of desire is to 
be recognized by the other" (Lacani 1977a, p.58). Once 
the subject can be recognized as desirable by others, the 
-
poss_ibility. of being such an object as the mother might 
recognise as the object of her desire is at least to 
some extent restored. This desire for the mother's 
. . 
desire, it may usefully be recalled, is also the desire 
for recognition by the Other (Chapter Three). The 
subject has been given by the recognition of others 
what she/he has been deprived of by the signification of 
unnaturality. The fact of being signified as unnatural 
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by the dominant ideology is no longer an exclusive 
fact. The subject has recourse to an alternative 
signification, given fundamental efficacy with respect 
to her/his desire by its embodiment in others, or, 
more accurately, in the Other (with, perhaps, a smaller 
O than the Other in whicp is located the dominant 
ideology) • 
It is the learning of various ideas from 
other homosexuals that allows the subject 
to in effect say, "I am homosexual, but not 
deviant", or, "I am homosexual, but not 
mentally ill". The cognitive category of 
homosexual now becomes socially acceptable, 
and the subject can place himself in that 
category and yet preserve a sense of his 
self-esteem or self-worth (Dark, 1971) 
pp.190-191. 
This is supported by Troiden (1979). 
Whether these affirming groups need number more than 
two (as in analyst and patient, for example), or 
whether they need be in the flesh, as opposed to 
psychological or symbolic· groups, are fascinating 
questions which must be pursued elsewhere. 
To avoid complicating the present train of thoughts 
with concrete examples, the specific ways in which 
gays and those in contact with them promote and maintain 
this inversion of ~deology will be discussed in section 
6.5. 
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The degree of change in the subject from abhorrence 
to acceptance will, therefore, be a function of the 
degree to which she/he invests his/her desire in the 
inverted ideological discourse, and to which she/he 
relinquishes his/her investment of desire ih the 
dominant ideological discourse. 
This relative change in investments of desire will in 
turn be a function of a great number of factors 
specific to various contexts and to the individuals 
themselves, such as investments in ethical discourses 
or familial loyalties. These factors must inevitably 
partake of investments of desire dependent on individual 
psychodynamics. Their elaboration is therefore a matter 
for psychoanalytic. research in specific instances, and 
falls beyond the parameters of this general description, 
which is in any event concerned with the nature or 
mechanism of the transformation from abhorrence to 
acceptance rather than with its causes. 
This change can be put in terms of the model of the gay 
predicament developed in the preceding chapter. Two 
fundamental contradictions were articulated there as 
ex~laining the gay predicament (sections 5.5 and 5.7). 
The first of these fundamental contradictions is the 
signification of the suoject as both natural and' unnatural 
in respect to the same attribute, that is, being gay. 
Once that attribute is no longer signified as unnatural, 
or once the signification.of that attribute has 
lessened force by virtue of the provision of an alter-
native and efficacious signification of it as natural. 
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The contradiction of being signified as naturally 
unnatural is therefore automatically vitiated. The 
possibility of achieving the object of the subject's desire, 
recognition by the mother, or the Other, is therefore 
no longer contradicted by the attribution of homosexuality 
to the subject. The lessening of the contradiction of 
this possibility of achieving the object of his/her 
desire lessens.the need to repudiate that contradiction/ 
denial. And, of course, the less gayness is experienced 
as unnatural, the less the need is to try to make it 
natural by such devices as explanation or "accounts" 
(Cass, 1979; Plummer, 1975, P.168). And, equally, its 
simultaneous signification as natural becomes less and 
less relevant as a preventative of explanation. The 
original signification of gayness as (equivocally) 
natural, that is, becomes a support for the new 
signification of it as unequivocally natural. 
The second fundamental contradiction articulated in the 
chapter on the gay predicament is that of being 
signified as natural in two mutually exclusive respects, 
that is, with respect to being gay, and with respect to 
.being the subject apparently signified by the "I" of 
the enonce. These were argued.to be mutually exclusive 
because, while the I is signified simply as natural, the 
gayness is signified as both natural and unnatural. 
The equivocally natural gayness is therefore irreconcilably 
opposed to the unequiv~cally natural I, because of the 
former's simultaneous unnaturality. It may be noted that, 
while the first contradiction explaining the gay predica-
ment, discussed in the last paragraph, is an opposition 
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between two significations of the same type ("natural" 
and "natural"). This should help to clarify that the 
second contradiction is not merely the first one rephrased, · i 
but a distinct and vital part of the explanation of the 
gay predicament. 
As the subject's desire becomes invested in the 
inverted ideology, the signification of unnaturality 
with respect to being gay becomes less effective. In 
consequence, the signification of gayness becomes 
increasLngly unequivocally natural. The mutual exclusivity 
of being gay and being the subject designated by the "I" 
of spoken discourse is therefore progressively undermined. 
This occurs because that mutual exclusivity, it will be 
recalled, is based on the signification of gayness as 
unnatural as well as natural, so that it is opposed to 
the unequivocally natural signification conferred by "I". 
Consequently the subject's desire becomes less and less 
committed to being two mutually edclusive essential 
objects. It will be recalled from Chapter Five (section 
5.7) that it is the exclusivity of these simultaneous 
commitments of desire which contradicts that possibility 
of recognition as the object of the mother's desire. 
Thus the reduction of that exclusivity restores the 
possibility of that imaginary achievement, and removes 
or lessens the need.to repudiate the former~y unnaturally 
natural homosexuality.· Thus, 
A person's identification of 
himself as homosexual is often accompanied 
by a sense of relief, of freedom from 
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t~nsion. 
"Coming out, in essence, often signifies to the subject 
the end of a search for his identity" (Dark, 1971, 
pp.189-190) • But "probably mos.t persons who eventually 
identify themselves as homosexuals require a change in 
the (negative) meaning of the cognitive category 
homosexual before they can place themselves· in the 
category" (ibid., p.189, insertion added). Both Dank 
(ibid.) and Troiden (1979) find that this change to a 
positive meaning of the homosexual category occurs, 
when it does, upon exposure to gay groups and subculture. 
The signification of naturality is, however, maintained 
in the inverted ideology, even though it is displaced. 
This means that the signification of unnaturality is 
still possible and, indeed, inevitable. There will 
still be, therefore, situations in which the go·a1 of 
the subject's desire can be powerfully threatened by 
the signification of unnaturality. Such situations_ 
include contexts .in.which the inverted ideology is not 
in force, for example in many .work situations or in the 
presence of large groups. of potentially homo~hobic 
pe0ple (Albro and Tully, 1979). The unnaturality 
signification may be displaced on to other stigmatised 
groups, such as paedophiles, transvestites, and other 
social deviants (Altman, 1971: Corbett, Troiden & 
Dodder, 1977; King, 1981). The feelings analysed here 
as proper to homophobia will then be felt in relation 
to members of these other groups. 
6.4 
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The Second Possible Cha;n~g_e ___ T_h_e_P_a_r_t_i_c_u_l_a_r_i_· _s_a_t_i_o_n_o_f_ 
Naturality 
There is another broad rearticulation of the dominant 
ideology suggested by the account of the gay predicame~t 
developed in the last chapter. This transformation will 
be discussed in this section, as well as the process of 
reaching it, and its consequences for the investments of 
desire in discourse that the gay predicament involves. 
Where the process of inverting the dominant ideology's 
signification of unnaturality involved a particular and 
redemptive application of the natural signification to 
what was elsewhere signified as unnatural as well as 
natural - that is, homosexuality - a further particular-
isation of the natural signification is conceivable. 
This involves the signification of the individual subject 
as natural, without requiring the other members of the 
· group or society to be signified as natural in the same 
respects. Thus unnaturality can only be predicated of 
the ,individual's contradiction of that which is signified 
as natural in him/her alone. 
Thus Troiden (1979) finds that "the effects of time and 
experience in the gay world provided an opportuni~y to 
become distanced from the homosexual role. Such distance 
might account for the lack of overriding feelings of 
distinctness (from heterosexuals in general)" (p.372, 
insertion added) • This finding of a dis-identification 
with the homosexual category is suooorted by Weinberg 
· (1970) and Dank (1971). As one of Dank' s subjects said 
of homosexuality, "I feel its normal. What's normal for 
one person is not always normal for another" (Dank, 1971, 
p.190). 
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In the transformation of ideology by inversion, 
discussed in the last section, gayness in particular 
is signified as natural and so is rendered definitive 
of the subject, just as it was before the ideological 
inversion (Cass, 1979; De Cacco, 1981; Weinberg, 1978). 
This follows from the salience given to gayness as a 
characteristic by the emphatic attention it is given 
(Fein & Nuehring, 1981). In this second type of 
transformation, in contrast, the individual qua individual 
is signified as natural, so that her/his gayness becomes 
simply one of many attributes (Cass, 1979; Coleman, 1981; 
Dank, 1971; Troiden, 1979). In terms of the second 
contradiction fundamental to the gay predicament, that 
of being signified as natural both with respect to being 
gay and to being the subject designated by "I", (re-explained 
in the last section) , the inversion of ideology emphasises 
the naturality of gayness, while the particularisation of 
naturality emphasises that the subject designated by "I" 
is natural. 
It is noteworthy that the signification of the 
individual as natural in the particularised ideology 
is precisely suited to the desire-impelled m~connaissance 
of the ego as a consistent essence. This clearly 
abolishes the contradictions in which desire is trapped 
in the dominant ideology, and it clearly restores the 
imaginary possibility of achieving the fundamental desire 
for the mother's desire to the fullest extent. The gay 
predicament is thus escaped. 
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There is a further implication of this, however. 
If this signification, how highly particularised, 
were removed altogether, one of the supports of the 
meconnaissance of the imaginary ego would be lost. 
A resistance beyond that of ideology would therefore 
come into play against the total abolition of the 
natural signification. At this point, then, the 
resistance of the subject's desire, to the abolition 
of the natural signification coincides with the 
resistance of ideology to that abolition. 
In the particularised ideology, the subject would 
react to another individual with the abhorrence or 
repudiation aroused by the unnatural only when the 
other's behaviour contradicts what is signified as 
natural in that particular other person. It would be 
possible for such feelings to occur, in such a subject, 
because contradictions to the naturality signified 
idiosyncratically of him/herself would signify unnaturality. 
The subject's own naturality could therefore be challenged 
by the particular, idiosyncratic unnaturality of the other. 
This would occur by virtue of the vicarious and 
identificatory challenge to a subject's coherence or 
naturality presented by the unnatural other and discussed 
in the last chapter. Thus some knowledge of the other 
would be necessary before she/he could be perceived as 
unnatural in this idiosyncratic sense, since it is 
necessary to know what is natural for the other in order 
to know what contradicts it and by that contradiction is 
unnatural. To the degree that the subject inhabits a 
discourse in which this particularised signification of 
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naturality operates efficaciously, no other abhorrence 
of self or other based on unnaturality should be possible. 
This signification of naturality and unnaturality may be 
conceived in the forms already considered: visibility 
and invisibility. For example, if a person with a social 
manner involving consistent self-control and invariable 
consideration for the feelings and limitations of others, 
begins repeatedly to go through periods of spontaneous, 
uncontrollable laughter or savage anger in social settings 
of the character of those she/he has always participated 
in, his/her behaviour and feelings may well appear unnatural 
in the present sense to others and him/herself. She/he 
will then arouse feelings of abhorrence or of lesser 
degrees of discomfort, feelings susceptible to the 
analysis of the gay predicament developed in this thesis. 
The first ideological transformation described above, the 
inversion of unnaturality, is no doubt usually an 
essential precondition for the particularising trans-
formation to occur. For a signification can only be 
efficacious at the level of desire if it is embodied 
in the Other. If the subject is to escape the traps of 
the dominant ideology in the first place, therefore, 
identification with a group whose ideology:emphatically 
signifies homosexuality as natural is essential (Cass, 
1979; Coleman, 1980; Dank, 1971). Only once that 
escape from the gay predicament has properly begun to 
occur is it possible for the further particularisation 
of naturality to be entered into. In cases where the 
initial entrapment is less effective for the subject, 
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for whatever reason, it is conceivable that the 
inversion of ideology can be bypassed. Thus, for 
example, the particularisation of naturality may conceivably 
be achieved by the operation on the subject of the Other 
in which are located groups which have already entered 
into such particularisation, or by some other process. 
The mechanisms by which the subject enters into the 
particularisation of ideology are at least twofold. The 
subject may, as suggested above, find groups in which 
such an ideology is already in operation. Or the subject 
may be sufficiently committed through the investments of 
desire both to an inverted ideology and to the dominant 
ideology, to be able to construct a discourse from the 
collision of the two. For the subject's desire will 
still be in contradiction as long as the dominant 
ideology has effect. And the fact that the signification 
of naturality in the dominant ideology is responsible 
for that contradiction can become evident to the subject 
once there is an alternative ideology, the inverted one, 
harbouring her/his desire and so making it possible to 
experience the effects of the dominant ideology in 
relative terms, as one of alternative ways of signifying 
the world. In turn, the maintenance of the natural 
signification in the alternative, inverted ideology, 
differently placed as it is, can become evident to the 
subject, since it has been picked up in the dominant 
ideology.as a salient feature. The possibility of 
transforming the inverted ideology in its turn thus 
becomes evident. And it has become evident.because.of 
the interplay of the two discourses. As Therborn puts 
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it, "the irreducible multidimensionality of ideologies 
means that a crucial aspect of ideological struggles 
and of ideological relations of force is the articulation 
of a given type of ideology with others" (1980, p.27); 
This process may be more accurately, if less accessibly, 
phrased, for the transformation is not a matter of a 
conscious "becoming evident". Motivation comes from 
desire, not from conscious perceptions of possibilities. 
In Lacan's words, "the motives of the unconscious are 
limited - a point on which Freud was quite clear from 
the outset and never altered his view - to sexual desire" 
(1977a, p.142). The motivation here is given by the fact 
that the subject's desire is still in contradiction 
because of the way naturality is still signified in the 
inverted ideology. The possibility of further change is 
given by the fact that the subject's desire is now 
invested in two networks of signif iers 'which may be 
brought into different relations with each other: "What 
one can do is to pin a signifier to a signifier and see 
what happens. But in that case, something new always 
results .•. namely, the appearance of a new meaning ••• " 
(Lacan, quoted in Laplanche and Leclaire, 1972, p.155). 
Such a construction of new relations is precisely what 
characterises the operation of desire in the symbolic 
register: that is, the processes of condensation and 
displacement, or metaphoric and metonymic linkages of 
signifiers. "The ... structural laws of condensation and 
displacement •.. are the laws of the unconscious. These laws 
are the same as those which create meaning in language" 
(Lacan, quoted in Lemaire, 1977, p.192). And, 
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the mechanisms described by Freud as those 
of "the primary process", in which the 
unconscious assumes its rule, correspond 
exactly to the functions that this school 
believes determines (sic) the most radical 
aspects of the effects of language, namely 
metaphor and metonymy - in other words, 
the signifier's effects of substitution 
and combination on the respectively 
synchronic and diachronic dimensions in 
which they appear in discourse (Lacan, 
1977a, p:298, insertion added). 
It may be mentioned also that it is not the subject or 
subjects who reart~culate the ideological discourse. 
It is the operation of the subjects' desire, and the 
operation of ideological discourse in structuring that 
desire, that bring about a rearticulation qf ideological 
discourse •. Lacan points out the importance of desire in 
shaping human life, despite the subject's subordination 
·to the symbolic: 
Servitude and grandeur in which the living 
would be annihilated, if desire did not 
preserve its part in the interferences and 
pulsations which the cycles of Language cause 
to converge on him, when. the confusion 9f 
tongues takes a hand and when the orders 
interfere with each other .•• (1968, p.42). 
Lacan ~ualifies this again, by saying that "this desire 
itself, to be satisfied in man, requires that it be recog-
nized, by the accord of the Word or by the struggle for 
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prestige, in the symbol or in the Imaginary" (ibid.). 
But he affirms nonetheless that 
we analysts have to deal with slaves who 
think they are masters, and who find in 
a Language whose mission is universal, 
the support of their servitude along with 
the bonds of its ambiguity. So much so 
that, as I might humorously put it, our 
goal is to reinstate in them the sovereign 
liberty displayed by Humpty Dumpty when he 
reminds Alice that after all he is the 
master of the signifier, even if he isn't 
the master of the signified in which his 
being took on its form (ibid., p.57). 
Finally, he formulates the relation between individual 
desire and universal language/symbolic reg,ister in 
terms of langue and parole: 
"We therefore invariably rediscover our 
double reference to the Word (parole or 
- speech) and to Language. In order to 
liberate the subject's Word (or oarole), 
we introduce him into the Language of his 
desire, that is, into the primary language 
in which, beyond what he tells of himself, 
he is already talking to us unbeknownst to 
him .•• (ibid., insertions added). 
This conceptualisation in terms of langue and parole 
which Lacan provides will be considered in its own right 
in a later section. 
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These two models of broad rearticulations of the 
dominant ideology, discussed in this section and 
the last one~ are two points of logical conclusion 
' of an escape from the contradictory positions constituting 
the gay predicament. There is of course a continuum of 
positions the subject may occupy in the process of 
reaching these moments of conclusion. 
That they are logical positions has had a relevant and 
an irrelevant significance. It is relevant in that they 
are logically end-points because they involve an escape 
from contradictory positions of the subject of desire. 
These end-points involve less contradiction in the 
investments of desire in discourse than are involved 
in in-between positions in discourse. Before the 
position described by the efficacious ideological 
inversion has been reached, the subject has by definition 
no effective alternatives to the predicament inherent 
for her/him in the dominant ideology. And once the 
ideological inversion is being abandoned by desire in 
favour of an.ideological discourse constructed by the 
interplay of the dominant and inverted discourses~ there 
is no.consistent discourse in terms of the natural 
signification for the subject until the particularised 
discours~ ~s effectively invested by his/her desire. 
The absence of a consistent ideological discourse means 
the instability of a. signification of the ~ubject as 
natural, with an immediate threat to the desire for the 
mother's desire or the Other's recognition. So the 
fact that the end-points given by the two models are 
logically derived is relevant because the logic refers 
to the way that desire in fact operates. 
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That they are logical is irrelevant in that particular 
contexts and intervening factors may make the specific 
contradictions of positions of desire dealt with here 
of secondary significance. For example, fear of 
alienating the mother in person may militate against 
inversion of the dominant ideology. These models of 
ideological transformation would then no longer be 
based logically upon desire, and would no longer involve 
the most satisfactory or even possible positions for 
desire. 
We have reached here another of the limits of this 
thesis. The present analysis deals with aspects of 
homophobia. Clearly, however, homophobia is not the 
only motivating factor in an individual's life. The 
intervention of other factors therefore makes it impossible 
to predict his/her behaviour on the basis of an under-
standing of homophobia alone. But this account is none-
theless valid as what is intended to be: an attempt at 
an analysis of the homophobic aspect of the individual's 
feelings and actions, and of the mechanisms by which 
that aspect of him/her operates. 
In the next two sections some of the details of the 
present analysis of ideological transformations will 
be elabOrated. 
6.5 The Inversion of Ideology in Practice 
The.simple inversion of the signification of homo-
sexuality as unnatural assumes the acceptance of the 
homosexual category as valid. For, in the dominant 
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ideology the binary opposition natural/unnatural 
is tied to the pair heterosexual/homosexual. The 
effecting of an inversion of the "unnatural" term 
in that opposition concentrates specifically on the 
part of the world linked to that term - that is, to 
categories such as that of those individuals of whom 
homosexuality may be predicated. Being gay is there-
fore assumed to be a fundamentally salient character-
istic of the people to whom the category applies. 
Thus the homosexual person is an essential being who 
is the same in essence as other homosexual people 
(Fein & Nuehring, 1981; Hart, 1982; Weinberg, 1978). 
It is not seen as simply a matter of one set of 
behaviours or feelings being given salience from a 
particular viewpoint, so that a different categorisation 
of types of people could negate the validity and 
significance of the distinction between heterosexual 
and homosexual. The definition of the subject by 
difference in discourse is denied, as it is wherever 
naturality is signified. The homosexual individual is 
seen as different from people with other sexual 
preferences, not by virtue of that sexual preference 
alone, but in essence. The fundamental traits which 
characterise his/her constitution as a humart being are 
similar to the fundamental traits characterising the 
constitution or make-up of other homosexuals, at least 
those of the same sex, and different from those 
characterising heterosexuals (Hart, 1982; Weinberg, 1978). 
This in turn assumes in the first place that there are 
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consistently characterising fundamental traits at 
all in human beings, and that there can be a general 
consistent similarity of fundamental traits amongst 
large groups of people, in particular heterosexuals 
on the one hand and homosexuals on the other. This 
again involves a denial of the synchronic and diachronic 
constitution of the subject. 
As Altman put this whole consideration, 
Our homosexuality is a crucial part of our 
identity, not because of anything intrinsic 
about it but because social oppression has 
made it so. On one level to love someone 
of the same sex is remarkable inconse-
quential - after all, but for some 
anatomical differences, love for a man or 
woman is hardly another order of things -
yet society has made of it something 
portentous, and we must expect homosexuals 
to accept this importance in stressing 
their identity (1971, p.230). 
The living out of this ideological inversion will 
therefore require a perpetual maintenance of the 
meconnaissance implicit in asserting that homosexuals 
constitutionally belong together and are essences 
consistently different from other types ot essence. 
And, again, this requirement is not to be conceived 
of at the level of an abstract logical prerequisite 
and abstractly necessary assumption. For the operation 
of desire in resolving its self-defeating predicament 
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depends on the above-mentioned assumptions that 
homosexuals constitute a meaningful category of 
essences. The subject's desire, as ever, is forced 
through the defiles of the signifying network, no· 
less in its collusion with the operation of the 
inverted ideology than in its collusion with the 
operation of the dominant ideology, as the latter 
was discussed in the last chapter. 
To return to the main.point, then, the desire of the 
subjects who are on the way to inhabiting a discourse 
bearing an inverted ideology, and who are in the 
process of living this inversion out, will be 
characterised from the perspective relevant here by a 
contradiction between the true state of affairs and the 
misrecognised state of affairs, since the above-argued 
meconnaissance is asserted and maintained. This is 
the contradiction ref erred to by La can in a br.oader 
context as the disparity between the true and the· real, 
given that the imaginary mode of relating to the world 
is a real and material part of the indi~idual's 
existence. As he puts it, "the truth is always 
disturbing •. We cannot even manage .to get used to it. 
We are used to the real. The. truth we repress" (1977a, 
p.169) •. 
The fact of this contradiction allows a systematic 
understanding of the characteristics of the subcultures 
and lifestyles of. _those gays who have reached self 
acceptance via.the inversion of ideology, as well as 
of _the ways of relating to homosexuality of those in 
. - - - ··- . . ···- -~-- --- . .__ - " " -------· --~--rv~-..:-..---,--....-----·-··-·-:---.,- _,_ ~----.--:&:;;---
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Lesbians, on the other hand, where the inveited 
ideology is in force, may adopt ~tereoty~ically 
masculine characteristics (Gagnon & Simon, 1973, 
p.197; Richardson, op. cit.). They may lower their 
voices, wear their clothes and hair in a stereo-
typically masculine fashion, and adopt physically 
aggressive stances with a similar message. 
Those in contact with gays may share these stereo-
types (Morin & Garfinkle, 1978; Weinberg, 1978). 
Hence male gays may be called "fairies" and referred 
to with a limp-wristed gesture (Plummer, 1981, p.53). 
And lesbians may be called "diesel-dykes", referring 
to the hypermasculinity imputed to truck-drivers, and 
"butch" (Richardson, ibid.). 
This cross-gender stereotyping may be understood as an 
affirming of the naturality of homosexuals. For it 
signifies them, within each gender, to be a certain type 
of being, different in essence from their heterosexual 
opposites. For the gay person, in a sub-society in 
which his/her essential nature is acceptable and 
desirable, this restores the sense of consistency as a 
being, which is the primal object of desire. For the 
other in contact with gay people, this restores the 
sense of consistency in the gay other, the lack of 
which vicariously threatens his/her primal object of 
desire. 
To put this in more detail, the contradictions engendered 
by the linking of the natural/unnatural oppo~ition to a 
mutual assimilation of biological sex, gender identity, 
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gender role, and sexual behaviour and orientation, 
as discussed in the last chapter, are resolved by the 
stereotyping discussed above. For only consistent 
beings can be signified as natural. And this stereotyping 
links in an enduring way male biological sex-female 
gender identity-feminine gender role-female sexual 
behaviour and orientation, in the case of male gays, 
and female biological sex-male gender identity-masculine 
gender role-male sexual behaviour and orientation in 
the case of lesbians (Marshall, 1981, pp.135-136). All 
this turns, in this case, around the signifying 
properties of the gender role. Thus the consistent 
combination of these gender/sex categories, requisite 
for the signification of naturality in an unequivocal 
way, is achieved by a cross-sexed stereotype of gender 
role. 
Clearly this process is dependent on the dominant 
ideology's mutual assimilation of the five gender/sex 
categories, in the course of the operation of its 
natural/unnatural oppositions. For it would not be 
meaningful or effective to signify a constant combination 
of the five categories in the inverted ideology if they 
were not already mutually assimilated by the dominant 
ideology as part of what must be consistent so as not to 
contradict naturality. Such a dependence on the 
dominant ideology is an inevitable limitation of a 
simple inversion of that ideology's signification of 
unnaturality. 
There is a further important dependence on the dominant 
\ 
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ideology implicit in the use of stereotypically 
cross-sexed gender roles to signify naturality. 
For the fact is that homosexuality is actually eliminated 
as a phenomenon in this process. 
The curious result of such gender 
inversion, however, was that it 
effectively eliminated the need for 
a homosexual concept. For as long 
as the person in question could be 
conceptualized as a "non-man", his 
"real" sexual identity could be 
interpreted as "female heterosexual" 
(in a male body) rather than "homo-
sexual male" (Marshall, op. cit., pp. 
135-136) • 
Only heterosexuals remain. Thus masculine male gays 
are not seen in this context as "really" homosexual, 
so that "homosexuality consisted of older men taking 
younger boys as female substitutes •.• It was a homo-
sexual situation satisfying a heterosexual need" 
(ibid. ' p .13 6) • 
-
Because of this extreme dependence on the dominant 
ideology, the inverted ideology renders the subject 
whose des,ire is invested in it susceptible to re-
entrapment in the dominant ideology. For heterosexuality 
is still in fact the only natural one of the pair 
heterosexuality/homosexuality. Homosexuality is still 
in effect rendered invisible; where it is present it 
is re-defined as heterosexuality by the cross-sexed 
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gender roles. The.subject in the inverted ideology 
is therefore still abhorrent of homosexuality as a 
sexual orientation towards people of the same biological 
gender, that is, insofar as it is differeni from 
heterosexuality. She/he has resolved this abhorrence 
in practice and in effect, but not in truth. 
Thus when the subject in question enters into 
situations where the d6minant ideology prevails, so that 
gender-role features in a different configuration with 
the other gender/sex categories, so that the subject's 
configuration of sex/gender categories is thereby 
threatened, the subject is vulnerable to experiencing 
the abhorrence of homosexuality as explicated in this 
chapter. Examples of such situations would be familial 
and work contexts, and simply being present in public 
situations (Albro and Tully, 1979). Ross (1978) shows 
perceived societal reaction to be a critical variable 
in understanding homosexual feelings and behaviour. 
It is not, then, simply a matter of the·possibility of 
being re-committed to the dominant ideology, a 
possibility which is always conceivable. An additional 
susceptibility is present, which lies in the fact that 
the unnaturality signification has not been inverted 
in relation to homosexuality as a same gender orienta-
tion, that is in relation to what makes homosexuality 
different from heterosexuality, but it has been 
inverted in relation to one of the gender/sex category 
configurations. 
This explains the super-stereotypical nature of some 
-209-
homosexual lifestyles, the way in which some gay men 
and women perform their respective cross-gender roles with 
noticeable skill in the smallest details. For to avoid 
the return of the abhorrence of homosexuality, the 
reality of the cross-gender (the woman in a man's body 
and vice-versa) must be asserted with great force. This 
also explains the finding that some of those in contact 
with homosexual. males experience greater discomfort when 
the gay individuals are not effeminate (Storms, 1978). 
For then the spectre of unnaturality - homosexuality 
as different from heterosexuality - stalks the channels 
of desire. 
It may be useful at this point to remember why the 
gender/sex categories have been introduced into the 
above.· analysis of the inversion of the unnatural 
signification of homosexuality. The unnatural/natural 
opposition is linked to homosexuality/heterosexuality; 
and homosexualitx/heterosexuality are linked to configura-
tions of a set of gender/sex categories. The analysis 
\ 
of how the signification of unnaturality affects homo-
sexuality and how it and its effects change therefore 
automatically involves an analysis of certain con-
figurations of these gender/sex categories. 
Homosexuality and heterosexuality ciay be linked to 
other dimensions than gender/sex categories in their 
bondage to the unnaturality/naturality opposition, as 
suggested in the last chapter. And, as stated there 
too, further research will be needed to discover what 
they are or to elaborate them. The analysis of their 
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ef fects and resolution in terms of the contradictory 
positions into which the subject's desire is forced 
by ideology will still apply, so that the elaboration 
of these other dimensions and their effects can be 
integrated into the present understanding. 
Clearly, only one configuration of the gender/sex 
categories has been discussed so far. Other 
configurations are possible which would necessitate a 
different inversion. of the unnaturality signification 
to escape the abhorrence of homosexuality. One such 
configuration, which involves the recognition of 
homosexuality as different from heterosexuality, is that 
of male biological sex-male gender identity-masculine 
gender role-homosexual sexual behaviour and orientation 
(Marshall, op. cit., p.137). Here gender identity has 
been separated from.gender role and sexual behaviour 
and orientation (Marshall, ibid., adapted). Gender. 
role sterotypes no longer have the dominant part~to 
play in this since they cannot restore the naturality 
of homosexuals by signifying a particular gender 
identity. This configuration of gender/sex categories 
actually falls under the particularisation of naturality, 
wfiich will be discussed in the next section. 
The form of inversion of the unnatural signification 
discussed here is clearly an extreme type. Keyed-down 
versions are found, such as, for example, the simple 
conviction that "homosexuals are different" (Hart, 
1982; Weinberger & Millham, 1979, p.244). The serise 
of an essential type of being is thus mairitained. But 
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gender-role need not play _the key role here, although 
research would be needed to check whether the sense 
of "difference" unconsciously involves a sense of being 
cross-gendered. Where such a sense is found, as has 
been done by some psychoanalysts (e.g. Kubie, 1974), 
the operation of ideology and desire as articulated in 
this thesis may play a part as well as or in place of 
the identification with the parent of the opposite sex 
so far held responsible by psychoanalysis. It would be 
most interesting to explore the effects on psychoanalytic 
practice and.theory of~introducing this addition~! 
dimension. Unfortunately, the parameters of this thesis 
makethis an enquiry to be pursued elsewhere. 
To find out in what other ways the unnatural signification 
is inverted, other than by inverting gender roles, 
sociological. and psychoanalytic research will need to be 
,. 
undertaken which looks specifically for such inversions. 
It may be hypothesized that if other inversions are 
possible, inversions with resuect to different concomitants 
of homosexuality, the subject may be able to invest his/ 
her desire in a number of such inversions~ A scale is 
then eonceivable ranging from the inhabiting of a discourse 
with only one such inversion, as in the case of cross-
gender sterotyping discussed above, to the inhabiting of a 
discourse with a multitude of such inversions·. The first 
case would then be most vulnerable to re-entrapment by 
the dominant ideology, ·and thus liable to extreme 
assertions of the lifestyle components which make the 
signification of naturality unequivocally possible, as 
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in the case of the extreme cross-gender stereotypes 
discussed above. The more inversions that' are in effect, 
the less the dominant ideology would be able to threaten 
the subject's escape from it. 
Again, further research is needed to construct a 
typology of such inversions and examine their processes 
of development in individual and group cases. These 
findings could.then be integrated into the conce~tualisa­
tion developed in this thesis, and be used to correct and 
refine it. This type of research is already burgeoning 
in the literature dealing with the coming-out process of 
gays, and will be discussed in the next chapter, where the 
present understandings will be compared with others. 
The limiting case of a multiplicity of inversions would 
be the particularisation of naturality outlined above as 
the second transformation of ideology. Why it is the 
limiting case will be discussed in the next· section, where 
its implications and details will be elaborated. 
6.6 The Particularisation of Naturality in Practice 
The particularisation of naturality, as suggested 
earlier, is characterised by the signification of the 
subject alone as natural. That is, naturality ceases 
to be signified of categories of people, who must then have 
fundamental traits in common. Naturality is signified 
only in terms of the individual, who need then have no 
fundamental. traits in common with other individuals. 
This is the ultimate. in.meconnaissance in one sense, 
although it appears to be closer to a recognition of the 
.. -- -· --·------·-- --~----
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subject as constituted by difference than any case 
so far discussed. For it is dependent up6n a certainty 
that the essential nature of the individual as posited 
by the imaginary ego is the truth of the matter. The 
subject could only abandon group support of the meconn-
aissance of the ego if that meconnaissance was firmly 
established for her/him. For it is, .after all, a 
misrecognition on which the possibility depends of 
achieving the primal object of desire, recognition by 
the mother, and consequently support for this vital 
misrecognition would not be abandoned unless it was secure. 
Such a firm establishment of the meconnaissance, which 
obviates dependence on direct support through direct 
recognition as a consistent being by others, suggests that 
such recognition has already played its part in confirming 
the meconnaissance of the ego. Clearly, the subject 
could have received this recognition in. the course of 
her/his development independently of the gay aspect of 
his/her existence. But if she/he has received this 
necessary recognition, which has now allowed independence 
from immediate recognition, in the course of his/her 
development qua gay or qua one in contact with gays or 
gayness, it will by definition have to have been in a 
group. Thus the subject will have had to pass through 
the inversion of ideology. For this is themechan1sm 
by which the subject challenged by the signification of 
homosexuality as unnatural resolves that challenge. 
And it occurs because of mutual recognition by people 
of a type. Or rather, by people occupy~ng similar 
positions in being homophobic, who become of .a type py 
~ ... 't: 
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mutual recognition. The groundwork for the 
particularisation of naturality, then, is laid by 
the efficacious recognition by others of the imaginary 
ego of the subject. And if the subject's development 
in this regard has been crucially located within the 
gay dimension of his/her life, as is frequently the 
case and probably always to a degree the case, the 
inversion of ideology is the specific nature of that 
laying of the groundwoxk. 
The process of change from the inversion of unnaturality 
to the particularisation of naturality is then on a 
continuum, and may be conceived as a particularising 
of categories. The inversion of ideology assumes a 
category embracing all homosexuals, at least within each 
biological gender. ~s discussed in the last section,· 
however, naturality in one extreme case of inversion is 
in fact predicated of one configuration 6f gender/sex 
categories. Thus two ~uch fonfigurations are signified 
as natural:, the inverted one and that of the dominant 
ideology. A case was also mentioned in the last section 
i~ which the gender/sex categories could be dissociated 
from each other without signifying unnaturality. This· 
, 
cas-e involved, in the female example, a female biological 
sex and feminine gender role and identity, with a homo-
sexual set of behaviour and sexual orientation.' This 
kind of :dissociation allows a number of dissociated 
.assertions of naturality: for example, transsexual 
operations, or the switching back and forth from male' 
to female stereotypes and roles, or the leather macho · 
image amongst male gays. In other words, unnaturality. 
·---. ---·--·· ... -··-·- -- ·--·----
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as applied to certain configurations of gender/sex 
categories ceases to be an effective threat. This 
multiplication of possible. assertions of naturality in 
fact challenges the concept of a natural category 
embracing all homosexuals. It is a process of 
particularisation of naturality. 
It is clear that the subject may still inhabit 
contradictory positions in these alternative discourses. 
For example, there is the mention above of two opposed 
yet naturally signified configurations of the gender/ 
sex categories. But in these cases the contradictions 
' 
are between positions in different discourses, so that 
there is at least one discourse to which the subject's 
desire is committed in which it is not forced into self-
defeating contradictions. Also, the dominant ideology 
makes some attributes more important than others in 
characterizing naturality. The reasons for this are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, given that certain of 
the attributes given salience by the dominant ideology 
are taken as a starting point for this analysis, as is 
the fact itself that they are salient. 
To return to the process of particularisation, then, the 
limiting case of such particularisations, as suggested 
earlier, is the case in question in this section, where 
the subject's idiosyncratic characteristics.are natural. 
At this point assertion of the flamboyant type used by 
way of example of the inversion of ideology above se~ms 
unlikely. For the more particularised.is naturality, 
the less directly related to the dominant ideology is 
the new particularising discourse. And, consequently, 
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the subject inhabiting. the new ideological discourse 
is less susceptible to re-entrapment in the dominant 
ideology, for the reasons discussed at the end of the 
last section. The motivation to assert in the fact of 
the dominant ideology will. be less, therefore, since 
the challenge posed by it is less and consequently 
requires less warding off. Thus where "I am gay and 
proud" (Altman, 1971, p.121) is an apt motto for the 
simple inversion of ideology, for the particularisation 
of naturality more apt would be "I am something and 
whatever it is I am proud of it". 
Again a scale is conceivable, in which the scale of 
multiplicity of inversions suggested in the last 
section would be examined also in terms of degrees of 
particularisation. In this way individuals and groups 
could be considered in terms of their distance from 
either of the two broad transformations of ideology, 
depending on what questions are posed. For example, if 
the challenge· to the dominant ideology is in question, 
it may be more useful to conceptualise the transformed 
ideologies in terms of inversion of the dominant 
ideology. This would lend itself more readily to a 
roughly quantitative evaluation. On the other hand, a 
conceptualisation in terms of the particularisation of 
naturality would lend itself more readily to a consid~ 
eration of the qualitative difference or contrast 
between the.dominant and alternative discourses. This 
second possibility would indeed be preferable for some 
purposes, including an attempt to develop strategies 
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of reinforcement for the inhabitants of the alternative 
ideologies. Thu~ if self~acceptance or absence of 
discrimination is.in question, the particularisation 
pole of the ideological transformations may provide 
the most useful conceptualisation. 
The behaviour of those inhabiting a discourse in which 
naturality is particularised cannot, by definition, be 
discussed in general terms. Such people will, however, 
be further discussed when this conceptualisation is 
compared with others, in the next chapter. 
6.7 The Tension between Language and Speech 
The process of transformation from abhorrence of 
homosexuality to acceptance of it may be seen as a 
detailed application of the tension between langue 
and parole, the social,.or universal, aspect of 
language and the individual, or particular, aspect 
of language,. a tension outlined in Chapter 2 (section 
2.3). This viewpoint will serve both to demonstrate 
the consistency of the development of Lacanian views 
undertaken in this thesis, and to suggest part of the 
use of this development. 
In the above-mentioned section Lacan was quoted as 
speaking of the "subject who is speaking" as "coming 
closer to the Word into which he will fully_ convert 
the Truth which his symptoms express (that is, the 
parole vide will. become a parole pleine)" (quoted in 
Wilden, 1968, p.142, Wilden's insertion). Here "the 
Word" is an alternative translation of parole, speech, 
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and parole vide and parole oleine are respectively 
translated as "empty speech" and "full" or "true speech". 
It will help to remember at this ooint the extent to 
which the.being of the subject is bound up with language: 
Symbols in fact envelop the life of man in a 
network so total that they join together, 
before he comes into the world, those who 
are going to engender him "by flesh and blood"; 
so total that they bring to his birth, along 
with the gifts of the stars, if not with the 
gifts of the fairies, the shaoe of his 
destiny; so total that they give the words 
that will make him faithful or renegade, 
the law of the acts that· will follow him 
right to the very place where he is not yet 
and even beyond his death; and so total that 
through them his end finds its meaning in the 
last judgement, where the word absolves his 
meaning or condemns it ••. (Lacan, 1977a, p.68). 
Again, "The use.of the Word requires vastly more 
vigilance in the science of man than it does anywhere 
-
else, for it engages in it the very being of its 
object" (Lacan, quoted in Wilden, op. cit., p.viii). 
Lacan pQints out the relation of the individual to the 
universal: 
the livirig being would be annihilated, if 
desire did not preserve its part in the 
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interf erences and pulsations that the 
cycles of language cause to converge on 
him, when the confusion of tongues takes 
a hand and when the orders contradict 
one another in the tearing apart of the 
universal work (1977a, p.68). 
But desire nonetheless operates only in relation to 
recognition by the Other, only in relation to the 
universal: "But for this desire itself to be satis-
fied in man requires that it be recognized, through 
the agreement of speech or through the struggle for 
prestige, in the symbol or in the imaginary" (ibid.). 
And, coming to the relation of this tension between 
individual and universal to transformations of the 
subject, Lacan explains that 
What is at stake in an analysis is the 
advent in the subject of that little 
reality that this desire sustains in him 
with respect to the symbolic conflicts 
and imaginary. fixations as the means of 
their agreement, and our path is the 
intersubjective experience where this 
desire makes itself recognized (ibid.)•: 
He concludes, "From this point on it will be seen 
that the problem is that of the relations between 
speech and language in the subject" (ibid.). 
It may be mentioned in passing that Lacan refers to 
three "paradoxes" in these relations which appear in 
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the domain of psychoanalysis (ibid.). These are: 
the paradox involved in madness·, that involved in 
neurosis, and "that of the subject who loses his 
meaning in the objectifications of discourse" (ibid.,' 
p.70). This last, "the most profound alienation of 
the subject in our scientific.civilization" (ibid.), 
may be construed to cover the case of those subject 
to the sign~fication of naturality, although it has, 
perhaps, wider implications. 
The conceptualisation of homophobia developed here may 
therefore produce useful results if applied to psycho-
analytic theory and practice, not simply in relation to 
the gay predicament and its resolution, but in 9eneral 
to those who have lost their "meaning in the objectifi-
cations of discourse". As has already been discussed 
in the introductory chapter and later~ neurosis and 
even madness may need to be taken into account iri 
explaining homophobia in particular cases. But this 
thesis is concerned with the third of Lacan's paradoxes 
in the relation. of language to speech. The fact that his 
theory provides a common ground within which to 
conceptualise all these types of symptoms, however, 
provides a means of integrating this conceptualisation 
of homophobia with the other psychodynamic factors 
requiring consideration in.particular cases. This, as 
suggested earlier in this chapter (section·6.5}, is 
material for work which continues where this thesis 
leaves off. 
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Lacan' s discussion of the langu~ge-speech tension in 
relation to the loss of meaning in the objectifications 
of discourse may, then, be applied to the.symptom which 
is homophobia. As he puts it, "If the. subject did not· 
discover in a regression.- often pushed right back to 
the 'mirror stage' .. - the enclosure of a sta9"e in which 
his ego contains its imaginary. exploits, there would 
hardly. be any assignable limits to the credulity to which 
he must succumb in that situation" (ibid.). And he 
points out that "Here there is a language-barrier 
opposed to speech, and the precautions against verbalism 
that are a theme of the discourse of the 'normal' man 
in our culture merely serve to reinforce its thickness" 
(ibid., p.71). Thus, in a sense the resolution· of 
homophobia.is a reworking in language of the individual's 
development as it has progressed after her/his entry 
into language. It. is a "regression" to the :i.;>oint of 
doubting the possibility of recognition by the mother, 
which doubt is the power of the abhorrence of homo-
sexuality itself. "In effect, it is in the disintegration 
of the imaginary unity constituted by the eg·o that the 
subject finds the signifying material of his symptoms" 
(ib~d., p.137). And "it is from the sort of interest 
aroused in him by the ego that the significations that 
turn his discourse away from those symptoms proceed" 
(ibid.). The resolution of homophobia is, then, as 
quoted at the start of this section, a "coming closer 
to the Word into which he will fully convert the Truth 
which his symptoms.express (that. is, the parole vide 
will become a parole.pleine)". 
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This is another point at which this thesis suggests 
further applications to areas more central to psychoanalysis, 
in this case the nature of the movement from empty speech 
to full or true speech in therapeutic analysis itself, 
which is nothing other than the nature of the cure. Here, 
however, little more than suggestions can be made, and 
even then only insofar as this movement or process 
relates to the movement from homophobia to acceptance. 
In keeping with what has been said in this chapter and 
Chapter 2 about the subject's individual speech and 
unconscious transformations of language,' Lacan maintains 
that 
We always come back, then to our double 
reference to speech and to language. In 
order to free the subject's speech, we 
introdurie him into the language of his 
desire, that is to say, into the primary 
language in which, beyond what he tells 
us of himself, he is already talking to 
us unknown to himself, and, in the first 
place, in the symbols of the symptom. 
- In the symbolism brought to light in 
analysis, it is certainly a question of 
a language. This language ••• has the 
universal character of a language (langue 
that would be understood in all other 
languages (langues), but, at the same time, 
since it is the language that seizes 
desire at the very: moment at which it is 
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humanized by making itself recognized, it 
is absolutely particular to the subject 
(1977a, p.81). 
It follows that the symptom homophobia is resolved by 
being translated into a.discourse which is the 
language of. the individual's desire. It is also 
clear from Lacan's statements that this language has 
the character of both a langue, and a parole, being 
particular to the subject. This is precisely what 
has been argued of .the transformation of ideological 
discourse in this chapter. It is a movement from a 
pregiven discourse to a transformed one; it is also 
a movement from the destruction of the possibility of 
achieving the object of the subject's desire to its 
re-affirmation; and it is also a movement from a 
distourse bearing a universal signification of 
naturality to a discourse bearing a particular or 
individual one. 
Symptoms of conversion, inhibition, 
anguish, these are not there to offer 
you the opportunity to confirm their 
nodal points ..• ;. it is a question of 
untying these knots, and this means to 
return them to the Word (or speech) 
function that they hold in a discourse 
whose signification determines their 
use and sense (Lacan, quoted in Wilden, 
1968, p.115, insertion added). 
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And Lacan affirms, too, the inevitable entrapment in 
the natural signification that remains: "I identifv . ... 
myself in language, but only by losing myself in it 
like an object" (1968, p.63). 
In Kristeva's words, "if the overly constraining and 
reducitive meaning of a language made up of universals 
causes us to suffer", one may nonetheless firtd "oneself 
different, irreducible, for one is borne by a simply 
singular speech, not merging with the others, but then 
exposed to the black thrusts of a desire that borders 
on idiolect and aphasia" (1980, p.x). This is another 
link that cannot be pursued here, a link with Kristeva's 
concern for the language of desire insofar as it is 
uncommitted to meaning. Thus she opposes the symbolic 
to her restricted definition of the semiotic, which 
"refers to the actual organization, or disposition, 
within the body, of instinc;tualdrives (hence the 'semiotic 
disposition'') as they affect language and its practice, 
in dialectical conflict with le symbolique" (Roudiez, 
1980, p.18). 
This section has touched on a host of points at which 
the conceptual elaboration developed in this thesis may 
feed fruitfully back into the Lacanian framework from 
which it derives in part. As a specific application of 
that '.framework, it may well assist elaborations of 
other ap~lications of Lacanian psychoanalysis, not 
least in the.theorising of analytic therapy itself. To 
fol-low up these .potential developments here would take 
us too far afield in terms both of relevance and of 
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space. But the extent to which the points made 
here relate to Lacan's psychoanalysis is well brought 
out by the following remarks: 
it is only through a speech that lifted 
the prohibition that the subject has 
brought to bear upon himself by his own 
words that he.might obtain the absolution 
that would give him back his desire. 
But desire is simply the impossibility 
of such speech, which, in replying to the 
first can merely reduplicate its mark of 
prohibition by completing the split 
(Spaltung) which the subject undergoes 
by virtue of being a subject only in so: 
far as he speaks (Lacan, 1977a, p.269)~ 
6.8 Summary 
• 
It was argued in this chapter that the transformation 
from abhorrence of homosexuality to acceptance of it 
can only take place via a transformation of ideological 
discourse, since the desire for naturality is 
inescapable. .It was further argued that such a 
transformation cannot be considered to abolish the 
signification of naturality without a revolution of 
the entire social.formation., and was therefore con~idered 
only to be able to displace this signification. 
Two broad.transformations of ideological discourse were 
described; the inversion of unnaturality, and the 
particularisation of the natural signification. These, 
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i t was argued, lie on a continuum. It was then 
argued that the manifestations of the acceptance 
of homosexuality could be understood in terms of 
the opposition or difference between the dominant 
and alternative ideologies, and in terms of the 
desire to maintain the mficonnaissance of the natural 
signification in its new application. Finally, the 
conceptualisation of the resolution of homophobia 
developed in this chapter was put in terms of the 




7 : COMPARISON WITH OTHER APPROACHES 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, this 
chapter is more of a commentary on the present 
conceptualisation of homophobia and its resolution 
than an account of other models. The other approaches 
will not be explained in themselves or in detail, but 
only briefly insofar as they serve to support the 
statements of this one, to reveal its limitations of 
application, and to demonstrate its value in opening 
new areas to understanding and incompletely analysed 
areas to systematic rigour. 
Several approaches to homophobia and its resolution need 
to be considered. The first is the classical psycho-
analytic approach, which ha~ it that the fact of pathology 
accounts for homophobia. This has been sufficiently 
dealt with in the Introduction and in the first two 
sections of Chapter Five. There it was argued that the 
explanation of homophobia as a consequence of pathology 
is not in fact an explanation but the arbitrary 
imposition of a value-judgement. Furthermore, it was 
argued that this attempted explanation is in any event 
too limiting, as a great deal can be gained by considering 
the role of ideology in explaining homophobia. The 
classical psychoanalytic approach leaves ideology 
completely out of account. This whole thesis, in a 
sense, is an argument for the value of including an 
analysis of the operation of ideological discourses in 
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an account of homophobia and its resolution. A further 
gain, which may be mentioned here, is that the present 
account reflects back on psychoanalytic theory itself 
in thought-provoking ways which could not be developed 
by approaching homophobia as a consequence of pathology. 
The classical psychoanalytic approach, then, will not 
be considered further here. The second approach which 
must be considered here is the radical or revolutionary 
psychoanalytic approach adopted by Hocquenghem (1978) 
and Mieli (1980). The third is that of symbolic inter-
actionism and related frameworks. The fourth approach 
is a newly emerging classical psychoanalytic approach 
which, in contrast to the pathology account, attempts 
to consider the internalised effects of homophobia in 
their own right, and not as.a function of some other 
pathology. The final approach to be considereq here 
is that of semiotic accounts of deviancy. 
7.1 Radical Psychoanalysis 
As mentioned in the_Introduction, the respective work 
of Hocquenghem and Mieli is radically subversive. They 
both attempt to compare the present capitalist social 
formation unfavourably with future completely transformed 
social formations. The account they give of the resolution 
of homophobia, that is, the change to acceptance, assumes 
such transformed social formations as a frame of reference. 
That is, they use their conceptions of ideal social 
unformulated nature of the libido" (Hocquenghem, p.80). 
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Hocquenghem argues that the explanations of homo-
sexuality as pathology are an attempt to recuperate it 
(draw it into relation to the natural) by the purveyors 
of the dominant ideology. "Desire, as an autonomous 
and polymorphous force, must disappear ••• This is now 
the position of post-Freudian psychoanalysis, which 
is an institution of bourgeois society charged with 
9ontrolling the libido" (p.63). Again, "Homosexuality 
must remain within the spheres of nosology, pathology, 
the neurotic mechanism, pathogenesis, etc.: no name 
is too terrifying to define it all" (p.46). Thus 
homosexuality "takes its place in ••. the Oedipus complex" 
(p.65); it is "surrendered to a recuperative inter-
pretation" (p.80). This parallels the brief discussion 
of the need to explain homosexuality in Chapter Five 
(section 5.7). 
Hocquenghem·also touches on another aspect of the 
present understanding, the relation of sexual identity, 
what we have discussed as part of the imaginary 
consistency of the ego, to limited configurations of 
sex/gender categories. "The difference in the sexes 
and the attraction exerted by one sex upon the other are 
the preconditions of sexual identity" (p.87). Thus "all 
homosexuals .•. have a confused identity" because of 
"the impossibility of knowing whether one is male or 
female" (p.87). 
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Hocquenghem clearly supports a number of the 
conclusions reached in this analysis of homophobia. 
But he takes these conclusions as the starting point 
of hi~ own analysis.· Thus the effect of the unnaturality 
of homosexuality is only briefly touched on and only to 
demonstrate the attributes of the ideology he is 
investigating. The challenge presented by desire to 
fixed categories of what is natural is used by Hocquenghem 
in the context of a challenge to the imposition of the 
Oedipus complex on people at all. He passes over the 
actual mechanism of homophobia, the process by which 
ideology and desire collude within the present ideological 
context to produce the powerful individual reaction to 
the stigmatising lapel of "homosexual". 
Hocquenghem's analysis, however, does suggest the 
limitations of the present understanding. He speaks not 
only of the threat of homosexuality, but also of its 
fascination. "The homosexual image contains a complex 
knot of dread and desire •.. Homosexuality expresses 
something - some aspect of desire - which appears nowhere 
else" (p.36). It would be interesting to consider this 
ambivalence in the light of the understanding of homo-
phobia developed here, and vice-versa. This is work 
for which place must be found elsewhere. 
Again, Hocquenghem thinks in terms of the abolition of 
.the Oedipal triangle, the nuclear family. This is a 
much more wide-ranging view than the present one, which 
restricts itself to a non-radically transformed social 
formation. If Hocquenghem's analysis may be seen as 
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valid in terms of the present framework, which 
decision would depend on a careful reading of his 
work so as to synthesize it with the present 
perspective (in the way that this thesis has read 
and·integrated aspects of Lacan and of theory of 
ideology) , his broader view would suggest useful 
developments of the present analysis. It would suggest, 
for example, the extension of the present analysis of 
the finely detailed conjuncture of desire and ideology 
to an account of more radital transformations of society. 
Further, it would suggest a description of the series of 
transformations leading to given radically changed end-
points. The present analysis could then be seen as a 
description of the first few transformations of this series. 
To sum up, then, the comparison of this understanding 
with Hocquenghem's work suggests a place for this analysis 
in accounting for the phenomena which are taken as a 
starting point by other analyses, without having been 
thoroughly analysed themselves •. 
Mieli (1980), too, thinks in terms of a radically trans-
formed social formation, in which the Oedipal complex 
itself is abolished •. Unlike Hocquenghem, however, he 
adopts a classically Freudian rather than Lacanian 
·framework. His work on homophobia cannot, therefore, 
easily be made continuous with the present analysis. 
Mieli's account does nevertheless touch on the present 
one in a number of respects. He too points out that 
"This ideology upholds the 'naturalness' of the present 
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system ••. , absolutising it in an ahistorical manner 
and concealing its underlying transience" (1980, p.114). 
And he, also, is aware of the need of human subjects in 
the present ideology to be consistent objects: "a . 
human being of 'impre:;iSe' sex has a much harder time just 
getting around than does a male person who seems, by all 
external signs, to be a woman, or vice-versa" (p.27). 
And, again, Mieli too comes to the conclusion that, if 
the reaching of acceptance "does not want to confirm 
sexual roles in the very act of negating those on which 
it is itself based, it must present itself as a step 
towards trans-sexuality, i.e. something totally different, 
both from so-called 'normality' and from the dialectical 
opposite of this" (Mieli, 198I, pp.37-38, quoting 
Parinetto). 
But these observations are all used to indicate what 
the gay predicament is, and to contrast the assumptions 
of homophobia with .the true state of affairs, according 
to Mieli's interpretation of Freud and Marx. Their 
potential for explaining homophobia is not exploited. 
Homophobia is explained rather "by the repression of the 
homoerotic component of desire in those individuals who 
are apparently heteros~xual" ,(p.23), and by "the·sense 
of guilt, or the internalisation of the social 
condemnation, which befalls those who do not completely .•• 
identify •.. with the prescribed •.. model of male or female, 
i.e. who do not fit the Norm" (p.49). But the repression 
and sense of guilt at transgressing the norm are taken 
as bottom line points of explanation without being further 
. -234-
analysed themselves. The precise mechanisms by which 
the Norm helps to provoke guilt and repression are not 
considered. Differently put, the process by which a 
social phenomenon (the Norm) has powerful effects at 
the individual level (guilt and repression) is not 
considered. 
Thus, Mieli's work, like Hocquenghem's, rests on phenomena 
analysed and in part accounted for by the present under-
standing. In both cases an unexplained area, a gap, 
between what is observed in the present social formations , 
and the accounts given of it by the two theorists is 
accounted for by the present analysis. 
7.2 The Interactionist Approach 
i) The Interactionist Approach to Homophobia 
The classic interactionist account of homos~xual stigma 
is Plummer's (1975). His work will therefore be taken 
as a basis for the comparison of the present approach 
with interactionism. Accounts of deviance which cohere 
absolutely with Plummer's may, however, be found in the 
work of such seminal interactionist theorists as Becker 
(1973, 1974), Cohen (1973), Gagnon and Simon (1973), and 
Weinberg (1978) . 
As outlined in the Introduction, symbolic interactionism 
starts with three basic premises. These are that 
individuals act according to their perceptions of the 
meanings of events and objects in their worlds; that 
these meanings are developed in interaction with other 
people; and that the perceived meanings may be re-
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negotiated. This, as argued there (section 1.2), 
allows only a limited analysis of the workings of the 
subjects themselves, since they are already assumed to 
exist as beings who interact and perceive meanings. 
These premises, however, also display a programme 
consistent with the present one. "The first (premise) 
directs the student the study the 'inner' side of life, 
to look at meanings" (Plummer, 1975, p.11, insertion 
added). This fits in with our concern with the operation 
of desire and signification. "The second directs him to 
study the emergent and constantly changing nature of 
social life" (ibid.). This is consistent with our concern 
with transformation in terms of investments of desire in 
discourse. "While the third suggests that the individual 
is best constantly studied in conjunction with some 
significant others, or in collective action" (ibid.). 
This, finally, is consistent with our concern to integrate 
a social and individual pole of analysis. This was 
attempted in three ways. Firstly, it was attempted 
within psychoanalysis itself, in accordance with Lacan's 
analysis of the subject in terms of the Other. Secondly, 
it was attempted within the theory of ideology in terms 
of the relation between language and speech. Thirdly, 
it was attempted by developing a synthesis of the two 
theories insofar as they bore on the question at hand. 
The interactionist approach and this one may therefore 
be used in conjunction, if at cost to some interactionist 
statements resulting from the interactionist incapacity 
to analyse the nature of subjectivity. These costs will 
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emerge below. 
As was pointed out in the Introduction, the interactionist 
account has so far produced a programme for research 
rather than a systematic account of homophobia. Nonethe-
less, some exploratory statements on homophobia have 
been made, and these can be usefully examined here. 
Speaking of the interactionist approach to deviancy in 
general, Plummer explains that 
Instead of assuming that deviance leads to 
"reactions" and control, an alternative 
route - that control and reactions lead to 
deviancy - is taken ... This is not to say 
that "reactions" create the behaviour in the 
first place (though on occasions they may 
even do that); it is simply to stress that 
the existence of "reactions" alters the 
nature and shape of those experiences to 
which the label of deviancy becomes attributed 
(1975, p.21). 
This is clearly in line with the present approach to 
homophobia, with its stress on the importance of 
ideological significations. And the assertion of the 
"crucial dimension of self-reaction, by which individuals 
may process themselves as deviant" (ibid., p.22), 
supports the attention given here to psychodynamics. 
Turning to the problem of the interaction between 




"analysts, the task of darting to and fro, 
between a world of 'objective, global 
realities' and a world of 'micro inter-
subjective realities' is indeed a 
formidable one. Nobody has yet accomplished 
such a task, which remains a key problem for 
sociologists ... Their complex interconnection 
will remain a research problem" (ibid., p.48). 
This is one point at which the inability to analyse 
the nature of subjectivity limits the capacity of 
interactionism to make the world intelligible. 
In contrast, Lacan's psychoanalysis allows a formalisation 
of this interaction between individual and general, in 
terms of the Other as the locus of both langue and 
parole. 
The Other is ..• the locus in which is consti-
tuted the I who speaks to him who hears •.• 
But this locus also extends as far into the 
subject as the laws of speech, that is to say, 
well beyond the discourse: that takes its 
orders from the ego (Lacan, 1977a, 141). 
This locus extends well beyond the ego both into the 
·unconscious and into the symbolic structures of the 
social formation. Thus the interactionist programme 
is similar to the present one; but what this present 
-238-
approach provides helps to show where the conceptual 
.equipment brought to the task by interactionism falls 
short of its stated aims. 
The fact that the present approach indicates the 
limitatibns of interactionism with respect to homophobia 
in turn illustrates what was meant earlier by saying 
that theoretical rigour is fundamental in determining 
the extent to which sense may be made of the world. 
And that is part of the place of a theoretical thesis 
such as this. 
When Plummer comes to accounting for the effect of 
homophobia, its mechanisms, he too stresses the role of 
naturality in explaining the homophobic effect in self 
and others. Thus "for any individual of a society, 
there is a tremendous pressure upon him to apprehend 
his reality as if it were inevitable, absolute and 
unchanging ••• a man-made order becomes mystified as a, 
Natural Order" (p.118). And he includes in the "natural 
order" the family, the gender system, and procreative 
sexuality (pp.119-120). This accounts for homophobia, 
in his view, because "the existence of homosexuality 
in this culture does pose a series of threats to the 
prevailing systems of classification about gender, ~mily 
and sexuality" (p.120). Here he supports the present 
emphasis and also adduces additional dimensions of 
naturality for consideration. 
Plummer considers a number of areas which this thesis 
does not. For example, he, discusses in detail how the 
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negative judgement of homosexuality is communicated to 
people, and what factors influence this (p.116 ff.). 
And he considers the implications of a variety of 
particular cases, such as that of male hustlers who do 
not define themseives as homosexuals. The present 
.conceptualisation suggests itself as a further approach 
to analysing these areas. Thus an interactionist 
perspective opens up questions which suggest further 
applications of the present understanding. 
But, in the interactionist approach, the mechanisms by 
which the "threats" presented by homosexuality to the 
natural order has its effects on individuals, and the 
precise meaning of that threat, are not considered. Nor 
can they be further considered within an interactionist 
framework, in view of the lack of a suitable conceptualisation 
of subjectivity. 
Thus, again, the present account serves to analyse and 
elaborate what is assumed by other accounts of homophobia. 
In the case of interactionism, it supplies what could not 
be provided by interactionism itself. Plummer, like most, 
if not all, interactionists, dismisses psychoanalysis on a 
variety of grounds, such. as failure to take personal 
meanings into account and an abuse of the concept of 
sexuality. Many of these criticisms are true of the use 
that has been made of some interpretations of psychoanalysis. 
But the above comparison between the present approach and 
the interactionist one suggests that some understandings of 
psychoanalysis can show the same sensitivity as inter-
actionism to the many levels of human complexity, and, 
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indeed, go beyond it in this respect. 
Other interactionist accounts of homophobia show the 
same deficiencies as Plummer's in relation to this approach, 
and also support it in similar ways to his (e.g. Cass, 
1979; Fein & Nuehring, 1981; Lee, 1977; Coleman; 
Troiden, 1979). The work of other interactionists will 
not be discussed, therefore, in this connection. 
Plummer and other interactionists provide a description 
of the process of acquiring a homosexual identity. 
Some of the stages they discern in this process - the 
"coming out" process - fall under the change from 
abhorrence of homosexuality to acceptance of it, and 
will therefore be discussed in the next section. The 
first couple of stages, however, include homophobic 
feelings, and the descriptions of these stages provide 
some interesting details. 
The first of Plummer's stages (of which there are four) 
he calls "sensitization". This consists in the first 
awareness of potential homosexuality, ''the general 
process of constructing sexual meanings, modifying 
them, and in many cases neutralizing themri (1975, p.135). 
What is of interest to an analysis of homophobia is the 
notion of neutralisation, which covers a variety of 
techniques and processes by which a homosexual inter-
pretation of feelings and behaviours is avoided. One 
of these has already been considered, that is, the 
explaining away of homosexuality as, for example, fear 
of women (Chapter Five, section 5.7). Plummer calls 
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this the providing of "accounts'' (p.140). 
Plummer also lists a number of other techniques or 
processes by which an interpretation of homosexuality 
is neutralised. These include subcultural norms which 
allow certain technically homosexual acts to be 
performed without being interpreted as such. Thus 
Reiss (1973) finds a subculture of male hustlers who 
do not see themselves as homosexual on grounds such as 
that they fellate men only for money. Another neutralising 
factor is the demands of the situation the potentially 
homosexual behaviour occurs in. Thus homosexuality in 
prisons tends not to be interpreted as such, but as a 
substitute for heterosexuality. Another "denial 
technique" (Plummer, 1975, p.82) is counter-reaction (ibid.), 
where the gay person becomes an active moral disapprover of 
gays and gayness. Cass (1979) provides a superbly 
organised account of a greater number of such neutralisation 
techniques and processes. They are mentioned here only to 
indicate what else the present analysis of homophobia can 
potentially account for, and to suggest that a useful 
study could be made of the systematic relation, if any 
exists, between these neutralisation devices and the 
present analysis of the gay predicament. 
Plummer's second stage, "signification'', deals with 
self-abhorrence itself, and has therefore already been 
discussed. The other interactionist researchers on the 
coming out process, cited earlier in this section, offer 
similar accounts to Plummer's, although in more detail. 
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The next section will consider the interactionist 
account of the change from.abhorrence to acceptance. 
ii) The Interactionist Approach to the Change to 
Acceptance 
Plummer's (1975) work is also representative of inter-
actionist thought in the area of the change from 
abhorrence to acceptance of homosexuality. Useful 
elaborations are also provided, however, by other 
interactionists, and their work will be considered 
accordingly in conjunction with his. No work seems to 
have been done on the equivalent of the "coming out" 
process in those who are in contact with others who are 
gay. This comparison is therefore restricted to the 
case of gays themselves. It would be interesting to 
see if research fonfirms the identity claimed in this 
thesis between the homophobic experience in gays and 
in those in contact with them. As matters stand at 
present, this thesis fills a gap in this respect. 
As mentioned in the previous section, Plummer divides 
~he coming out process into four stages. As with the 
stages proposed by other intrractionist re~earchers, 
the experience covered by his earlier stages still 
counts in the present analysis as pre-acceptance. They 
have therefore been considered in the preceding section, 
on homophobia itself. But his third phase, "coming out", 
itself, he defines as "the process by which individuals •.. 
are 'reborn' into the organized aspects of the homo-
sexual community - a process during which they-come to 
define themselves as 'homosexuals'" (1975, p.147). 
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This. involves the rebuilding of an identity and a 
resolution of both the subjective and objective 
problems associated with self-abhorrence and consequent 
isolation (p.148). 
Dank (1971), too, finds the crucial aspect of the 
coming out process to be a self-identification as 
homosexual, "the end of a search for •.• identity" 
(p.190). He finds this identity formation to be 
dependent on the content of the homosexual category 
having been made positive by interaction with self-
accepting homosexuals, and he finds it brings relief 
from tension (pp.190-191). Furthermore, he finds the 
change to be "intimately related to the access of 
knowledge and information concerning homosexuals and 
homosexuality" (p.193) and to the general reversal of 
silence about homosexuality. 
All of these findings are supported by Troiden (1979) 
who, like Plummer, divides the coming out process into 
four stages. His first three stages are the same as 
Plummer's, so that in his analysis of coming out proper, 
he is talking about the same thing as Plummer. Dank, 
too, covers the same phenomena in his investigation of 
coming out. 
These observations support, in detail, the account of 
ideological inversion given in the last chapter. There 
is a change from abhorrence of homosexuality to a 
positive attitude towards it. This is held to occur as 
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a consequence of meeting other homosexuals and 
reversing the injunction to silence on homosexuality. 
And it involves a sense of identity, of consistent self-
hood, a sense of being something. The relation of the 
present conceptualisation to the concept of identity 
will be recurred to in the Conclusion of the thesis. 
These are all descriptive accounts, however. No 
explanation is given of how it is possible for such 
changes to occur, and the details of the processes by 
which the observed contributing factors interrelate 
are not analysed. This is in accordance with the 
inability of interactionism, discussed in the last section, 
to analyse the nature of subjectivity itself. The 
analysis developed in this thesis, therefore, supplies 
here, too, what has not and cannot be provided by 
interactionist accounts of the coming out process. 
Plummer's fourth stage in the coming out process is 
that of "stabilizing homosexuality" (1975, p.150). This 
in fact fits in with the inversion of ideology, which, 
as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, is the form of 
acceptance corresponding to the reaching of acceptance 
discussed immediately above. "Stabilizing homosexuality" 
fits in with the inversion of ideology because it 
involves what Plummer calls "role imprisonment" (p.152). 
In role imprisonment the gay individual finds it easiest 
to see him/herself as defined by his/her homosexuality, 
both because of the rewards of belonging to the gay 
community and because of the homophobic pressures 
exerted by the external world. Troiden (1979) partly 
-245-
conceives his fourth stage of coming out ("commitment") 
in similar terms: "commitment is indicated when homo-
sexuality is adopted as a way of life" (p.370). 
This was given a further level of explanation in the 
last chapter (section 6.4), in the discussion of the 
way the need to be recognised as something consistent 
and positive leads to gay subcultural behaviour, and 
of how reaction to the threat of re-entrapment by the 
dominant ideology leads to greater degrees of stereo-
typical subcultural behaviour. 
But Plummer does make room for the possibility that 
"in the distant future" there may be "a decrease of 
polarization ..• with an accompanying decrease in rigid, 
exclusive forms of sexuality" (p.153). Dank (1971) and 
Troiden (1979) find this already to have occurred in 
some cases. 
This fits in with what has been analysed here as the 
particularisation of naturality. For example, Troiden 
finds time and experience in the gay world to lead to 
"a relative lack of overriding feelings, of distinctness 
(from heterosexuals in general) (ibid., p.j72, insertion 
added). And, to quote one of Dank's (1971) subjects, 
"What's normal for one person is not always normal for 
another" (p.190) ~ Another subject's attitude is 
expressed as follows: "Just because I happen to like 
strawberry ice-cream and they like vanilla, doesn't make 
them right or me right" (ibid.). The former over-riding 
salience of the homosexual aspect of their personalities 
no longer applies. What is "all right" is seen as right 
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for the individual, not for categories of individuals. 
This coheres with the present understanding of the 
inhabitant of the particularised ideology as seeing 
what is natural as natural for the individual alone. 
And that, the de-emphasis of the membership of the 
homosexual category means the reduction of the salience 
of being homosexual, to its being one of many character 
traits of equal importance to it, is also supported by 
the above observations. 
Here, as in the case of the interactionist accounts of 
the inversion of unnaturality, a detailed account of 
processes and mechanisms of change in the subject is 
absent, and is supplied by the present analysis. 
7.3 A Classical Psychoanalytic Approach 
Now that the contribution of the present analysis 
has been more clearly delineated by comparison with 
other approaches, it may be illuminating to compare it 
to an approach which considers the mechanisms of homo-
phobia in gays from a classical psychoanalytic perspective. 
Such an approach is made in a paper by Malyon (1982), on 
"internali~ed homophobia" (p.59). 
Malyon argues that internalised homophobia becomes a 
conscious and unconscious part of the ego, and "as a 
component of the ego, it influences identity formation, 
self-esteem, the elaboration of defenses, patterns of 
cognition, psychological integrity, and object relations" 
(1982, p.60). When homosexual desires become manifest, 
----------- ------ ----
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. they are thus already made "ego alien" by "a socialized 
predisposition which ... militates against their 
integration" (p.60). Malyon goes on to say that the 
primary developmental task of adolescence is identity 
formation (following Erikson, 1963), and that "identity 
develops in an interpersonal context" (p.60). The 
consequence for the homophobic gay person is "an 
interruption .•. of the process of identity formation 
and epigenesis of ego-integrity" (p.61). The resolution 
of the identity problem is seen as a consolidation of 
identity through a restoration of ego development (p.61). 
This description may be seen as closely corresponding to 
the account developed in this thesis. The sense of what 
is natural and hence unnatural (including homosexuality) 
was in effect argued in Chapter Four to influence; identity 
formation and psychological integrity (the subject is 
signified by "I" as natural and hence as an object with 
integrity)i patterns of cognition (the world is 
organised, given meaning, for the subject by language in 
general and ideology in particular);· and the elaboration 
of defenses (unnaturality is denied and repudiated). 
Homosexuality, in our account, too, is clearly "ego 
alien" and its integration is militated against. And 
this is clearly because of the socialized predisposition 
which we analysed as a collusion between the inter-
pel la tion of the subject by ideological discourses 
which signify the world as natural, and a subject's 
desire which constitutes the imaginary ego as an object. 
And the consequence for the homosexual is in our view 
discours·e. 
Malyon is of course dealing with the effects of internal-
ised hpmophobia, so that h~s individualistic framework 
is appropriate to his purposes. But for an account of 
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the mechanisms by which the stigma on homosexuality 
has such a strong effect on individuals, its lack of 
place for an account of the links provided by 
signifying and ideological practice make it a deficient 
analysis in relation to the present one. 
7. 4 Semiotic Approache·s to Deviancy 
The conceptualisation developed in this thesis has 
much in common with semiotic approaches to deviance. 
In addition, its psychoanalytic component serves to 
fill out some aspects of such semiotic accounts. 
Firstly, the entire problematic of the thesis may be 
situated within the implications of the following 
representative statement: 
Any elision, truncation or convergence of 
prevailing linguistic and ideological 
categories can have profoundly disorienting 
effects. These deviations briefly expose 
the arbitrary nature of the codes which 
underly and shape all forms of discourse ... 
Notions concerning the sanctity of language 
are intimately bound up with ideas of 
social order. The limits of acceptable 
linguistic expression are prescribed by a 
number of apparently universal taboos. 
These taboos guarantee the continuing 
"transparency" (the taken-for-grantedness) 
of meaning. 
Predictably, then, violations of the 
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authorized codes through which the s6c~al 
world is organized and experienced have 
considerable power to provoke and to 
disturb (Hebdige, 1979, p.91). 
It is such an approach which allows the kind of 
question asked in this thesis, and the type of answer 
given to it: the question, why does a particular 
categorisation have the emotional effect it does; and 
the answer, because, in part, categories are bound up 
with the organisation and experience of the world. 
The psychoanalytic dimension provides a means of 
explaining the precise mechanisms through which such 
categories operate on the subject. 
A more specific comment on categories is made by Hall 
(1977). He speaks of codes which 
constitute the criss-crossing frames of 
reference, the sedimentations of meaning 
and connotation, which cover the face of 
social life and render it classifiable, 
intelligible, meaningful ... The different 
areas of social life ... appear to be "held 
together" in social intellegibility (sic) 
by this web of preferred meanings. These 
networks are clustered into domains, which 
appear to link, naturally, certain things to 
certain other things, within a context, and 
to exclude others (pp.330-331, insertion added). 
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The homosexual category is one such domain, even to 
the agreement on the assumption of natural links in 
such categories, as in the caie of sexual orientation 
and the gender/sex categories. Again, the application 
of psychoanalytic understanding allows a more detailed 
analysis of how such signifying networks operate on 
the subject, and why they do it with such effect. 
The necessity of analysing the effects of deviance in 
terms of the social formation is justified by Hall in 
similar terms' to those of this thesis. He argues that 
people involuntarily enter conditions which are not 
of their making (ibid., p.320), so that 
the terms through which men "make sense" of 
their world, experience their objective 
situation as a subjective experience, and 
"come to consciousness" of who and what 
they are, are not in their own keeping and 
will not, consequently, transparently 
reflect their situation (ibid., p.320). 
Again, the linking of different levels of analysis, 
in our case the psychoanalytic and the ideological, 
is given a place: 
If •.• this social formation .•• is not to be 
conceptualised as a series of unrelated 
practices, then this relatedness must be 
"thotight" through the different mechanisms 
which connect one with another within the 
"whole" .•• The principle of determinacy ••• 
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.•• must therefore be thought •• as the 
structured sum of the different determina-
tions, the structure of their overall 
effects. Althusser gives to this double 
way of conceiving the "relative autonomy" 
of practices and their "determination in 
the last instance", the term, over-determina-
tion (ibid., p.327). 
The point is also made that the natural, the taken-
for-granted, is disseminated by visibility, so that when 
the unnatural, that which violates the taken-for-granted 
codes, becomes public, it becomes hyper-visible by 
contradicting its inconceivability (Hebdige, pp.101-102). 
Thus the possibility of using the shocking unconventional 
significations to establish a strengthening group identity 
is accounted for by semiotic deviancy theory too. 
The recuperation.of deviant ideologies by dominant ones 
is a topic extensively dealt with in the work on deviance 
under discussion. While it is unfortunately beyond the 
province of this thesis, an analysis of such recuperations 
together with the conceptualisation of alternative 
ideologies developed in the last chapter could be most 
fruitful for both areas of interest. 
7.5 ·suMMARY 
This chapter compared the present approach to a number 
of others. It appears that, in some cases, the details 
of some links within theories of homophobia and its 
resolution, details which have remained unconsidered 
within the theories, are provided by the present account. 
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These details consist in the mechanisms and processes 
by which the social stigmatisation of homosexuality 
come to have an effect of great power on individuals. 
In other cases, the present approach explained or 
accounted for the phenomena which were simply assumed 
by other approaches, or which the other approaches 
lacked the conceptual equipment to attempt to analyse 
further. 
Finally, the present acoount is supported in many 
respects by other accounts and frameworks, while in 




It remain~ to conclude by recalling the place of 
a theoretical thesis, and by summarising the 
contributions this thesis makes and some of the 
future work that could be based on it. 
It is useful· to recall the place and value of a 
theoretical thesis, as this one could be objected 
to on the grounds that it need not necessarily be 
able to account for any given case of homophobia 
and its resolution, since it deals with only one of 
many possible aspects of the phenomena in question. 
This conceptualisation has been developed as a response 
to the specific question of how to conceive the process 
by which the social stigmatisation of homosexuality 
creates such a powerful abhorrence at the level of 
individual feelings in certain cultures. It therefore 
answers a very specific question which is located at a 
high level of generality. Furthermore, the answer 
offered here is specifically tailored to meet the 
requirements of this limited question. It therefore 
involves the development of a synthesis between a 
theory of ideology and Lacanian psychoanalysis. The 
product of this synthesis is a highly abstr~ct frame-
work which is, again, located at a high level of 
generality. The analysis will therefore inevitably 
account for only a few aspects of most of the phenomena 
to which it has application, since it is originally a 
response to so specific a question. It will, however, 
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equally inevitably have at least some bearing on a 
great number of phenomena and questions, since it is 
pitched at a general level. Furthermore, because of 
its specificity of application and origin, it will 
' 
·account in rigorous detail for those aspects that it 
does account for. But even as a conceptualisation of 
the gay predicament itself, it is intended to offer 
only one level of analysis, allowing even in its 
original application for overdetermination. And it 
could have been less limited only at the extensive 
cost of systematic detail and rigour. 
The value of this analysis, then, is in fact dependent 
upon the limitation and specificity· of its application. 
And this is so for additional and far-reaching reasons. 
For the human phenomena which it attempts to deal with 
require by their nature a multitude of levels of 
analysis if they are to be fully accounted for. And 
the mutual and internal theoretical consistency of 
each of the frameworks applied in these analyses can 
bnly be assessed to the degree that the detailed 
implications of each are elaborated. That is to say, 
they can only be used to correct and refine each other 
to this degree. This, then, is another reason why the 
value of this analysis depends on a rigorous elaboration 
within its own limits. 
And this, too, is why the continuities of this analysis 
with other levels of analysis and other frameworks have 
been systematically posited here. For its value lies 
not only in its relevance to the psychological data to 
which it is directly applied, but also in its application 
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to the fields on which it borders, and in its 
reflexive application to all the theoretical frame-
works out of which it derives. For the use of these 
frameworks inevitably develops implications for 
their own consistency and applicability, implications 
which are not necessarily apparent in the.frameworks 
themselves. Some of these implications have been 
hinted at in the course of the thesis, and will be 
recalled shortly. This is the strength of a theoretical 
analysis, given its limitations in fully accounting for 
concrete particular cases. 
This type oi th~sis, then, has a valid place in social 
scientific work. The specific contributions of this 
one will now be summarised. 
The account of homophobia and its resolution given here 
consists firstly in an explanation of how it is 
_possible for a social phenomenon, stigmatisation of 
homosexuality, to have the powerful emotional effect 
that it does at an individual level; and secondly, in 
an elaboration of the details of that effect and of the 
ways in which it is resolved. Thus a formalisation is 
developed of the relation between the apparently 
individual and the apparently social, and that 
formalisation is used to analyse, in detail, homophobia 
and its resolution. 
It should be clear from Chapter Seven that this account 
fills a gap in some preceding analyses of homophobia 
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and of what is involved in gay liberat~on (e.g. that 
of radical psychoanalysis), and answers questions 
which carmot even be asked by yet other approaches 
(e.g. interactionism and classical psychoanalysis). 
This is partly ~ result of the present use of Lacan's 
highly sophisticated analysis of the nature of subjectivity, 
involving as it does an appreciation of the place of the 
Other, the symbolic, in the constitution of a human 
subject. 
But perhaps the most original contributions this thesis 
makes, are the detailed working out of the implications 
of the concept of naturality, and the use of that 
concept as an interface between the province of a 
theory of ideology and the province of Lacanian psycho-
analysis. Thus a contribution has perhaps been made at 
a more general level, to the theory of subjectivity and 
signifying practice as currently practiced by such 
semioticians as Kristeva (1980) and Hall (1974, 1977). 
On a smaller scale again, this thesis may be seen as an 
attempt to recuperate psychoanalysis for gay liberation, 
in·the same way in which Juliet Mitchell (1974) has 
attempted to recuperate it for feminism. 
A number of directions for ·future work based on the 
present work immediately suggest themselves. Firstly, 
and most obviously, psychoanalytic research into 
homophobic experience and the experience of its 
resolution, and sociological/social psychological 
research into the same areas and the area of the 
characteristics and trends of gay subcultures, would 
,~--------------~---~-
considerations as those offered here. 
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It should perhaps be emphasised that the present 
account of homophobia does not aim to replace 
aetiological accounts of homosexuality. It simply 
brings additional considerations to the fore. Thus 
what would be modified in psychoanalytic theory, if 
anything, is not the presence of aetiological 
understandings of homosexuality, but the use that is 
made of them in psychoanalytic theory and practice. 
Such understandings must have a place in psychoanalysis;' 
but that place may have to be differently conceived. 
Thirdly, a contribution may be developed from this 
work to the theory of identity. The comparison in 
Chapter Seven between this conceptualisation of the 
change to acceptance and that of interactionist 
researchers suggested a link between the present account 
of the desire to be a natural object with consistent 
characteristics, such as may be recognised by the Other, 
or, originally by the mother, and the concept of identity. 
The present analysis gives a rigorous definition of 
identity in terms of the characteristics of naturality. 
It also gives a thorough account of the significance of 
such identity for the individual and for the relation. 
of the individual to the social formation. This 
analysis could very possibly be extended to answer some 
of the questions associated with the concept of identity. 
Finally, insofar as the questiori of identity formation 
enters into the process of psychotherapy; and insofar 
as the relation between language and speech, social 
and individual, enters into that _process, this analysis 
may be useful in pursuing aspects of the theory of 
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psychotherapy. In particular, the present use of 
the concepts of naturality and unnaturality may be 
of use, in that the psychotherapeutic situation is 
artificial from the viewpoint of everyday relating, 
and also depends, in one sense, on a denial of 
naturality - for it affirms the historical constitution 
of the subject. Thus the feelings that have been 
analysed here as proper to homophobia may be part of 
the resistance experienced in psychotherapy, and 
could perhaps be usefully analysed in terms of the 
present account. 
This in turn suggests other applications of the present 
use of the natural/unnatural opposition. For example, 
women in jobs which are "naturally" for men only, 
working class people in haute bourgeois situations and 
vice-versa, immigrants to foreign cultures, may all 
experience the feelings analysed here as proper to homo-
phobia (Fein & Nuehring, 1981), in relation to them-
selves and to others, and originating in themselves and 
in others reacting to them. Their feelings and the 
feelings of those in contact with them could then be 
understood in terms of the present analysis, and that 
understanding may then help to do something effective 
about their predicament. It may be mentioned in 
passing that the above mentioned applications of this 
theory to women may have bearing on some of the 
conceptual problems with which Marxist feminist theory 
is beset (Barrett, 1980). 
These, then, are some of the contributions and pot-
ential contributions of this thesis. 
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APPENDIX GLOSSARY OF SOME LACANIAN TERMS 
This glossary of a few of Lacan's more frequently used 
terms is taken from translation notes prepared by the 
translater of Lacan's The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis (1977b), Alan Sheridan, with the assistance 
of Jacques-Alain Miller. The full glossary they provide 
may be found in Lacan, (1977b, p.277ff.). 
DESIRE (desir; Wunsch, Beg~erde, Lust). The Standard 
Edition translates Freud's "Wunsch" as "wish", which 
·corresponds closely to the German word. Freud's French 
translators, however, have always used "desir", rather 
than "voeu", which corresponds to "Wunsch" and "wish", 
but is less widely used in current French. The crucial 
distinction between "Wunsch" and "wish", on the one hand, 
and "desir", on the other, is that the German and English 
words are limited to individual, isolated acts of wishing, 
while the French has the much stronger implication of a 
continuous force. It is this im9lication that Lacan has 
elaborated and olaced at the centre of his psycho-analytic 
theory, which is why I have rendered "desir" by "desire". 
Furthermore, Lacan has linked the concept of "desire" with 
"need" (besoin) and "demand" (demande) in the following way. 
The human individual sets out with a particular organism, 
with certain biological needs, which are satisfied by 
certain objects. What effect does the acquisition of 
language have on these needs? All speech is demand; it 
presupposes the Other to whom it is addressed, whose very 
signifiers it takes over in its formulation. By the same 
token, that which comes from the Other is treated not so 
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much as a particular satisfaction of a need, but rather 
as a response to an appeal, a gift, a token of love. 
There is no adequation between the need and the demand that 
conveys it; indeed, it is the gap between them that 
constitutes desire, at once particular like the first and 
absolute like the second. Desire (fundamentally in the 
singular) is a perpetual effect of symbolic articulation. 
It is not an appetite; it is essentially excentric and 
insatiable. That is why Lacan coordinates it not with 
the object that would seem to satisfy it, but with the 
object that causes it (one is reminded of fetishism). 
IMl'-1-GINAF.Y; SYMBOLIC, REAL ( imaginaire, symbolique, reel) . 
Of these three terms, the "imaginary" was the first to 
appear, well before the Rome Report of 1953. At the time, 
Lacan regarded the "imago" as the proper study of 
psychology and identification as the fundamental psychical 
process. The imaginary was then the world, the register, 
the dimension of images, conscious or unconscious, 
perceived or imagined. In this respect, "imaginary" is 
not simply the opposite of "real"; the image certainly 
belongs to reality and Lacan sought in animal ethology 
facts that brought out formative effects comparable to 
that described in "the mirror stage". 
The notion of the "symbolic" came to the forefront in the 
Rome Reoort. The symbols referred to here are not icons, 
stylized figurations, but signifiers, in the sense 
developed by Saussure and Jakobson, extended into a 
generalized definition: differential elements, in them-
selves without meaning, which acquire value only in their 
mutual relations, and forming a closed order - the question 
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is whether this order ii or is not complete. Henceforth 
it is the symbolic, not the imaginary, that is seen to 
be the determining order of the subject, and its effects 
are radical; the subject, in Lacan's sense, is himself 
an effect of the symbolic. Levi-Strauss's formalization 
of the elementary structures of kinship and its use of 
Jakobson's binarism provided the basis for Lacan's 
conception of the symbolic - a conception, however, that 
goes well beyond its origins. According to Lacan, a 
distinction must be drawn between what belongs in experience 
to the order of the symbolic and what belongs to the 
imaginary. In particular, the relation between the 
subject, on the one hand, and the signifiers, speech, 
language, on the other, is frequently contrasted with the 
imaginary relation, that between the ego and its images. 
In each case, many problems derive from the relations 
between these two dimensions. 
The "real" emerges as a third term, linked to the symbolic 
and the imaginary; it stands for what is neither symbolic 
nor imaginary, and remains foreclosed from the analytic 
experience, which is an experience of speech. What is 
prior to the assumption of the symbolic, the real in its 
"raw" state (in the case of the subject, for instance, 
the organism and its biological needs), may only be 
supposed, it is an algebraic x. This Lacanian concept 
of the "real" is not to be confused with reality, which 
is perfectly knowable; the subject of desire knows no 
more than that, since for it reality is entirely phantasmatic. 
The term "real", which was at first of only minor import-
ance, ~cting as a kind of safety rail, has gradually been 
-264-
developed, and its signification has been considerably 
altered. It began, naturally enough, bi presenting, 
in.relation to symbolic substitutions and imaginary 
variations, a function of constancy: "the real is that 
which always returns to the same place". It then became 
that before which the imaginary faltered, that over which 
the symbolic stumbles, that which is refractory, resistant. 
Hence the formula: "the real is the impossible". It is 
in this sense that the term begins to appear regularly, 
as an adjective, to describe that which is lacking in the 
symbolic order, the ineliminable residue of all 
articulation, the foreclosed element, which may be 
approached, but never grasped; the umbilical cord of 
the symbolic. 
As distinguished by Lacan, these three dimensions are, as 
we say, profoundly heterogeneous. Yet the fact that the 
three terms have been linked together in a series raises 
the question as to what they have in common, a question to 
which Lacan has addressed himself in his most recent 
thinking on the subject of the Borromean knot (Seminaire 
1974-75, entitled "R.S.I"). 
JOUISSANCE (jouissance). There is no adequate translation 
in English of this word. "Enjoyment" conveys the sense, 
contained in jouissance, of enjoyment of rights, of 
property, etc. Unfortunately, in modern English, the 
word has lost the sexual connotations it still retains in 
French. (Jouir is slang for "to come"). "Pleasure", on 
the other hand, is pre-empted by "plaisir" - and Lacan uses 
the two terms quite differently. "Pleasure" obeys the law 
of homeostasis that Freud evokes in Beyond the Pleasure 
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Principle, whereby, throggh discharge, the psyche seeks 
the lowest possible level of tension. "Jouissance" 
transgresses thi~ law and, in that respect, fr is beyond 
the pleasure principle . 
. LACK (manque). · "Manque" is translated here as "lack", 
except in the expression, created by Lacan, "manque-~-etre", 
for which Lacan himself has proposed the English neologism 
"want-to-be". 
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